Europe from the far right: Europe in the ideology of the Front National and Movimento Sociale Italiano/Alleanza Nazionale (1978-2017) by Lorimer, Marta
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPE FROM THE FAR RIGHT 
EUROPE IN THE IDEOLOGY OF THE FRONT NATIONAL AND MOVIMENTO 
SOCIALE ITALIANO/ALLEANZA NAZIONALE (1978-2017) 
 
 
 
Marta Lorimer 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the European Institute of the London School of 
Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, August 2019   
2 
 
Declaration 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London 
School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I 
have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work 
carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, 
provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without 
my prior written consent.  
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the 
rights of any third party. 
 
I declare that my thesis consists of 80,580 words. 
 
 
Statement of use of third party for editorial help 
I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and 
grammar by Dr. Brianna Beck (Chapter 6), Peter Ceretti (Chapter 7), and Dr. Maximillian 
Lemprière (Chapters 1-6).   
3 
 
Abstract 
Born as a small economic union, the European Union has become a large supranational 
political organisation. Far right parties have been vocal critics of this process, leading 
some to consider opposition to European integration as one of their defining ideological 
features. Closer inspection of their position, however, reveals that their views are more 
complex than the label ‘Euroscepticism’ captures. What, then, is the relationship between 
the far right and ‘Europe’? What do they mean by it and how has it become a part of their 
ideology?  
To address these questions, this thesis carries out an in-depth interpretive analysis 
of party documents produced between 1978 and 2017 by the Movimento Sociale 
Italiano/Alleanza Nazionale in Italy and the Front National in France. Employing 
morphological analysis, it studies how these parties integrated Europe into their ideology, 
and how they defined their positions on the European Union.  
The thesis’ core contention is that the MSI/AN and FN repurposed key elements 
of their ideology to integrate Europe into their worldview, thus giving rise to a distinctive 
far right conception of Europe. In particular, it shows how they employed the three 
concepts of Identity, Liberty and Threat to present a distinctive conception of Europe as 
a bounded community, a space of freedom, and an endangered civilisation. It then 
illustrates how these concepts, along with the concept of National Interest, came together 
in the parties’ positioning on the European Union. Through its diachronic focus, the thesis 
highlights how the parties display a strong level of continuity in their conception of 
Europe, using the same concepts to define it throughout the period of the study. These 
findings demonstrate the need to subject the equation of far right ideology and 
Euroscepticism to further scrutiny and acknowledge the complexity of far right thinking 
on Europe.  
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Se mille son le storie che il vento porta via,  
questa è la nostra storia, generazione mia.  
Venuti dall'inferno col fuoco nelle vene innalzeremo al cielo le nostre catene.  
E torneremo Europa... lo promettiamo a te. Europa torneremo uniti per te.  
[If the wind carries away thousands of stories,  
this is our story, my generation.  
Coming from hell with fire in our veins, to the sky we will raise our chains.  
And we’ll be back Europe… We promise it to you. Europe we will reunite for you.] 
- Amici del Vento, Amici del Vento, 1978 
 
Europa Nazione, Terza Via, Solidarietà occidentale.  
[Nation Europe, Third Way, Western solidarity] 
- Movimento Sociale Italiano, Manifesto dell’Eurodestra, 1979 
 
L’Europe sera impériale ou ne sera pas. 
[Europe will be imperial or will not be] 
- Jean-Marie Le Pen, Discours et Interventions, 1985 [1989] 
 
Polen, Grieken en Italianen van de eerste naoorlogse immigratiegolf hebben zich 
zonder grote problemen en zonder hulp van de overheid in onze maatschappij 
ingepast. Niet alleen omdat zij als Europeanen met ons verwant waren, maar omdat 
zij deel uitmaakten van dezelfde overkoepelende Europese beschaving. 
[Poles, Greeks and Italians from the first post-War wave of immigration have 
adapted to our society, without great difficulties and without help from the 
Government. This is not only because they were related to us as Europeans, but 
because they are part of the same overarching European society.] 
- Vlaams Blok, Party Programme, 1999 
 
We are committed to a Europe of peoples and autochthonous groups of people which 
have developed through history, and firmly reject any artificial synchronisation of 
the diverse European languages and cultures by means of forced multiculturalism, 
globalisation and mass immigration. Europe shall not be reduced to a political 
project of the European Union. 
- Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, Party Programme, 2011 
 
I am confident that if we can safeguard freedom of speech and democracy, our 
civilization will be able to survive. Europe will not fall. We, Europe’s patriots, will 
not allow it. 
- Geert Wilders, The Failure of Multiculturalism and How to Turn the Tide, 2011 
 
The European Union has become a prison of peoples. Each of the 28 countries that 
constitute it has slowly lost its democratic prerogatives to commissions and councils 
with no popular mandate. Every nation in the union has had to apply laws it did not 
want for itself. Member nations no longer determine their own budgets. They are 
called upon to open their borders against their will. 
- Marine Le Pen, After Brexit, the People’s Spring Is Inevitable, 2016 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Born as a primarily economic union between six core countries, the European Union1 has 
today expanded to a supranational political organisation encompassing a large majority 
of the European continent. The growth in size and in powers of the EU has not been 
without contestation and, over the years, some of its most fervent opponents have 
gathered significant amounts of electoral support. Far right parties2 have arguably been 
amongst the most vocal critics of the project, leading some commentators to highlight 
‘Europhobia’ as one of their distinguishing features (Marks and Wilson 2000: 457). 
However, if the European Union has undoubtedly been the bête noire of several of these 
parties, it is also worth noting that it has represented an enabling feature in their success, 
providing them with funding, visibility and political capital.  
Importantly, the depiction of the far right as a ‘homogeneous and static 
Eurosceptic bloc’ (Almeida 2010: 244) hides a more complex picture made of ideological 
tensions, variations and U-turns. Furthermore, it fails to acknowledge that ‘Europe’ is not 
limited to the political project of the EU, and that one may well support the former, but 
not the latter. Thus, the opening quotes of this thesis should serve as a reminder that, even 
if today far right parties converge on criticism of the EU, what exactly Europe is, and how 
it should be assessed, has been open to contestation within the party family: it has been 
the subject of songs and political slogans, but also the object of fierce criticism; it has 
 
1 While the European Union did not become ‘Union’ until the Maastricht Treaty, throughout the thesis the 
term ‘EU’ is used to refer both to the pre-Maastricht EEC and the post-Maastricht EU. 
2 While the literature has used a variety of terms to refer to a broadly similar group of parties, including 
radical right (Art 2011, Kitschelt and McGann 1995, Rydgren 2018), extreme right (Hainsworth 2000, 
Harrison and Bruter 2011, Ignazi 2003, Mudde 1996 and 2000, Schain et al. 2002), and variations on 
‘populist radical right’ (Akkerman et al. 2016, Betz 1994, Herman and Muldoon 2019, Mudde 2007, 2017, 
Rydgren 2004), following Vasilopoulou (2018a: 6), I here use ‘far right’ as an umbrella term to encompass 
parties of the radical and extreme right. Based on the definition proposed by the German Federal Office for 
the Protection of the Constitution in the 1970s, parties of the extreme right are defined as those which reject 
the existing constitutional order, while radical right parties are those that while holding radical positions, 
broadly accept the existing democratic order (for more on the distinction, see for example Ignazi 2003: 25-
34). While, where relevant in the analysis, the weight of this distinction will be acknowledged and 
discussed, this thesis considers that the beliefs brought forward by parties of the extreme and radical right 
are sufficiently similar to be discussed and studied together in the context of this research. 
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been reclaimed as a nation and potential empire but also as a ‘prison for its peoples’; it 
has been defined as a shared culture but also as a continent in decline. What, then, is the 
relationship between the far right and Europe, whether this be intended as a distinct 
civilisation or as the specific project of the EU? What do they mean by it, and how has it 
become a part of their ideology and political programmes? 
This thesis seeks to address these questions by focusing specifically on the far 
right’s ideological understanding of Europe. Employing an in-depth interpretive and 
qualitative analysis of party documents produced between 1978 and 2017 by the French 
Front National (FN)3 and the Italian Movimento Sociale Italiano/Alleanza Nazionale 
(MSI/AN), it analyses how Europe is viewed and incorporated in far right ideology. Its 
main aim is to understand what far right parties talk about when they talk about Europe 
and how this informs their positions on the project of European integration (their 
‘ideology of Europe’).  
 
THE ARGUMENT 
The core argument the thesis advances is that the MSI/AN and FN have created a 
distinctively far right conception of Europe by repurposing key elements of their ideology 
to integrate Europe in their worldview and define their positions on the EU. 
The argument is developed in an empirical fashion by showing how the studied 
parties redeployed core concepts of far right ideology to define the meaning of Europe 
and their positions on the European Union. Drawing on Freeden’s morphological 
approach to analyse party documents produced between 1978 and 2017, the thesis focuses 
on how the parties employed the three concepts of Identity, Liberty and Threat to present 
a distinctive conception of Europe as a bounded community, a space of freedom and as 
an endangered civilisation. It then analyses the link between this understanding of Europe 
and the parties’ positions on the EU by illustrating how the concepts of Identity, Liberty 
and Threat, joined by the concept of National Interest, came together in the parties’ 
positioning on the European Union. In addition to teasing out these concepts and their 
meanings, this thesis’ diachronic focus also highlights that the parties have been 
consistent in their use of these notions by illustrating how while they have been defined 
 
3 In 2018, the Front National changed its name to ‘Rassemblement National’. Given that this thesis focuses 
on the period preceding the name change, however, it adopts the old nomenclature. 
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differently across parties and across time they have been constantly present throughout 
the studied period.    
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section reviews the relevant literature 
on the far right and Europe, identifying its key findings and limitations. It ends with the 
formulation of a number of research questions on the topic which remain to be addressed. 
The following section sketches out the key theoretical and methodological tenets of the 
study, as well as its contribution to existing research. The final section presents an outline 
of the remainder of this thesis. 
 
FAR RIGHT PARTIES AND EUROPE: THE RESEARCH 
AGENDA 
The field of study of far right politics is a crowded one. If in the 1980s, Klaus Von Beyme 
(1988) could lament the absence of perspectives on far right parties, these have by now 
become one of the most studied party families in political science and beyond (Arzheimer 
2018, Mudde 2013, 2016; for perspectives from other fields see for example Berezin 
2009, Holmes 2000, Miller-Idriss 2017). Throughout the years, studies have tackled a 
variety of issues including the definition and ideological characteristics of far right parties 
(Carter 2018, Mudde 1996, 2000, 2007, Rydgren 2018), the reasons for their success 
(Amengay and Stockemer 2018, Art 2011, Arzheimer 2009, Caramani and Manucci 
2019, Carter 2005, Kitschelt and McGann 1995, Morrow and Meadowcroft 2018, Norris 
2005; see Eatwell 2003 for a review), and their impact on democratic polities and other 
parties (Abou-Chadi and Krause 2018, Eatwell and Mudde 2004, Herman and Muldoon 
2019, Minkenberg 2001, Schain et al. 2002).  
With the exception of their positions on immigration, comparatively less attention 
has been dedicated to mapping out far right positions on specific issues (although see 
Schori Liang 2007, Olsen 1999); however, in recent years there has been growing interest 
in studying the far right’s positions on the EU. While the issue was conspicuously absent 
(or barely mentioned) in early seminal monographs on the far right (e.g., Betz 1994, 
Kitschelt and McGann 1995, Norris 2005), following the growth of Euroscepticism and 
the EU’s multiple crises, it has acquired more prominence in recent works (e.g., Mudde 
2007, Rydgren 2018). This has also been driven by the fact that Euroscepticism has 
increasingly imposed itself as a shared feature of the party family (Marks and Wilson 
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2000: 457; Gómez-Reino 2018: 63-64), and a ‘natural’ one given the far right’s 
oppositional role (Taggart 1998, Williams 2013, Sitter 2001) and its nationalist ideology 
(Marks and Wilson 2000, Hooghe et al. 2002, Halikiopoulou et al. 2012).  
While there are few works dedicated specifically to the relationship between far 
right parties and Europe, and even less where a sustained analysis of that relationship is 
central (for notable book-length exceptions, see Polyakova 2015 and Vasilopoulou 
2018a), it is nonetheless possible to distinguish three different strands in this growing 
body of research: first, an historical-interpretive strand; second, a comparative politics 
strand; and third, a ‘Europeanisation’ strand. This thesis will focus primarily on the first 
two strands; however, its findings may also contribute to the third strand.  
The first strand of literature is the oldest of the three and consists primarily of 
works seeking to understand both the historical roots of the relationship between the far 
right and Europe, and the conception of Europe in the far right. It stresses that the idea of 
Europe has a long pedigree in far right thinking and teases out the complexities and 
contradictions involved in its definition. This literature is also mindful of the fact that 
Europe cannot be reduced to the political body of the EU, leading it to study Europe in 
its larger sense of continent and civilisation. 
The study of the far right’s historical relationship with Europe has attracted some 
attention from historians in particular. Griffin (1994), for example, provided an overview 
of how Europe has been interpreted in the fascist tradition and in the post-war far right 
milieus. Setting out to explore how ‘Europe can be mythically created in the mind of the 
beholder’ and citing prominent post-war far right figures such as Bardèche, Evola, 
Mosley and Thiriart, he shows that inter-war fascism presented a pan-European face 
which sought to overcome national boundaries to put a halt to the decadence of Europe. 
This pan-Europeanism survived in many post-war far right circles, demonstrating both 
the relevance of the idea of Europe for the far right as well as the fact that nationalism 
and transnationalism are not necessarily antithetical forces (on this, see also Gosewinkel 
2018). Mammone (2011, 2015) further expanded these points by investigating the 
transnational history of post-war far right parties in France and Italy, highlighting the 
importance of ideas of Europe in their collaboration. Meanwhile, Tamir Bar-On (2008, 
2011) discussed more thoroughly the fascist lineage and persistence of pan-Europeanism 
in the intellectual circles of the French Nouvelle Droite. 
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While some attention has been dedicated to the historical positions of the far right 
on Europe, the main focus of this first strand of literature has been the analysis of the 
content of far right positions on European integration and Europe more broadly. Usually 
as part of larger monographs on the far right (Hainsworth 2008, Mudde 2007) or on 
political parties in the EU (Fieschi et al. 1996, Startin 2018), this literature stresses the 
parties’ opposition to the process of European integration, but also the complexities 
involved in their positions on Europe. On the first point, Hainsworth (2008: 82), for 
example, argues that far right parties view European integration as ‘an encroaching, 
bureaucratic and elitist phenomenon’ which undermines ‘constructs and values, such as 
the nation-state, national identity, state sovereignty, deeply embedded roots and national 
belonging’. Adding a layer of complexity to these accounts, however, some authors have 
shown that the far right’s view of Europe has been dominated by a series of contradictions 
and ambiguities which are lost in definitions of them as ‘Eurosceptics’. In fact, while 
there is a tendency to present the far right as a single anti-EU bloc, this view is misleading 
because it conflates views of Europe and views of the EU, and fails to acknowledge that 
far right parties have converged on anti-EU positions rather than started from them.  
The ambiguities involved in the far right’s view of Europe have attracted the 
attention of scholars since the early 1990s, when they became most evident in the form 
of an opposition between ‘Europe’ and ‘the EU’. One of the first works to note this 
distinction in far right thinking between Europe and the EU was Duranton-Crabol’s 
(1991) French language monograph dedicated to analysing the cultural identity of the far 
right. In it, she argued that the far right’s positions on Europe were dominated by two 
tendencies: on one hand, they opposed the EU because it led to the retreat of traditional 
identities; on the other, they espoused a marked Europeanism as a form of ‘national 
identity transposed to the level of the peoples of Europe’ (1991: 34). In a study on the 
positions of the Front National, Alain Bihr (1993) made a similar point, stressing how 
Europe was both a ‘menaced identity’ and a ‘menacing identity’. As he put it, the FN’s 
view of Europe was deeply ambivalent as they saw it as both a ‘complementary identity’ 
which ‘extended and reinforced’ the national identity, but also as a ‘competing, even 
contradictory identity’ which worked as a deterrent (1993: 61-62). Perhaps most clearly, 
Fieschi et al. (1996) have presented this as an opposition between an idealised Europe 
and the realities of European integration. In particular, they argued that Europe presented 
a conundrum for far right parties because, on the one hand, they felt the need to unite in 
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front of an external threat; on the other, they needed to reconcile this with the 'natural' 
national sentiment. This translated into a discourse which appealed to an abstract 
European civilisation, but also presented a stark opposition to the reality of European 
integration and the sacrifices it demanded in terms of sovereignty. This ambivalence 
remains today, with far right parties claiming an attachment to Europe as a civilisation, 
but also opposing vividly the European Union as a concrete body and justifying this on 
grounds of attachment to Europe (Adamson and Johns 2008, Brubaker 2017, Glencross 
2019; see also Brown 2019, and Wodak and Boukala 2015 on how far right actors can 
use this bond as a tool of exclusion).  
In addition to being ambivalent in their assessment of Europe, it is also important 
to note that far right parties have not always been anti-EU. This point is highlighted by 
Cas Mudde (2007) amongst others. In his study on the far right in Europe, he stressed that 
many far right parties started off from pro-EU positions but changed following the end of 
the Cold War and the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (2007: 182). Almeida (2010: 241-
244) thus suggested that seeing them as a ‘static’, Eurosceptic bloc ignored the fact that, 
in the past, the European Union acted as a counterweight to the Soviet Union in far right 
thinking. While attachment to the European project was never unqualified, as it was often 
seen as being either too influenced by the United States or in need of some kind of reform 
(for example to reduce the ‘democratic deficit’), ‘hard’ Euroscepticism was not a 
dominant feature until the 1990s (on the distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
Euroscepticism, see Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b: 2).  
In the context of parties whose nationalist or ‘nativist’ ideology (Minkenberg 
2003: 151, Eatwell 2000: 412-413, Mudde 2007: 19, Harrison and Bruter 2011; the tenets 
of far right ideology will be further discussed in the next chapter) would appear to 
predispose them negatively towards a transnational concept, this interpretive strand has 
the merit of highlighting that the relationship between the far right and Europe is 
complicated and scattered with ambiguities. In focusing primarily on understanding what 
parties had to say about Europe, however, this strand has dedicated less attention to the 
development of theoretical accounts that could help explain such positions and the 
ambiguities involved in them. Addressing this limitation has been one of the objectives 
of the second strand of literature which, grounding itself in comparative politics, has 
sought to build theories concerning far right positioning on European integration.  
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At the heart of the second strand of literature on far right parties and the EU is the 
question ‘how can far right Euroscepticism be explained?’ Drawing on a wider body of 
work dedicated to explaining how political parties and voters position themselves on the 
issue of European integration (e.g., De Vries 2018, Hooghe et al. 2002, Kopecky and 
Mudde 2002, Leconte 2010, Leruth et al. 2018, Marks and Wilson 2000, McLaren 2002, 
Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a, 2008b, Taggart 1998), it seeks to account for how far right 
parties came to oppose the European Union. Compared with the first strand of literature, 
this strand is narrower in scope as it centres exclusively on positions on the EU, and its 
focus is explanatory rather than exploratory.  
Research on far right Euroscepticism mainly draws on two types of explanations: 
one which is rooted in the parties’ system of beliefs, and the other on the parties’ strategic 
considerations and political opportunity structures. These explanations need not be seen 
as antithetical but, rather, as mutually reinforcing (De Vries and Edwards 2009: 19, 
Gómez-Reino and Llamazares 2013: 794) or determining different aspects of a party’s 
opposition to EU integration (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b: 13-14).  
The first set of explanations conceptualises political parties as actors limited in 
their political choices by forms of ‘bounded rationality’ (Marks and Wilson 2000: 433-
434). Following this logic, the positions they hold on new issues are expected to be 
‘framed within the available stock of ideas, although they may incrementally recast such 
ideas’ (Kitschelt 1994: 265). As a result, their positions on European integration are 
expected to be determined by previously held ideological beliefs, often measured in terms 
of Left/Right positioning (Aspinwall 2002) or placement on the GAL/TAN axis (Hooghe 
et al. 2002). For far right parties, this leads to an expectation that they will oppose 
European integration because of the central role occupied by the nation in their ideology. 
This is well captured by Hooghe et al.’s (2002: 976-978) assertion that far right parties 
‘react against a series of perceived threats to the national community. […] European 
integration combines several of these threats and poses one more: it undermines national 
sovereignty’. Gómez-Reino (2018: viii) stresses a similar point when she claims that 
nationalist parties’ position on European integration are shaped by their position on key 
territorial and cultural cleavages. Stressing the malleability of nationalism by looking at 
both far right parties and minority nationalist parties, she suggests that the far right’s 
combination of the defence of the state and ethnocentric exclusionary policies shapes its 
views against EU integration (2017: 63). While she notes that in earlier years, there was 
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a tension between a cultural vision of Europe which led them to pro-integration positions 
and issues of political sovereignty which led them to favour a confederal model of 
association, their positions on European integration have become increasingly critical and 
based precisely on issues of national sovereignty. Drawing on nationalism as an 
explanation for far right Euroscepticism, Halikiopoulou et al. (2012: 510) also stress that 
far right parties oppose the EU as a body that threatens the ‘autonomy, unity and identity 
of the nation’. In particular, they claim that radical right parties primarily oppose the EU 
on ethnic grounds, seeing its heterogeneous nature as a ‘threat to the nation's cultural 
homogeneity’ (2012: 508).  
The second set of explanations focuses more on parties as actors taking part in 
electoral competition and, hence, guided by strategic calculations. Instead of focusing on 
how parties’ ideas shape their positions on European integration, these explanations focus 
on how their position within the domestic political system and their electoral objectives 
provide them with strategic incentives to support or oppose the EU. Thus, they shift 
attention from long-term factors to more short-term issues such as domestic constraints 
and the structure of political competition at the national level. Taggart (1998: 382), for 
example, defines Euroscepticism as a ‘touchstone of dissent’ and argues that marginal 
political parties (including far right ones) can use their positions on the EU to differentiate 
themselves from established political actors and gain attention. In a similar vein, Sitter 
(2001) claims that opposition to the EU is primarily driven by the politics of government 
and opposition. De Vries and Edwards (2009) discuss this with respect to far right parties, 
arguing that these parties can benefit from opposition to the EU by presenting themselves 
as the only actors that defend the nation from it (see also Kriesi et al. 2006). Almeida 
(2010: 141) stresses this point further, suggesting that far right Euroscepticism is part of 
a strategy to differentiate themselves from mainstream parties and ‘sustain a role as 
tribunes against the “political establishment”’, as well as a way to reframe programmatic 
commitments such as opposition to immigration and the critique of the domestic and 
international elites (2010: 243). In the most detailed study of far right Euroscepticism to 
date, Vasilopoulou (2018a) makes strategic claims central to her analysis. While 
acknowledging the role of ideology in determining the type of Euroscepticism brought 
forward by the parties (see also Vasilopoulou 2011: 226), she argues that far right parties 
perform a balancing act between interest representation, electoral politics and party 
competition in defining their positions on the EU. Thus, she shows that depending on 
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their strategic goals and position within the electoral system, they will adopt different 
levels of Euroscepticism. Far right Euroscepticism, then, may be viewed not only as an 
ideological phenomenon, but also as the result of the strategic calculations of the far right.  
Compared with the first strand, this second strand of literature has the merit of 
bridging literature on Euroscepticism and work on the far right and offer a theoretical 
account of the link between the two. However, it also suffers from a number of 
shortcomings which limit its ability to develop a complete picture of the far right’s 
relationship with Europe. Theoretically, by focusing more on outcome than on process, 
the ideological accounts in particular remain rather scant on the development of the link 
between far right ideology and opposition to European integration. The previously cited 
Hooghe et al. (2002: 976-977), for example, only dedicate a few lines to explaining the 
theoretical rationale behind far right opposition to European integration. This means that 
while they are able to establish a connection between far right ideology and 
Euroscepticism, the steps leading from one to the other are left unexplored. Even in cases 
when theorisation has been more central, existing studies have been limited in terms of 
the materials used, focusing particularly on party manifestoes which, it has been argued 
elsewhere, do not fully capture party ideology (e.g., Mudde 2000: 21-22) or the nuances 
involved in it (Flood and Soborski 2018: 37-38). Halikiopoulou et al. (2012), for example, 
develop a persuasive theoretical account to explain the link between Euroscepticism and 
far right nationalism. However, their reliance on a quantitative analysis of Euromanifesto 
data and their exclusive focus on opposition to the EU also means that the ambiguities 
involved in the far right’s positioning on Europe teased out in the first body of literature 
go mostly unnoticed and unexplained. In short, while these accounts have some merits, 
they can only tell part of the (ideological) story about the relationship between the far 
right and Europe. 
Perhaps most noticeably, both the accounts from the first and the second strand of 
literature suffer from a limited theorisation of ‘ideology’. In fact, many of these works 
have tended to limit themselves to describing the tensions provoked by Europe or to 
relating these to previously held beliefs, without relating this more deeply to how 
ideologies work. While this is a common issue with studies of ideologies that tend to 
focus more on the effects of ideology rather than on their structure (see Freeden 1998a: 
48 and chapter two of this thesis), it means that we have a limited understanding of how 
Europe fits within far right ideology, how far right parties came to view it in a certain 
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way and why conflicts arose in their understanding of Europe. In other words, we do not 
know whether there is a method to their ideological view of Europe, implying that the 
meaning of Europe and positions expressed on the EU ‘make sense’ within the parties’ 
system of belief and are integrated in it. Although one might claim that this is 
unproblematic, the fact that these parties professed to be attached to Europe, and were 
initially in favour of European integration before turning against it, does at least warrant 
the question of how the same ideology could lead to different outcomes, or, if one does 
not accept the idea that parties are somehow bound by ideology, how this strategic choice 
could be justified in such a way that they still appeared to be motivated by certain 
principles.  
Altogether, this suggests the need to further scrutinize the place of Europe in far right 
ideology, by refocusing our attention to the processes by which Europe has become a part of it. It 
also requires studying not just positions on European integration, but on Europe more broadly, so 
as to be able to capture the differences between the two. Europe is not limited to the political 
project of the European Union. In regard to the far right, it was previously noted that they consider 
Europe to be something beyond the EU. Europe, in their view, is a specific civilisation, 
characterised by a shared culture. This distinction is not one that has been made exclusively by 
them; there is a rich body of literature that seeks to understand how one might define ‘Europe’ 
and the ‘Europeans’ (e.g. Pagden 2002, Davies 1996, den Boer et al. 1995). Even joining the 
European Union requires that a prospective member state persuade the others of its 
‘Europeanness’ and, as the case of Turkey shows, the question is not merely of a geographical 
nature but touches upon larger cultural questions. In short, because Europe is a ‘protean’ (Pagden 
2002) and extremely ‘malleable’ concept (Flood 2002: 7), knowing what far right parties feel 
about European integration may tell us very little about what they think about Europe more 
broadly, and how they can use this malleability to their advantage. Thus, when studying their 
understanding of Europe, it is pertinent to look at not only what they have to say about the EU, 
but also how this relates to the concept of Europe that preceded it. This entails looking at 
references to Europe as a geographical space and understanding its boundaries, as well as 
analysing what the parties think unifies Europe and Europeans and makes them culturally distinct 
from other peoples. 
The discussion so far has centred on two strands of literature focusing primarily 
on what far right parties had to say about Europe (and why they said it); however, it is 
important to note the existence of a third strand of literature on the far right and Europe 
that looks into what the parties did and did not do when it came to being a part of the 
EU’s institutions, and what they gained from this belonging. Shifting the gaze from party 
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positions on Europe and the EU to party engagement with the EU, this third strand of 
studies on far right parties and Europe focuses on their behaviour within the European 
institutions, as well as the practical and symbolic advantages they gained from this 
activity. In this sense, it concerns the ‘Europeanisation’ of the far right because it studies 
how the process of European integration has affected and changed them (on the concept 
of Europeanisation and how it may be applied to political parties, see for example 
Almeida 2012, Hertner 2018, Hix and Lord 1997, Ladrech 2002, Mair 2000, Poguntke et 
al. 2007).  
Within this body of literature, it has often been noted that the EU has provided far 
right parties with a number of ideational and strategic resources which have helped them 
establish themselves in the political system. Fieschi (2000: 521) summarised this most 
clearly when she argued that, ‘in spite of their anti-Europeanism, these parties have gained 
enormously from the solemnity, ritual and political symbolism of the European arena and 
from the credibility derived through seats in the European Parliament (EP)’. More 
recently, Polyakova (2015) went even further, arguing that the persistence of nationalism 
and the success of the far right could be read as an unintended consequence of and a direct 
response to the process of European economic integration. In other words, it appears that, 
while they have been critical of the process itself, far right parties have also been 
beneficiaries of it. 
In terms of the advantages that far right parties have gained from the process of 
European integration, it is worth noting a few. First, the European Union has provided 
many of them with elected office. In fact, while historically far right parties have often 
struggled to gain representation at the national level, the ‘second order’ nature of EU 
elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980, Marsh 1998, Hix and Marsh 2011), coupled with a 
proportional electoral system, has made it easier for them to win seats in the European 
Parliament than in their national parliaments (Hainsworth 2008: 83, Almeida 2010: 243-
244, Reungoat 2018). This has come with a number of practical advantages because, as 
Norris (2005: 255-256) stressed, winning seats allowed far right parties to gain 
‘legitimacy, resources and patronage’ which could then be used to consolidate their 
results. Second, by participating in European elections and gaining elected office, far right 
parties have also been able to share their ideas more widely and voice their concerns in 
an additional arena. This has given them more visibility and influence on the policy 
agenda (Schulte-Cloos 2018). Third, the rise in salience of European integration, in 
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conjunction with the parties’ ability to establish a level of ‘ownership’ of it (Petrocik 
1996, Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009, Vasilopoulou 2011) has also offered them an 
opportunity to reinforce the electoral link with their voters and gain new votes by covering 
positions on integration previously ignored by the mainstream (Gómez-Reino 2018: 77, 
Gómez-Reino and Llamazares 2013, Werts et al. 2012; although see also McDonnell and 
Werner 2018 on the limitations of far right party-voter linkages on the EU issues). In a 
study of the Front National, Reungoat (2014) illustrated these dynamics by showing how 
the EU provided the party with both practical and symbolic resources that helped it 
survive and grow. In practical terms, she argues that the EU gave the FN and its MEPs 
the financial means and institutional framework to gain in political experience and 
dedicate themselves fully to the profession of politicians. In symbolic terms, Reungoat 
suggests that, internally, successes in the European arena could be sold to the party 
membership as a demonstration of the success of the party’s ideas; externally, on the other 
hand, the EP mandates represented symbols of external legitimation and allowed the party 
to appear less isolated, especially through alliance with likeminded parties abroad (2014: 
133-136). 
Far right parties have not only been passive beneficiaries of the process of 
European integration, but have also actively sought to ‘use’ it to their own advantage (on 
the notion of ‘usage’ see Woll and Jacquot 2010). This has been already apparent in the 
‘strategic’ accounts of far right opposition to European integration, but has been shown 
even more clearly in the study of the transnational practices of the far right (e.g., Caiani 
2018, Zuquete 2015: 74-78), with authors such as Startin (2010, 2018), and McDonnell 
and Werner (2017, 2019) arguing that far right parties strategically used transnational 
collaboration as a legitimacy-enhancing tool. Startin (2010: 439), for example, 
highlighted how the creation of the short-lived Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty Group 
in the European Parliament was guided by the belief that collaboration at the EU level 
would represent ‘a clear and transparent confirmation that their parties are able to play by 
the existing rules of the game within a clear democratic framework, thus allowing them 
to negate some of the accusations of a broadly hostile media and political class about the 
group’s lack of democratic integrity’. In a similar vein, McDonnell and Werner (2017) 
have shown how concerns about legitimacy and respectability at the national level helped 
explain why and with whom far right parties decided to collaborate in the European 
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Parliament. This suggests that the parties have been well aware of the opportunities 
offered by European integration and have been willing to use them to their advantage. 
While this body of literature does not represent the central focus of this thesis, an 
in-depth analysis of the relationship between the far right and Europe can offer some 
insights into how taking part in the process of European integration has shaped far right 
ideology. In this sense, it may be able to show how ‘Europeanised’ far right ideology has 
become and indicate the adaptations that European integration has led to. As the 
conclusion will suggest, in the future this may form the basis for work that concerns how 
far right parties have benefitted from holding certain positions on European integration. 
 Summing up, the far right’s view of Europe is not as straightforward as one might 
expect. Its puzzling features include: positions of support for Europe that seemingly 
contradict the centrality of the nation in their ideology, and appear as radically different 
compared to the positions they hold on the European Union; changes in their positions on 
Europe which led them from support for forms of European integration as a protective 
mechanism, to rejection of it as a destructive one; and a tendency to benefit from a process 
that they explicitly reject. With this in mind, this thesis proposes to study the far right’s 
understanding of Europe and positions on the EU (in short, its ‘ideology of Europe’) so 
as to understand its nature and contents, and disentangle its complexities. This entails 
answering two questions: 
1. How have far right parties viewed Europe through 
ideological lenses and how have they incorporated it in their 
system of beliefs? 
2. How has their ideology informed their positions on the 
European Union? 
These two questions guide the rest of this thesis, with the objective of understanding what 
far right parties talk about when they talk about Europe and how this informs their 
positions on the EU. 
Beyond the intrinsic value of seeking to understand a complex and somewhat 
puzzling phenomenon, there are three good reasons why these questions are worth 
investigating in more depth. First of all, one might cite the ‘gap in the literature’ argument. 
In particular, the earlier section pointed towards a partially answered question within the 
systematic investigation of the far right’s understanding of Europe and positions on the 
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EU. A study analysing how ideology plays into the emergence of a certain idea of Europe 
can thus add depth to existing work on the relationship between the far right and Europe.  
Second, this study of the far right’s relationship with Europe may be looked at as 
a ‘heuristic device’, allowing one to observe broader tendencies within far right ideology. 
In particular, we may look at this study as one focusing on an instance of ideological 
change and how parties deal with it. It can provide us with a sense of how they integrate 
new issues, and the extent to which in this context ideological consistency appears to be 
of value to them. It may also advance a reflection on how this integration of new issues 
pushes the boundaries of an ideology and shapes it as a result. This last point is 
particularly interesting given the transnational nature of Europe and the tensions it is 
therefore likely to generate in parties that value the nation above all things.  
Finally, a study of this kind presents a starting point for a broader reflection on the 
future of the EU. At a time where far right parties are a growing force and increasingly 
normal feature of the European Parliament, it is as important as ever to understand how 
they think and have thought about Europe. Their presence in the institutions is likely to 
shape them from the inside, and their political relevance in electoral contests across 
Europe can significantly impact the way citizens approach the European project. Studying 
the far right’s vision of Europe, this thesis will hopefully be able to give a keen sense of 
some of the challenges that lie ahead of the Union in the coming years. 
 
THE FAR RIGHT’S IDEOLOGY OF EUROPE: THE 
APPROACH 
Building on previous literature, and keeping its shortcomings in mind, this study is built around 
two central tenets: first, it grounds the study of far right positions on Europe in the literature of 
political ideologies; and second, it proceeds to an in-depth empirical investigation of the far right’s 
ideology of Europe by focusing on two case studies: the Movimento Sociale Italiano/Alleanza 
Nazionale (Italian Social Movement/National Alliance, MSI/AN) in Italy and the Front National 
(National Front, FN) in France.  
In order to investigate how Europe is understood through far right ideological lenses and 
capture the process by which it becomes a part of their ideology, this thesis draws on Michael 
Freeden’s morphological approach (1998a), which considers that ideologies are best thought of 
as constellations of mutually-decontesting concepts. Political concepts, in this view, do not have 
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fixed meanings, but rather acquire different meanings (are ‘decontested’) in relation to one 
another. Following this view, this thesis breaks down the far right’s ideology of Europe into its 
component concepts by looking at what else the studied parties talk about when they talk about 
Europe. It then analyses the way in which these parties defined the meaning of Europe through 
these concepts and how this shaped their understanding of the process of European integration as 
a whole.  
 The second tenet of this study is an empirical analysis of the far right’s ideology of 
Europe. This thesis opts for an in-depth interpretive and qualitative analysis of party documents 
produced by two far right parties: the French Front National (FN), and the Italian Movimento 
Sociale Italiano (MSI) and its successor party, Alleanza Nazionale (AN). To study the parties’ 
ideology, the research looks at party documents produced by the MSI/AN and FN between 1978 
and 2017. The chosen starting date is shortly before the first EP election, at which time it is 
expected that the parties would start discussing Europe more prominently. Although, where 
necessary, this thesis also includes references to previous documents. The documents were 
collected through archival, internet and library research, which yielded a corpus of 397 documents 
(175 for the MSI/AN and 222 for the FN) comprising manifestoes, party congress documents, 
party newspaper and magazine articles, speeches and interviews. The documents are analysed by 
means of manual concept coding, a form of qualitative coding aimed at identifying the general 
ideas behind the data (Saldaña 2016: 119-220), and close textual interpretation in order to 
reconstruct the meaning of Europe in far right ideology.     
One last point concerning the way in which the parties’ documents are approached 
is worth mentioning. In line with the interpretive commitment to understand ‘how humans 
conceive of their worlds, the language they use to describe them and other elements 
constituting that social world’ (Schwartz Shea and Yanow 2012: 52), this thesis seeks to 
understand far right parties in their own words and interpret them as much as possible 
according to their own logic. Thus, unlike some more critical approaches to the study of 
the far right (e.g., Wodak and Richardson 2012, Wodak 2013), it does not purport to 
assess the ‘correctness’ of the statements brought forward by parties or try to ‘unmask’ 
their agenda, but merely traces the logics they employ and studies the views they adopt 
with the aim of digging deeper into their understanding of the political world. It considers 
that there is value in understanding parties, even unsavoury ones, in their own words, as 
this may help understand why a sympathetic reader might find them attractive. While this 
does not entail subscribing to that world view or taking all they say at face value, it does 
mean taking them seriously and seeking to understand how they would want to be thought 
of and, most likely, how many of those who do follow them see them. 
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THE CONTRIBUTION 
In studying the far right’s ideology of Europe, this thesis makes four substantive 
contributions. Empirically, it analyses a corpus of mostly unstudied primary sources. This 
is particularly true for the Italian case, where very little work has been done on analysing 
the ideology of the parties starting from primary sources (for exceptions, see Griffin 1996, 
Ignazi 1989 and 1998, Tarchi 2003). Even for the French case, where more studies have 
focused on the Front National’s ideology (most recently Alduy and Wahnich 2015, 
Davies 1999, Dézé 2008, Reungoat 2015), Europe has represented a marginal, rather than 
central, focus of the analysis.  
Methodologically, taking up Flood and Soborski’s (2018: 38) invitation to give 
‘proper attention’ to the study of ideology in works on Euroscepticism, it studies far right 
positions on Europe through an in-depth interpretive and qualitative analysis over a long 
time span. In a field where comparative quantitative research based on expert surveys and 
analysis of manifesto data dominates (Mudde 2012: 197-198, Vasilopoulou 2018c: 26-
31), this thesis presents a novel approach that not only draws on a wider body of sources 
than most studies on far right Euroscepticism (and is hence more likely to be reflective of 
‘ideology’), but also captures how parties responded to changes in the EU itself. As such, 
while the scope of analysis remains limited to two parties, the findings complement 
existing studies on far right Euroscepticism by providing them qualitative depth and an 
historical perspective. In addition, by viewing ‘Europe’ more broadly, it enhances our 
understanding of how ideas of Europe differ from, but also interact with, understandings 
of the EU.  
In theoretical terms, this thesis bridges the gap between studies on ideology and 
research on far right parties’ positions on Europe. Adopting a morphological approach, it 
suggests a way to conceptualise far right ideology and study how new issues such as 
Europe are integrated in it. This account is then developed by looking into how the 
MSI/AN and FN integrated Europe in their ideology. This makes it possible not only to 
establish a relationship between far right ideology and holding a certain idea of Europe, 
but also to observe the process leading from one to the other and understand which 
elements in the MSI/AN and FN’s ideology mattered the most to their understanding of 
Europe.  
27 
 
Finally, and most importantly, this thesis’ key finding – namely, that the MSI/AN 
and FN drew on existing concepts in their ideology to define their positions on Europe 
and the EU – complement, qualify and adds to existing knowledge on the far right. 
Beyond positing a link between far right ideology and opposition to European integration, 
it shows how ideology mattered in the far right’s understanding of Europe and why the 
link between far right nationalism and Euroscepticism is less straightforward than one 
might think. It also highlights that, even when the parties changed positions on European 
integration, they remained deeply consistent in terms of the concepts they used to explain 
those positions. As a result, the thesis leads one to reconsider some assumptions both 
about far right parties, and about the link between their ideology and their views on 
Europe. 
 
PLAN OF THE THESIS 
The following chapters are organised as follows. Chapter two presents the conceptual and 
methodological tenets of this study. The opening section of the chapter briefly introduces 
the field of ideology studies and explains how Michael Freeden’s morphological 
approach informs the present study. Following this introductory section, the second part 
of the chapter develops two expectations in response to this thesis’ research questions: 
first, that far right parties will employ central concepts in their ideology to define the 
meaning of Europe; second, that they will do the same when determining their positions 
on the European Union. The final part of the chapter outlines the research design of the 
study, presenting this thesis’ empirical strategy. 
Chapters three to six constitute the bulk of the empirical part of the research and 
are arranged thematically around the concepts and discourses forming the far right’s 
ideology of Europe. Chapter three examines how the MSI/AN and FN employed the 
concept of Identity to define Europe, arguing that its use led to an ‘opening’ of the parties’ 
ideology. Presenting the concept of Identity as a key ‘boundary-building’ feature of 
nationalism which creates in- and out-groups, the chapter shows that the studied parties 
used it to define Europe and the Europeans as a distinct civilisation with clear boundaries 
separating it from foreign ‘Others’. It also shows how the MSI/AN and FN claimed to 
belong to this civilisation, implying a positive relationship between their national and 
European belonging. The chapter concludes by illustrating how the use of the concept of 
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Identity to decontest Europe led to an ‘opening’ of the parties’ ideology, making them 
appear less ‘closed’ than commonly assumed. 
Chapter four analyses the second concept that the MSI/AN and FN drew upon to 
define Europe: namely, the concept of Liberty. Introducing Liberty as a ‘political’ feature 
of nationalism which serves to establish the rights of the nation, the chapter shows how 
the parties employed the concept to refer to ideas of European and national autonomy and 
democratic self-rule, as well as to ideas of European power outside its borders. The 
chapter shows the complexity of the relationship between the concept of Europe and that 
of Liberty, demonstrating that the MSI/AN and FN have viewed Europe both as a space 
of liberty and as a potential threat to their own nations’ freedom. The concluding section 
also argues that, by focusing on the concept of Liberty, the parties drew on ideas that were 
not exclusive to them, but were part of a shared way of thinking about the nation. 
Chapter five moves away from the parties’ ideological core and into the area of 
adjacency, advancing the contention that both the MSI and the FN (but not AN) viewed 
Europe as endangered by a series of threats. Presenting the concept of Threat as a 
distinctive feature of far right ideology, the chapter shows how the MSI and the FN 
portrayed Europe as endangered by a series of internal, external and diffuse threats. 
Drawing on Moffitt’s (2016) discussion of the ‘populist performance of crisis’, it is 
argued that this use of the ‘politics of emergency’ allowed the parties to present 
themselves as ‘providential’ actors who were aware of the danger Europe was in, and 
could therefore save it from decline and disappearance.  
Chapter six leaves behind the analytical reconstruction of the character of far right 
ideology, and focuses on how the parties employed the previously studied concepts to 
define their positions on the European Union. Looking at ideology as a form of praxis-
oriented political thought, it illustrates how the MSI/AN and FN employed the previously 
studied concepts, along with the additional concept of National Interest, to define their 
positions on European integration as a concrete political issue. In contrast to the view of 
far right parties as ‘populist’ actors that will stand for anything, it shows how the parties 
were consistent in terms of the concepts they used to determine their positions on the EU. 
The use of these concepts in the definition of policy, the chapter concludes, made it 
possible for the parties to stress commitment to core principles in their ideology and 
present themselves as principled actors, thus serving both strategic and ideological 
functions. 
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Chapter seven briefly summarises the findings and explains how they contribute to 
existing research on far right parties and Europe, and to the study of far right ideology 
more broadly. It explores their implications and suggests three possible avenues for future 
research. These include: consolidating the study by looking at more far right parties; 
analysing how parties from other party families have integrated Europe in their ideology; 
and, finally, exploring further how ‘essentially contested concepts’ are used in day-to-day 
politics.  
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2. STUDYING THE FAR RIGHT’S 
IDEOLOGY OF EUROPE 
 
 
The previous chapter established the far right’s ideology of Europe as the thesis’ key area 
of interest. In particular, it stressed the need to study the two following interrelated 
questions: 
1. How have far right parties viewed Europe through 
ideological lenses and how have they incorporated it in their 
system of beliefs? 
2. How has their ideology informed their positions on the 
European Union? 
This chapter explains how these questions are addressed in practice. The opening section 
defines the aims and methods of ideological analysis, and explains how these are used to 
approach the study of the far right’s ideology of Europe. The second section of the chapter 
develops some expectations concerning the answers to these questions. Rather than being 
formal hypotheses, these are better thought of as propositions meant to guide the reader 
through the empirical material and allow her to assess the validity of the author’s own 
interpretation. The concluding section outlines the research design adopted in the study, 
presenting the author’s empirical strategy in approaching the three questions and 
answering them.  
 
STUDYING THE FAR RIGHT’S IDEOLOGY OF EUROPE  
‘Ideology is the most elusive concept in the whole of social sciences’  
- David McLellan, Ideology, 1995  
Creating definitions is a key task in the social sciences, and even more so when one is 
dealing with a contentious concept. A scholar, looking for a straightforward answer to the 
question, ‘what is ideology?’ will likely struggle to find one. Hamilton (1987: 20-21), for 
example, identified a non-exhaustive list of 27 different definitions and features of the 
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term, while Michael Freeden (2006: 3) defined it as ‘the problem-child of political 
analysis’. Not only has ideology been hampered by conceptual obscurity, it has also been 
vilified as a form of ‘false consciousness’ in the Marxist tradition (Marx and Engels 1976 
[1932], but see also Leopold 2013 on the different ways in which Marx and Engels used 
the term), a concept with unclear boundaries (Mullins 1972: 499-502), a form of ‘bad 
theory’ (Freeden 2000: 302), and even as a perverse ‘pseudoscience’ and a totalising 
doctrine (see for example Arendt 1953, Crick 2013 [1962], Popper 2013 [1945]). Thus, 
while one may not agree with McLellan’s view that it is ‘the most elusive concept in the 
social sciences’, it is certainly one that is rich in meanings, not all positive and not all of 
them compatible with one another.  
 This thesis follows the more recent trend of viewing ideology as a broadly neutral 
concept (e.g. Freeden 1998, Geertz 1973, Knight 2006, Seliger 1976).4 Ideologies are 
regarded as ‘systems of political thinking, loose or rigid, deliberate or unintended, 
through which individuals and groups construct an understanding of the political world 
they, or those who preoccupy their thoughts, inhabit, and then act on that understanding’ 
(Freeden 1998a: 3). In this conception, ideologies therefore have two factors: first, a 
specific ‘worldview’, and second, a ‘programme for action’ informed by it. Within this 
context, far right ideology is approached as one such system of political thinking, which 
defines and describes the world from a specific perspective and uses this understanding 
to inform political action.  
 Having identified and defined the object of analysis, one might next ask how its 
study should be approached. The scholar of ideologies is presented with a number of 
options (see Leader Maynard and Mildenberger 2018 for a review of approaches in 
political science, and Martill 2017 for a review in the field of international relations). In 
the field of political science, studies of ideology often make use of spatial models in which 
party positions are quantified and studied in terms of their place on a certain number of 
issue dimensions. While these approaches have undeniable advantages in cases where 
one wishes to study a large number of parties, they are poorly suited to the study of 
meanings and understandings that is at the heart of this thesis.  
 
4 Note that Seliger distinguishes between a restrictive and an inclusive definition of ideology. The former 
only applies to ‘extremist beliefs and parties’ which systematically distort the truth, while the latter refers 
to a conception which considers ideology to be a feature of all belief systems. It is in this second, broad 
sense that he studies it. 
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With this in mind, the thesis turns to an interpretive approach for the study of 
ideology: Michael Freeden’s (1998a) morphological approach. The morphological 
approach is used to understand how far right parties integrate Europe in their ideology by 
focusing on the concepts they employ to discuss it. Given the thesis’ interest in the 
specific idea of Europe, this approach appeared particularly appropriate because it takes 
concepts and conceptual structures as the analytical focus. Furthermore, in a study of 
parties whose positions on Europe have tended to vary, it was considered likely to provide 
a keen sense of the nature and depth of such changes. Since morphological analysis 
focuses on concepts rather than individual policies, it is better able to capture instances 
of ideological continuity at the level of ideas that might not be perceptible when focusing 
exclusively on policies. While the thesis does not adopt a fully-fledged morphological 
approach, since this is usually used to analyse ideologies as a whole, its main tenets offer 
an important conceptualisation of ideological structures and a helpful entry point into the 
study of Europe in far right ideology.   
 
THE MORPHOLOGICAL APPROACH 
In his seminal book ‘Ideologies and Political Theory’ (1998a), Michael Freeden set out 
with the ambition to refocus the study of ideology on the conceptual structures that 
underlie it and provide a theoretically informed method to study such structures. 
Lamenting the tendency of studies of ideology to represent ideologies as ‘tantamount to 
what they do’ (1998a: 48), he asserted the need for scholars to open the ‘black box’ of 
ideology and start studying its configuration. Ever since, a number of scholars have 
followed him in this endeavour, adopting the morphological approach to study a variety 
of ideologies in different settings (e.g., Atkins 2011 on New Labour, Bajpai 2011 on 
nationalism and group rights in India, Franks et al. 2018 on anarchism, Talshir 2002 on 
green parties, Turner 2011 on neoliberalism). Three elements may be identified as key to 
this approach: first, the study of concepts as the building blocks of ideologies; second, the 
analytical reconstruction of ideological structures; and third, a focus on context in 
studying the first two. 
Political concepts are at the heart of Freeden’s approach. These are defined as 
‘complex ideas that inject order and meaning into observed or anticipated sets of political 
phenomena and hold together an assortment of related notions’ (1998a: 52). Familiar 
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concepts include Liberty, Equality and Justice; and ideologies, he claims, are best thought 
of as specific configurations of such ‘essentially contested concepts’, that is, concepts 
‘the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on 
the part of their users’ (Gallie 1955: 169). Thus, while all ideologies are expected to be 
formed of similar concepts, different traditions will attach different meanings to them. 
These specific meanings will usually be the result of a series of time- and space-dependent 
judgements about the description and assembly of the concepts’ individual components, 
as well as the evaluations of such components (Freeden 1998a: 52).5 The first job of the 
scholar of ideologies is to identify, describe and analyse these concepts, with the objective 
of understanding the component elements and specific meanings of the building blocks 
of any given ideology (Freeden 1998a: 48).  
Political concepts alone, however, are insufficient for the study of ideology, as 
they rarely acquire meaning by themselves. Rather, in the morphological approach, they 
are considered to acquire a more definite meaning (or to be decontested) in relation to the 
other concepts that form an ideology, signifying that the scholar of ideologies should also 
be concerned with the relationship between different concepts. In addition, she should be 
aware of their specific place within a constellation, as this will provide a clearer view of 
the overall structure of the ideology being studied.  
Concepts may be placed in a core, adjacent or peripheral position depending on 
their centrality to the ideology in question and may shift from one position to the other 
over time. Core concepts are the long-term and shared features of all known cases of a 
given ideology (Freeden 2013: 125). One can think, for example, of Liberty as a core 
concept of all forms of liberalism or of Equality as the core of any given instance of 
socialism. Core concepts are also those that hold the ideology together and thus shape its 
content most prominently (Freeden 2013: 125). Adjacent concepts are not as pervasive or 
ever-present as core concepts. However, they have the crucial role of ‘finessing the core 
and anchoring it—at least temporarily—into a more determinate and decontested 
semantic field’ (Freeden 2013: 125-126). Adjacent concepts can be culturally or logically 
adjacent, and flesh out the core concepts, leading to emphasising one aspect of the 
conceptual core over the other. Finally, ideologies have peripheral concepts that ‘add a 
vital gloss’ (Freeden 1998a: 78) to core and adjacent concepts. These peripheral concepts 
 
5 This point will be further developed in Chapter five, when discussing the extent to which the concepts in 
the thesis are ‘far right’. 
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are of two types: ‘marginal’ concepts and ‘perimeter’ concepts. Marginal concepts are 
those whose relevance to the ideology is insubstantial. Perimeter concepts, on the other 
hand, while being placed in a peripheral position with respect to the centre, are key to the 
operation of ideology in real life contexts because they anchor it to reality. Unlike core 
and adjacent concepts, which allow the ideology to ‘function on a long-term and wide-
space basis’ (Freeden 1998a: 79), perimeter concepts ‘enable them [ideologies] to gain 
relevance for specific issues, to incorporate and identify significant facts and practices, to 
embrace external change, and to provide the greater degree of precision necessary to 
interpret the core and adjacent concepts’ (Freeden 1998a: 79-80). Ideas and concepts 
within an ideology will usually be identified following a trajectory that goes from the 
centre to the periphery via adjacent concepts or vice versa, bearing in mind, however, that 
the road followed is usually only one among many possible ones (Freeden 1998a: 81). 
Underlying the morphological approach is an appreciation not only of the 
complexity of ideologies, but also of their flexibility, both at the micro-level of individual 
concepts, and at the macro-level of ideological structures. At the macro-level, the 
previous section has shown that concepts can move from one position to the other within 
the ideology, acquiring more or less relevance with respect to other concepts, and even 
disappearing with time. Similarly, at the micro-level, the internal structure of individual 
concepts may evolve, leading them to shift into a different realm of meaning, privileging 
one understanding over the other. Importantly, shifts tend to be rooted in context-
dependent judgements, showing how ideological change is inextricably linked to social 
and political dynamics. The implication of this observation is that ideologies are best 
studied in context and over time, as this will allow to appreciate the value of such 
dynamics.  
 While these points are somewhat skeletal and discuss only the most salient 
features of Freeden’s approach, they nonetheless allow one to tease out some of the main 
features of a study of the ideology of Europe, with clear methodological implications. 
First of all, they direct the researcher’s focus towards questions of structure and 
relationships. In other words, rather than merely looking at the content of an ideology or 
at an individual concept within it, one is invited to elucidate its key concepts and the way 
in which they mutually decontest each other within a broader configuration. The practical 
implication of this is that if one is to understand how far right parties understand Europe, 
it will be necessary to insert it in the broader constellation of concepts that make up their 
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ideology and operate a conceptual reconstruction of Europe’s ideological space. Thus, to 
understand how Europe is brought in and anchored in an existing ideology, the researcher 
will have to identify which core and adjacent concepts allow for this integration. In 
addition, because ideology is constituted by both a worldview and a programme for action 
based on that worldview, she will have to perform a similar task to understand how a 
certain worldview translates into concrete positions on the European Union. Secondly, 
because ideologies are variable, this analysis should not focus exclusively on the here and 
now but should adopt a measure of diachronic analysis to allow for an appreciation of the 
shifting meanings of Europe and its relation to the ideological configuration as a whole. 
Finally, attention needs to be paid to the context of statements on Europe in order to show 
how ideologies are anchored in social, political and historical realities. These theoretical 
points will necessarily inform the research design of the thesis (which will be discussed 
in the final section of this chapter), as well as the way in which documents will be 
presented and analysed in the empirical analysis. 
In sum, this section has presented a view of ideologies as ‘systems of political 
thinking, loose or rigid, deliberate or unintended, through which individuals and groups 
construct an understanding of the political world they, or those who preoccupy their 
thoughts, inhabit, and then act on that understanding’ (Freeden 1998a: 3) and has argued 
that the best way to study the far right’s ideology of Europe is through Freeden’s 
morphological approach. The next section sets out some expectations concerning the 
answers to those questions, before presenting the empirical strategy utilised for the study. 
 
SETTING SOME EXPECTATIONS 
While the research questions of this thesis are all exploratory and inductive rather than 
explanatory and deductive in nature, it is nonetheless helpful to present a view of the 
possible answers to them that one might expect. Two expectations are developed in the 
following paragraphs:  
1. Far right parties will draw on core concepts in their 
ideology to decontest Europe and integrate it in their ideology. 
2. In a similar vein, they will rely on core concepts in their 
ideology to define their positions on the European Union as a 
concrete issue. 
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These expectations are not to be read as concrete hypotheses, but rather, as ‘educated 
provisional inferences that will be considered and explored’ (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 
2012: 53). These ‘provisional inferences’ also serve the more functional role of guiding 
the reader through the empirical chapters; ideally, they will allow her to judge the 
analytical conclusions and interpretations of the author as well.  
Starting from the premise that ideologies are distinctive configurations of political 
concepts to which determinate meanings are assigned through processes of mutual 
decontestation, the first objective of this thesis is to ascertain how ‘Europe’ has been 
decontested in far right ideology.6 It is helpful to start by making an educated guess about 
the type of concept that Europe is within far right ideology. It is probably not a stretch to 
define Europe, at least initially, as a perimeter concept for the far right. Perimeter 
concepts, as noted in the previous section, are a type of peripheral concept that ‘straddle 
the interface between the conceptualisation of social realities and the external contexts 
and concrete manifestations in and through which these conceptualisations occur’ 
(Freeden 1998a: 79). Their peculiarity is that they allow for ideologies to accommodate 
and influence current events, thus remaining relevant in the social world. Europe would 
appear to pertain to this area, on the one hand, due to the broad post-war reflections on 
the place of Europe in the world, and on the other hand, because of the presence of the 
European Economic Community and then European Union as a real-life policy issue that 
needed to be addressed. Following this perspective, Europe embeds ideology in a given 
historical and political context, giving the far right’s ideology as a whole a more grounded 
character.  
The view of Europe as a perimeter concept is relevant to understanding how it is 
decontested. In fact, it was argued earlier that it is usually possible to trace a path from 
core to adjacent to peripheral concepts, through an analysis of processes of logical and 
cultural adjacency that lead from one to the other. In order to answer our question on the 
definition of Europe, then, we will have to turn to this path and understand how, from the 
core and via the area of adjacency, one arrives at the perimeter – and, of course, if over 
 
6 Note that while decontestation is a process that flows both from centre to periphery and from periphery to 
centre, implying that the incorporation of a new issue is likely to shape the way in which old ones are 
defined, the primary focus here is on the centre-periphery dynamic. However, the thesis will also consider 
how decontesting Europe in a certain way shaped the way in which other concepts were understood. 
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time that perimeter moves. While it will be for the empirical part to determine that path, 
it is at least possible to suggest what one might find on the way to decontestation.  
The first expectation of this thesis is that the decontestation of Europe will likely 
make reference to concepts and ideas situated in the ideological core of the far right: 
namely, concepts falling under the domain of nationalism. In fact, if scholars have 
disagreed in the past on how to define the far right and its ideology (see Mudde 1996, 
2000 for early reviews and Carter 2018 for a more recent assessment), a broad consensus 
exists that the minimum definition of a far right party needs to include nationalism as a 
core trait and ‘focal point’ (Minkenberg 2017: 14) of their ideology (e.g., Bar-On 2018, 
Davies 1999, Harrison and Bruter 2011, Mudde 2007). 
While nationalism is as debated a concept as that of ‘far right' (for examples on 
how to define nationalism and whether it qualifies as an ideology see Adams 1993: 82ff, 
Ball and Dagger 2014: 13-14, Finlayson 1998, Freeden 1998b, Griffin 1999), definitions 
will usually encompass two aspects: first, they will identify the nation as the referent 
actor, and second, they will express the need for this group’s identity to be expressed 
politically and/or institutionally. Thus, for example, Ernest Gellner, a pioneering scholar 
in the field, famously defined nationalism as a political principle ‘which holds that the 
political and national unit should be congruent’ (1983: 1). Anthony D. Smith, for his part, 
described it as ‘an ideological movement to attain and maintain autonomy, unity and 
identity on behalf of a population, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an 
actual or potential “nation”’ (1999: 256). From the morphological perspective, Michael 
Freeden, while expressing some scepticism as to nationalism’s status as an ideology, 
defined its core as composed of five elements:  
First, the prioritisation of a particular group – the nation – as a 
key constituting and identifying framework for human beings and 
their practices. The realised condition in which this occurs is 
called nationhood. Second, a positive valorisation is assigned to 
one’s own nation, granting it specific claims over the conduct of 
its members. Third, the desire to give politico-institutional 
expression to the first two core concepts. Fourth, space and time 
are considered to be crucial determinants of social identity. Fifth, 
a sense of belonging and membership in which sentiment and 
emotion play an important role. (1998b: 751-752) 
In studies of the far right, far right nationalism has been further specified as being a 
specific type of exclusionary nationalism (Minkenberg 2003: 151, Eatwell 2000: 412-
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413) or, as Mudde puts it, a form of nativism that combines xenophobia and nationalism 
to present an ‘ideology that holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members 
of the native group (“the nation”), and that non-native people and ideas are fundamentally 
threatening to the homogenous nation-state’ (2007: 19). This nativism has at times been 
framed in racial terms, but in political parties in Europe it is now mostly present in an 
‘ethno-pluralist’ version which strips the insider/outsider divide of its hierarchical 
character, while maintaining the idea that cultures are fundamentally different and 
incompatible (Rydgren 2007: 244; although see Mondon and Winter 2017 for a more 
critical perspective). Beyond the concept of nation and its logical corollary of (closed) 
community as defining characteristics of nationalism, the definitions also point towards 
ideas of autonomy and self-realisation, political representation, belonging and emotional 
attachment. While these are only some definitions in a vast literature, they provide us 
with some clues in terms of the concepts we might expect the parties to rely on in their 
definition of Europe (although it is very possible that they may not all be present or 
relevant within this study).7 
In addition, although nationalism forms the core of the far right’s ideology and is 
likely to be the most relevant element in the study given Europe’s nature as a transnational 
phenomenon, other elements are often brought forward as defining the far right’s system 
of beliefs. For example, the ideological feature of authoritarianism occupies a prominent 
place in definitions of the far right (Hainsworth 2008, Harrison and Bruter 2011, Ignazi 
2002, Inglehart and Norris 2019, Mudde 2007), and many recent definitions also include 
populism among the key features of a specific set of the far right (Herman and Muldoon 
2019, Mudde 2007, Rydgren 2018: 5-6, Skenderovic 2009). One may also include a 
dubious commitment to the existing political system as a defining characteristic of the far 
right, thus including ‘anti-establishment’ and ‘anti-democracy’ as ideological features to 
note, although the latter will typically only apply to the so-called ‘extreme right’ (see 
Hainsworth 2008: 8-9 on the distinction between radical and extreme). Thus, other 
concepts which may appear as relevant are: the primacy of the state, the importance of 
order, an attachment to traditional values, the defence of the ‘true’ people against a 
 
7 Note that, just as in the expectations of this thesis, the definitions provided here are meant to be ‘educated 
provisional inferences’. In keeping with the exploratory and inductive nature of the research, this thesis 
deliberately avoids adopting a formal definition of far right ideology. While definitions brought forward by 
others are here discussed with the objective of setting out some expectations, they are not considered as 
‘definitive’, but rather as tentative and subject to adaptation and further exploration based on the empirical 
findings.  
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corrupt elite, the view of politics as expressing the will of the people thus defined, and 
even opposition to democratic rule as a whole. While some of these may prove to be 
adjacent concepts, or relevant only to certain far right parties, they nonetheless provide 
us with some expectations about concepts that go beyond nationalism and which may 
appear in the far right’s definition of Europe.  
The second expectation of this thesis is that similar concepts will also play a role 
in informing concrete policy positions on the European Union. This is a reflection of the 
thesis’ consideration that ideology is composed of two elements: a worldview and a 
programme for action informed by it. Intrinsic to this idea is the presence, within 
ideology, of some conception of ‘the Good Society’ (Sainsbury 1980: 10), which the 
programme for action is meant to lead towards. Thus, it is expected that the way in which 
the concepts—as part of the worldview—are decontested and interact will inform an 
evaluation of the EU based on how well it conforms to the far right’s distinctive view.  
To conclude, we may summarise the two main propositions of this section as 
follows: first, the far right will draw on central concepts in their ideology to define the 
meaning of Europe and place it in their ideological schemata; second, they will perform 
a similar operation in defining their positions on the European Union as a concrete 
political issue. The empirical sections will explore these propositions in more depth and 
specify, adapt, add flesh to or even overturn them in the light of the analysis.  
Although these two propositions will be central to the analysis, the empirical 
sections are also likely to yield observations that go beyond them and which the reader 
may find of interest. The diachronic and comparative nature of the analysis which is 
discussed below, for example, is likely to offer interesting insights into the evolution of 
the idea of Europe, as well as on the different ways in which it has been approached by 
different far right parties. It can highlight their potentially varying concerns, their 
approaches to similar questions and the range of answers they have provided. It can also 
provide an overview of the effects on ideology of decontesting Europe in a certain way, 
thus offering an insight into the periphery-centre path of decontestation. Finally, beyond 
the field of far right studies, it can provide a view of ‘a certain idea of Europe’ that readers 
focusing on the intellectual history of ‘Europe’ (e.g., den Boer et al. 1995, Malmborg and 
Strath 2002, Pagden 2002) might find worthy of attention. The following section turns to 
elucidating the way in which this will be done. 
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THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
Having identified the research questions, conceptual approach and set some expectations, 
it is now possible to bring these together into a research design that can remain committed 
to the theoretical underpinnings sketched out earlier and provide some answers to the 
research questions at hand. The following sections present the main features of the 
empirical strategy adopted by the thesis. 
The thesis’ interest in exploring questions of meaning led the researcher to opt for 
an interpretive approach supported by the use of qualitative methods. At the heart of 
interpretive research, in fact, is a concern with meaning-making (Schrag Sternberg 2013: 
8, Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 46, Yanow and Schwartz Shea 2006: xii), requiring 
the researcher to focus on ‘meanings, beliefs, and discourses, as opposed to laws and 
rules, correlations between social categories, or deductive models’ (Bevir and Rhodes 
2006: 70) and interpret the actions of the studied subject ‘in terms of actors’ 
understandings of their own contexts’ (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 52). While 
interpretive works are in a minority in the field of political science, their focus on 
‘meaning-making’ gives them a comparative advantage in studies centred on 
understanding how actors ‘make sense’ of the world and how this informs their actions 
(Bevir and Rhodes 2006: 73, Schwartz Shea and Yanow 2012: 52). The use of qualitative 
rather than quantitative methods followed logically this commitment to an interpretive 
stance. While scholars of ideology have used both quantitative and qualitative methods, 
the latter are arguably more appropriate in the context of an approach where meaning, 
contextuality and ‘thick description’ take centre stage (Bevir and Rhodes 2015: 18-19, 
Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 48ff). 
The far right’s ideology of Europe was studied through two case studies: the 
Movimento Sociale Italiano/Alleanza Nazionale in Italy, and the Front National in 
France. The choice to focus on a small number of cases was dictated by the author’s desire 
to fully exploit the interpretive framework’s potential to provide in-depth and nuanced 
understandings of social phenomena that can add to existing theories and help build new 
ones (Nowell and Albrecht 2018). Given the time-consuming nature of interpretive 
research, examining a larger number of cases would have risked diluting this approach’s 
power. Case studies are also notably better suited for exploratory and theory building 
research (Gerring 2004) than other qualitative and quantitative methods, and help identify 
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trends and patterns which can then be tested in a larger set of cases. While the focus on a 
small number of cases entails costs in terms of generalisability,8 these are offset by the 
depth of knowledge which is central to understanding processes of meaning-making. 
The Movimento Sociale Italiano was the ‘grandfather’ of post-war European far 
right parties. Founded in 1946 from the ashes of the Italian Fascist party, it was for a long 
time the only successful far right party in Europe. While the MSI never reached 
particularly high peaks in terms of vote share (its best electoral score was little under 9% 
of the popular vote in the 1972 general election, but in general they hovered around the 
5-6% mark), it was a constant presence in the Italian and European parliaments.  
 In the context of Italy’s ‘polarised pluralism’ (Sartori 2005: 116ff), the MSI 
occupied the far right pole of a political system dominated by the Christian Democrats in 
the centre and the Italian Communist Party on the far left. Originally opposed to Italy’s 
post-war liberal-democratic settlement, especially in its early years, the MSI oscillated 
between, on the one hand, pursuing a policy of inserimento (insertion) and moderation, 
and on the other hand pushing for outright opposition to the political system as a whole 
(Newell 2000: 469-470). The question of which strategy to pursue was a source of tension 
between the party’s internal factions, with the right-wing authoritarian faction pushing 
for mainstreaming, and the more left-wing revolutionary groups aiming for further 
radicalisation (on the MSI’s factions, see Ignazi 1989, 1998, and Tarchi 1997). In spite 
of its attempts to become an accepted player in the political system, the MSI was, for a 
large part of its history, a pariah party. It was kept away from the circles of power and, 
having failed to insert itself into the political system in its early years, it embraced its anti-
system role in later years.  
The 1990s presented the MSI with an environment that was conducive to making 
the transition from an anti-system party to a mainstream party. Three factors explain why 
this became possible: the Tangentopoli (Bribesville) scandal, evolving voter preferences, 
and changes to the electoral law (Newell 2000: 475). Tangentopoli revealed the extent of 
corruption within the political system and, coupled with the decline of traditional party 
loyalties, led to a collapse of the Italian post-war party system. Furthermore, a change to 
the electoral law pushed for the formation of coalitions (Renwick, Hanretty et al. 2009) 
 
8 The notion of ‘generalisability’ is also rarely considered as an appropriate standard for qualitative and 
interpretive research (e.g., Guba and Lincoln 1984, Schwartz-Shea 2006). 
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and an overall restructuring of the political system on a Left/Right cleavage (Fella 2006: 
13-14, Ignazi 2005: 334).  
These changes provided the MSI’s reform-oriented party leader Gianfranco Fini 
with ammunition to advocate for a fundamental rebranding of the party, with the objective 
of bringing it into power. Largely untouched by the Tangentopoli scandal, between 1994 
and 1995, the MSI underwent a transformation from a ‘neo-fascist’ party to the ‘post-
fascist’ Alleanza Nazionale. Following the 1994 election, in which it won 13.5% of the 
vote, it entered government in a short-lived coalition with Forza Italia and the Lega Nord 
(now simply the Lega). In 1995, at the Fiuggi Congress, the MSI formally changed its 
name to Alleanza Nazionale. While most of the party’s personnel remained the same 
(with a few exceptions, such as Pino Rauti’s radical faction which converged into the 
MSI-Fiamma Tricolore) and their core ideas were only moderately refashioned (Ignazi 
2003, Tarchi 2003), Fiuggi represented the first step in a march towards normalisation. 
AN’s mainstreaming continued in the following years as the party sought to develop a 
political culture independent of the MSI’s heritage and an increasingly respectable face 
(Tarchi 2003: 177-178). Between 2001 and 2005, it also developed its experience in 
government by holding prestigious ministries (most notably, Fini held the positions of 
Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister). The process of mainstreaming culminated 
in 2009 with the merging of Alleanza Nazionale and Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia into 
a single party, the People of Freedom.  
In the academic literature on the far right, the MSI is commonly considered as the 
‘archetype’ of the ‘old’ neo-fascist far right (Ignazi 2003), and an early source of 
inspiration (especially in terms of organisation) for several of the parties that came after 
it. Alleanza Nazionale, on the other hand, is regarded as an interesting experiment in 
ideological transformation (Griffin 1996). It was the first far right party to be included in 
government (along with the Lega), even before the Fiuggi Congress that transformed it 
officially into a ‘post-fascist’ party. While the inclusion of the AN may raise some 
scepticism, as the literature highlights their successful transition from ‘post-fascist’ to 
‘something else’ (Tarchi 2003), this paper decides to follow them through their ‘post-
fascist’ transition because transitions are usually long and tortuous, and often some 
elements from the past remain (see for example Griffin 1996, Vasilopoulou 2011).  
The French Front National, on the other hand, once again according to Ignazi’s 
classification, represents the ‘prototype’ of the ‘new’ far right party, or, as others have 
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dubbed it, the ‘populist radical right’ party. While not the most electorally successful far 
right party in Europe, the Front National’s influence on other far right parties in Europe 
is well-documented, leading some to consider it as having provided the ‘master-frame’ 
for the parties that came after it (see Rydgren 2005, Van Hauwaert 2014). 
The Front National was founded in 1972, with the objective of bringing together 
the various far right groups operating in France. It started off as a fourre-tout of extremist 
groups, including neo-fascists, traditionalist Catholics, poujadistes, monarchists, and 
Algerian war veterans (Camus 1989), kept together by the charismatic leadership of Jean-
Marie Le Pen. During its first years, referred to within the party as the ‘crossing of the 
desert’ (Lecœur 2003: 29), it struggled to have electoral relevance and remain cohesive.  
The Front National’s electoral breakthrough only came about in the 1980s, 
following a series of transformations within the French system. Unhappiness with the 
Socialist government, increasing concerns about immigration, and an ongoing economic 
crisis helped the Front National fashion itself as the champion of anti-immigration and 
security (Stockemer 2017: 13-14, Williams 2006: 82). This increased focus paid off and 
led the party to its first victories at the local level. Most notably, the 1982 cantonal 
elections in Dreux saw the party gain around 10% of the vote, and this was followed by 
a positive showing in the 1983 municipal elections. The Front National finally emerged 
as a successful party on a national level when it gained over 10% of the national vote in 
the 1984 European elections, and when in 1986 it secured 35 MPs in national elections. 
In 1986 in particular, the FN benefitted from Mitterrand’s choice to introduce a system 
of proportional representation (Betz and Immerfall 1998: 21). While the President’s main 
objective had been to limit the Socialist Party’s losses and split the right-wing vote 
between the FN and the Gaullist Rassemblement Pour la République, he also helped the 
FN become a permanent fixture in the French political system (Stockemer 2017: 17).  
The 1980s were not only a period of electoral growth for the FN, but also one of 
organisational growth. Its electoral successes facilitated the establishment of a strong 
organisational structure, and it attracted new recruits at all levels (Rydgren 2004: 19). 
Among the new recruits were a number of experienced politicians and intellectuals such 
as Bruno Mégret, Jean-Yves Le Gallou and Yvan Blot, who sought to professionalise the 
party, consolidate its programme and grow its appeal (Gauthier 2009: 388). These 
evolutions helped the party sustain its growth in the long-term and contributed to its firm 
establishment in the French political system. 
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Following a decade of growth, the 1990s and 2000s were marked by ebbs and 
flows in the party’s successes. On the one hand, the return to the two-round majoritarian 
system of voting and the continued ostracisation of the party on the part of other actors 
kept the FN out of power. Furthermore, in 1998, the party suffered the worst split in its 
history, when fundamental strategic disagreements and personal conflicts between Jean-
Marie Le Pen and Bruno Mégret led to the expulsion of the latter from the FN (Dézé 
2012: 125). Mégret did not leave alone but brought a sizeable chunk of the party’s 
leadership (although not many of its voters) with him to his newly formed Mouvement 
National Républicain (MNR) (Stockemer 2017: 22). On the other hand, the FN’s political 
programme remained appealing thanks to the dominance of issues such as globalisation, 
corruption and immigration (Stockemer 2017: 20). In 2002, only a few years after the 
split, the Front National achieved one of its most stunning feats when Jean-Marie Le Pen 
reached the second round of the French presidential election and secured around 18% of 
the vote in the final round (Goodliffe 2012: 1). 
In 2011, Marine Le Pen replaced her father as leader of the party and embarked 
on a process of ‘de-demonisation’, aimed at making the Front National a more respectable 
and ‘coalitionable’ political actor (Ivaldi 2016, Shields 2013, Stockemer and Barisone 
2016). Following a series of negative electoral results in the late 2000s, and aware of the 
need for ideological renewal, she reoriented the party’s political agenda (Williams 2006: 
95) while maintaining a strong continuity with the past (Alduy and Wahnich 2015). Even 
though the party still struggles to gain representation at the national level due to France’s 
majoritarian electoral system, and is still shunned by most other political actors, it has 
grown exponentially in the last eight years since Marine Le Pen took over from her father. 
Most notably, Marine Le Pen won almost 34% of the vote in the second round of the 2017 
presidential election and secured 8 MPs in the legislative elections that followed. In 2018, 
in a bid to grow its electoral appeal, the party changed its name to ‘Rassemblement 
National’ (National Rally, RN), but the change was mostly cosmetic, with little evolution 
in terms of ideas.  
The logic of selection can be summarised as a ‘diverse case study design’ 
(Seawright and Gerring 2008). Diverse case study designs are defined as case studies 
whose primary goal is ‘the achievement of maximum variance along relevant dimensions’ 
(Seawright and Gerring 2008: 300) with either exploratory or confirmatory aims, 
depending on whether one is focusing on a single variable or on the relationship between 
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different variables. This type of design allows a wider range of variation, leading to a 
more comprehensive view of the type and content of claims advanced by far right parties 
on Europe.  
Within this context, the selected parties present the clear advantage of holding 
different positions on Europe. In fact, while they both started off with broadly 
‘europositive’ stances, the MSI never turned towards fully-fledged opposition to the 
European project and remained throughout its history, and after its transformation into 
Alleanza Nazionale (AN), broadly ‘compromising’ in its stance towards the EU, while 
the Front National quickly turned to a ‘rejectionist’ attitude especially following the 
introduction of the Maastricht Treaty (Vasilopoulou 2011, 2018a, Reungoat 2012: 100-
102). In addition, since they represent two different ‘types’ of far right party (Ignazi 
2003), and had a significant influence on the parties that came after them, it was hoped 
that they would capture two somewhat different strands of far right ideology (although 
the extent of their difference is subject to debate, e.g., Cole 2005, Mammone 2009: 177, 
Mudde 2000: 15, Taguieff 2014). This does not mean that the findings will be 
automatically generalisable, but when coupled with thick description, such an approach 
can facilitate the readers’ judgement about their potential transferability to other settings 
(Bloomberg and Volpe 2008, Given 2008, Lincoln and Guba 1984). 
There are also a number of more practical but no less important reasons to examine 
these parties in particular. First, their long political history made it possible to carry out 
the diachronic analysis that is so important to morphological studies. Second, both the 
MSI/AN and the FN have achieved respectable results in electoral terms and have 
managed to sustain them over time. This has given them the opportunity to construct a 
varied and accessible ideological corpus that could be studied in some depth, providing 
the reader with a more cogent and exhaustive analysis. Finally, there is an issue of 
language. When adopting a qualitative and interpretive approach to the analysis of 
ideology, it is essential to be able to fully capture not only what is being said, but also the 
shades of meaning in the language one is analysing. Thus, it was judged important for the 
researcher to be able to read documents in their original language, rather than in 
translation. While these considerations may seem trivial, they are nonetheless important 
in the framework of a PhD. 
Admittedly, the MSI/AN and FN are only two far right parties among many that 
could have been studied, so it is also worth briefly mentioning why they were chosen over 
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other likely contenders. One might, in fact, wonder why in Italy the analysis focused on 
a ‘dinosaur’ such as the MSI instead of the more popular La Lega (League, Lega), or why 
the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party, FPÖ) or the Vlaams Belang (Flemish 
Interest, VB) were not included in the analysis. These parties’ inclusion would have 
allowed this study to capture similar elements of diversity concerning positions on 
Europe, with the VB, Lega and FPÖ starting off as broadly europositive. The FPÖ and 
VB, furthermore, as far right parties with a long history, would have allowed to capture a 
similar time frame as the MSI and FN, but, unlike the MSI, are still alive and well. 
While these observations are correct, what the parties mentioned above lacked 
was the ability to represent the different ‘strands’ of the far right. In particular, the FPÖ 
and VB, like the FN, are commonly classed as ‘new’ radical right parties. Furthermore, 
both were heavily influenced by the FN (Rydgren 2005, Van Hauwaert 2014), making it 
more interesting to study the original. The Lega, on the other hand, posed a different 
problem concerning its very belonging to the far right party family. While its recent 
developments under Matteo Salvini suggest that it has become a fully-fledged far right 
party, its regionalist origins mean that this definition has been contested in the past 
(Albertazzi et al. 2018, McDonnell 2006, Passarelli 2013), making it a disputable choice. 
Thus, while other parties could have credibly been studied, and may indeed be looked at 
by future researchers, the MSI/AN and FN appeared as the best suited for the study. 
Before proceeding to a discussion of the analytical tools of the study, it is 
important to dispel one final reservation that might have arisen in the reader: the focus on 
political parties in a study of ideology. Criticism of this choice may take a variety of 
forms, but two of the main objections will be taken into account. The first one is a critique 
on grounds of origins. In this line of critique, the choice of parties would be considered 
misdirected, because parties do not produce ideology but merely ‘disseminate it’ and 
make it ‘readily consumable’ (Freeden 2003: 78-79). Thus, the scholar interested in 
ideology would be better served by studying the work of political philosophers, public 
intellectuals, or think tanks, rather than looking at ‘participant ideologists’ (Román-
Zozaya 2008). While this is a valid concern, the role of parties as ‘disseminators’ is 
precisely what makes them interesting, as they represent the link between the world of 
ideas and that of day-to-day politics. Thus, they are likely to shape current debates to a 
higher degree and influence public understandings of Europe in a way that other actors 
may not be able to achieve. 
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The second critique proposes a more substantial challenge regarding the value of 
ideology in political parties and raises concerns about the value of ideas. This line of 
criticism stems from the branch of comparative politics that studies political parties and 
presents two distinct aspects, one pertaining to the relevance of party ideology, and the 
other concerning its validity. At the heart of both accounts is the view of the political 
party as a body involved, sometimes exclusively, in political competition over votes (e.g., 
Downs 1985 [1957]: 24-25, Epstein 1980: 9, Mair 1997: 21). In the most extreme version 
of the account, the party is an actor whose sole purpose is to maximise votes (Downs 
1985 [1957]) or gain political office (Riker 1962). In this perspective, ideology as a 
system of beliefs falls quickly into irrelevance, as it is, at best, nothing but a disguise for 
the real motives of the party. There are at least three possible answers to this claim 
(beyond it being not empirically substantiated – see Strom 1990: 568 for a review). The 
first one is to claim that vote seeking is a form of ideology or at least guided by certain 
beliefs about what is ‘strategic’ – meaning that even in the case of a purely strategic party, 
one would be dealing with some kind of ideology. The second and more relevant point in 
this case is that even if we accept that parties are purely strategic actors, it does not follow 
that they are free from the burden of justifying their actions in front of voters. Justification 
will rarely resort to an appeal to winning votes but will usually involve some reference to 
principles, and, as Quentin Skinner so eloquently put it, once an agent has professed an 
attachment to certain motives ‘even if the agent is not in fact motivated by any of the 
principles he professes, he will nevertheless be obliged to behave in such a way that his 
actions remain compatible with the claim that these principles genuinely motivated them’ 
(Skinner 1974: 299; see also Flood and Soborski 2018: 38 for a similar point). The third 
answer is that seeing parties as being motivated merely by winning office or votes offers 
a heavily distorted vision of the party which covers only one of its facets. Without wanting 
to review the meaning of the term ‘party’ (although see White and Ypi 2016: 10ff and 
White 2006 for an account), most definitions seem to acknowledge at least that parties 
are not only electoral machines, but also groups united by interests, purposes, common 
projects and a shared view of the world: in other words, what has been so far defined as 
an ideology. While not all parties will have an equally developed ideology, it is at least 
reasonable to expect them to express some worldview and a programme for action based 
on it. As a result, the accusation of irrelevance needs to be rejected.  
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The second line of critique is more relevant and pertains to the validity of claims 
brought forward by parties as being the reflection of ‘ideology’. In particular, without 
necessarily seeing parties exclusively as electoral machines, it will raise the issue that 
what parties say is often said in the context of electoral competition, where underlying 
ideological commitments will mix with more contingent measures (Mair and Mudde 
1998: 219). The risk, then, is that one may be either unable to tell one from the other, or 
that party ideology may bear little relation to the policies being proposed (Mair 1997: 24). 
While this critique needs to be taken seriously, it can also be managed through a careful 
selection of sources. In particular, it invites the scholar to avoid focusing exclusively on 
electoral material in the study of ideology, and it requires her to put less focus on analysis 
of individual statements and more on regular patterns emerging over a variety of 
documents. 
With this in mind, the thesis sought to capture party ideology drawing on a variety 
of internally and externally directed partisan documents collected through online, library 
and archival research. Instead of focusing exclusively on party manifestoes as the 
‘official’ expression of party ideology (Borg 1966: 97), it delved deeper into party 
literature, drawing in particular on party papers, newspapers, magazines and books 
published by party elites, considering that this could produce a more accurate view of 
party ideology and that it would also allow for a measure of triangulation (for similar 
approaches, see also Ignazi 1989, Mudde 2000, Flood and Soborski 2018). The starting 
year for data collection was set as 1978, the year before the first European Parliament 
election, so as to allow for the long timeframe required for morphological analyses.  The 
end point for the MSI/AN is 2009, when the party was merged into the Popolo delle 
Libertà; for the Front National, the analysis stops at the French Presidential election of 
2017, the last major election to take place in the course of this research. 
While the analysis could have credibly started earlier, typically at the time of the 
foundation of the parties (1946 for the MSI and 1972 for the FN), 1978 was considered 
as a better starting point. First, it is at this time that one would have expected European 
issues to start featuring more prominently in the parties’ ideology. Second, this timeline 
allowed the researcher to equalise the starting date of the analysis. For the Front National, 
this was also due to practical data limitations: the archival sources covering the 1972-
1978 period were not accessible at the time in which the fieldwork was completed. While 
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the timeline of data collection is relatively limited, where relevant, the thesis also 
considers documents produced before this time.  
Starting in 1978, rather than a later date, on the other hand, had the advantage of 
making it possible to capture evolutions in the process of European integration itself and 
reflect the EU’s changing nature through the decades. In fact, throughout the studied 
period, the European Union evolved geographically and politically from a small and 
primarily economic union to a large supranational political organisation (for a history of 
European integration, see Dinan 2010, Gilbert 2012). Geographically, through successive 
enlargements, it expanded from a restricted group of six, and then nine, Western-
European countries between the 1950s and 1970s, to a union of twenty-eight member 
states covering most of the European continent in the 2010s. Politically, the limited 
economic collaboration of the early European Economic Community transformed into an 
openly political project with the creation of the European Union. In fact, following the 
initial impetus of the 1950s and a period of stagnation in the 1970s, the 1980s and 1990s 
saw a series of evolutions which marked a qualitative shift in the process of European 
integration. Between the 1980s and the 2000s, the EU acquired its own flag, anthem, 
currency, and (unsuccessfully) tried to introduce a Constitution. The Single European 
Act, and the Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon Treaties all pushed the EU into an 
increasingly supranational mode of decision-making (notably, through the shift from 
unanimity to qualified majority voting in the Council and the increased use of co-decision 
in legislative decision-making – e.g. Tsebelis and Garrett 2000: 12-13, Héritier et al. 
2015), making it more powerful and visible in domestic and international politics, and, 
importantly, more contested (Hooghe and Marks 2009, Schmitter 2009: 211-212). These 
dynamics have also been strengthened in recent years by the responses to the Eurocrisis 
and the migration crisis, which further enhanced the EU’s influence on national contexts, 
as well as its contestation (e.g. van Middelaar 2019). Adopting a wide timeframe therefore 
made it possible to capture and acknowledge how these evolutions in the process of 
European integration affected the parties’ understanding of the project. 
The full corpus of source materials studied in the thesis consisted of 397 
documents, 175 for the MSI/AN (divided as follows: 93 MSI, 82 AN) and 222 documents 
for the FN.9 The documents for analysis were selected based on two criteria: they either 
 
9 More information on corpus creation is available in Appendix A. 
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had to be particularly significant to the life of the party (examples include manifestoes 
and congress documents); and/or, they had to explicitly mention Europe (whether as the 
EU or as the continent and civilisation associated with it), and not be of a purely factual 
nature (such as reports on votes in the European Parliament in which no evaluative 
judgement is expressed, accounts of laws passed by the EU, etc.). For the MSI and AN, 
the researcher collected party programmes for European and national elections published 
between 1978 and 2008, internal congress documents, interview books and a number of 
newspaper articles and interviews focusing on European issues. Documents were 
retrieved mainly from the archives of the Fondazione Ugo Spirito – Renzo de Felice, from 
the pages of the party newspaper ‘Il Secolo d’Italia’ and from the archives of the 
Manifesto Project (https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/) and of the European Election 
Studies Euromanifesto project (http://europeanelectionstudies.net/). For the Front 
National, the researcher collected party programmes for European and national elections 
presented between 1979 and 2017, books, magazine articles, interviews, speeches and 
press releases dealing with European issues. Documents were retrieved mainly from the 
Bibliothèque Nationale de France, where the researcher gained access to party magazines 
(specifically, ‘La Lettre de Jean-Marie Le Pen/Français D’Abord!’ and ‘Le National’) 
and speeches via the internet archives available on site. Manifestoes were mostly 
available online or in book form at the LSE and Sciences Po Paris libraries. European 
Parliament election manifestoes were kindly provided by the European Election Studies 
project. 
In order to reconstruct the conceptual space of Europe and answer the first and 
second research questions on the place and meaning of Europe in far right ideology, as 
well as how this translates into concrete policy, the research worked through a two-step 
procedure. At first, the corpus was analysed through a procedure referred to as ‘concept 
coding’. In qualitative analysis, a code is ‘a word or a short phrase that symbolically 
assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion 
of language-based or visual data’ (Saldaña 2016: 4). Coding refers to the process of 
assigning codes to evidence collected by the researcher, with the aim of using such codes 
for purposes such as ‘pattern detection, categorisation, assertion or proposition 
development, theory building, and other analytical processes’ (Saldaña 2016: 5). Among 
the various coding techniques available to the researcher, concept coding appeared a 
helpful method to abstract from specific utterances about Europe the more general 
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conceptual categories required of morphological analysis. In concept coding, in fact, the 
researcher focuses on the general ideas behind the data, rather than on behaviours or on 
specific objects (Saldaña 2016: 119-220). Concept coding was used here to identify the 
main concepts discussed by parties in relation to Europe. While often in conceptual 
analysis there is a tendency to equate concepts with the words expressing them, in this 
case concepts were approached as ‘realms of meaning’ formed by associated notions 
which, while not having the same name as the general concept, are used as synonyms of 
it or express similar ideas.  
In this round, all documents were read, summarised and assigned keywords 
defining the individual concepts used by the parties in conjunction with Europe. The 
driving principle was to understand the individual components of the concept of Europe, 
as well as the relationship between Europe and other concepts. This initial phase yielded 
four main concepts (Identity, Liberty, Threat, National Interest), each subdivided into 
sub-themes representing the different facets of the concepts. Table 1 provides a summary 
of the concepts, sub-themes and some examples of coded text.10 These concepts were set 
in conversation with the literature, with the objective of ensuring their credibility. Based 
on the view widely expressed in the literature and discussed above of far right parties as 
primarily nationalist parties, the concepts appeared sufficiently plausible. 
While the first round of analysis was aimed primarily at identifying the conceptual 
space of Europe, the second round of analysis was more concerned with analysing the 
meanings of the individual concepts, their relationships and their evolution over time. In 
this round, the researcher recoded and analysed only a smaller purposive sample of 112 
documents11 with the objective of identifying key passages of text that could be used to 
trace the ‘micro’ level of the ideologies, and to move from the skeletal reconstruction of 
the ideological space to the analysis of its meanings.12 The selected documents were those 
which articulated the parties’ positions most clearly, thus providing the researcher and 
reader alike with a stronger analytical perspective and exemplary excerpts. The researcher  
 
10 Note that, while the concepts of Identity, Liberty and Threat are presented through themes capturing their 
meaning, the National Interest is structured around the three ‘stages’ of European integration as defined in 
literature on Euroscepticism (e.g., Vasilopoulou 2011, Kopecky and Mudde 2002): the principle of 
European collaboration, its current practice, and its future .  
11 Complete list available in Appendix B 
12 The researcher considered that, given the high ideological intensity observed in the studied parties (both 
by the author and by previous researchers; e.g., Dézé 2008), a smaller sample would still guarantee some 
level of saturation while avoiding ‘informational redundancy’ (Francis et al. 2010; Guest et al. 2006). 
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TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF CONCEPTS 
 
Main 
concept 
Subthemes Description Examples 
Liberty Autonomy 
and self-rule 
Analyses relationship between 
Europe and ideas of freedom from 
external constraint and freedom to 
make one owns’ laws at the national 
and European level 
• ‘More than ever it is time for France to 
free itself of the diktats of the European 
Union which have led us to an 
impasse’ (FN 2015) 
External 
power and 
rayonnement 
Analyses relationship between 
Europe and ideas of freedom to 
project power and influence in the 
external realm 
• ‘We have to push her [Europe] to 
rediscover the sense of its autonomous 
personality […] to aim for the first 
place in the world’ (MSI 1987) 
 
Main 
concept 
Subthemes Description Examples 
Threat External 
threats 
Analyses people, countries and 
phenomena which are defined as 
presenting an immediate danger to 
Europe and its nations from the 
outside 
• ‘We must […] document our 
opposition to the ‘civilisation of Coca-
Cola’ coming from the USA, which 
disaggregates the spirit and the soul of 
our popular and national traditions’ 
(MSI 1979a) 
Internal 
threats 
Analyses people and phenomena 
which are defined as presenting an 
immediate danger to Europe and its 
nations from the inside 
• ‘[…] individual crises, and that of 
Europe as a whole, are a crisis of unity, 
of political integration. An outburst of 
bad and poorly digested nationalism 
[…]’ (Romualdi 1981) 
Diffuse 
threats 
Analyses people and phenomena 
which are not clearly identifiable as 
internal or external in nature and who 
are defined as presenting an 
immediate danger to Europe and its 
nations 
• ‘The Europe of Brussels [...] marches, 
slyly, towards Eurofederalism, a simple 
stepping stone towards Globalism, that 
is, to be clear, World Government by 
the United States’ (FN 1999) 
 
Main 
concept 
Subthemes Description Examples 
National 
interest  
Principle of 
European 
Collaboration 
Analyses statements concerning the 
reasons, means and goals of 
collaboration at the European level 
• ‘The nations of Europe have common 
interests and are subject to shared 
dangers. Hence they must be able to 
ensure together their defence’ (FN 
1993) 
Practice of 
European 
Integration 
Analyses judgements assessing how 
EU performs both in terms of 
ensuring goals of European 
collaboration are met and in general 
• ‘Neither can we accept the passivity 
with which the Community adapts 
itself to a secondary role in the world’ 
(MSI 1987d) 
Future of 
European 
Integration 
Analyses views on how an ideal 
European community would look like 
and what principles it would respect 
 
• ‘What we hope for is that Europe is 
[…] a Confederation of different and 
sovereign States […]’ (AN 1994b) 
Main 
concept 
Subthemes Description Examples 
Identity Europe as 
common 
civilisation 
Analyses definition of ‘Europe’ as a 
community of belonging with 
constitutive norms and practices by 
focusing on how Europe and 
Europeans are described 
• ‘Europe is a historic, geographic, 
cultural, economic and social 
ensemble. It is an entity destined for 
action’ (FN 1985) 
Europe as 
bounded 
community 
Analyses view of Europe as a spatial 
and relational category by focusing 
on definitions of its geographic and 
symbolic boundaries 
• ‘Now that Europe has recovered those 
cultures and nations from which it had 
been separated […], the European 
mission realises a historic objective’ 
(AN 2004) 
National and 
European 
identities 
Analyses relationship between 
national belonging and belonging to a 
broader European community 
• ‘One can be French and proud to be 
European, descending from the most 
formidable of civilisations’ (FN 1991) 
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selected at least one document per year, but some years it was deemed necessary to 
include more than one document. This happened particularly around crucial events such 
as the first EP election in 1979 (especially for the MSI), and the Maastricht and European 
Constitution referendum years for the FN. In order to facilitate the retrieval of key 
illustrative sentences, the researcher employed NVivo as a tool to store and organise the 
data. It is mostly through the thick description of the documents studied in this second 
round of analysis that the narrative of the empirical chapters is developed. The remainder 
of the thesis presents the results of the analysis and is organised as follows. Chapters 
three, four, and five address the first research question, identifying the conceptual space 
of Europe. Each chapter addresses one concept that is key to the definition of Europe: 
Identity, Liberty, and Threat. Identity and Liberty, it is argued, are two concepts close to 
the core of the far right’s brand of nationalism and serve to define the meaning of Europe. 
Threat, on the other hand, is an adjacent concept that further characterises the core and 
presents the link between the core and the concrete policy orientations of the parties. 
Chapter six addresses the second question, illustrating how the concepts identified in the 
previous chapters along with a fourth concept of National Interest inform the parties’ 
positions on European integration. Chapter seven concludes the thesis, discussing the 
findings’ implications and identifying areas for future research.  
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3. EUROPA PATRIA NOSTRA: EUROPE AS 
IDENTITY 
 
 
How has Europe acquired meaning in far right ideology? This chapter advances two 
arguments: first, in line with the expectation that parties would draw upon key elements 
in their ideology to decontest Europe, it holds that the MSI/AN and FN have drawn upon 
the concept of Identity to define the meaning of Europe. Second, it suggests that by 
employing this concept, they have ‘opened’ their ideology to incorporate a transnational 
element.  
The following sections develop these points by demonstrating how the concept of 
Identity is mobilised in the MSI/AN and FN’s discussions of Europe.13 The chapter opens 
with a discussion of the relationship between nationalism and Identity, explaining why 
the latter may be considered a core concept in far right ideology. The empirical section 
of the chapter illustrates how the studied parties have employed the concept of Identity in 
their definition of Europe. It shows how the MSI/AN and FN have established the 
existence of Europe as a distinct and unique civilisation with defined symbolic and 
geographic boundaries – in other words, an ‘Us’ that is distinct from ‘Others’. It then 
highlights how membership of this community has carried a broadly positive value, 
although this has come at times to clash with the reality of the EU, considered, in many 
cases, as a limit to a positive understanding of Europe. The concluding section focuses 
on how the inclusion of Europe via the concept of Identity affects the shape of the parties’ 
ideologies, arguing that it ‘opens’ their ideology by adding a layer of belonging that goes 
beyond the national one.  
 
 
13 Both explicit references to the term Identity but also to its component parts as identified in the opening 
section of the chapter are taken into account here. Note, in fact, that the modern use of the term identity as 
a category of belonging is rather recent, and that while this represented the fulcrum of FN discourse, it did 
not appear in this meaning in the discourse of the MSI until the late 1980s. In fact, when used in early 
documents of the MSI, the word ‘identity’ is taken to mean ‘sameness’. However, ideas of in-group and 
out-group that are commonly associated with the term appear in the discourse of the MSI, leading the 
researcher to use the term. 
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MOBILISING THE CORE: FROM IDENTITY TO EUROPE 
Nationalism, Chapter two argued, is often identified as a core ideological feature of far 
right parties. The chapter also suggested that, as an ideology, nationalism is concerned 
with the creation, definition and demand for political recognition of bounded 
communities called ‘nations’, or, as Smith put it, ‘attaining and maintaining autonomy, 
unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual 
or potential “nation”’ (Smith 2010: 9). Nationalism, then, entails first, the definition of a 
group (what will be here referred to as a ‘boundary-building’ element), and, second, some 
claim to political power, agency, or as a bare minimum, self-expression and recognition 
for that group (which will be here called a ‘political’ element).14 
This chapter illustrates how, consistent with the idea that parties will draw on 
existing elements of their ideology to incorporate new issues, the MSI/AN and FN 
redeploy the ‘boundary-building’ elements of nationalism within a new framework and 
employ the concept of Identity to define what Europe is and who belongs to it. 
Furthermore, their understanding of Europe through the prism of Identity is developed in 
such a way that their definition of Europe closely mirrors their definition of the nation.  
Identity, as Tajfel succinctly put it, is ‘that part of the individual’s self-concept 
which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group(s) together with 
the value and emotional significance attached to that membership’ (1978: 63). It can be 
seen as comprising of two elements: first of all, the identification of a certain group, or 
community, and, second, a sense of belonging to said group. Social identities and 
divisions between ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ are a common way of thinking about the world 
(Cramer 2016); however, the centrality of the concept, as well as the components that 
make for a certain identity, will vary across groups. In this sense, while the language of 
identity will be shared, how that identity is construed and how much it matters will vary. 
Identity is a particularly central notion in the case of far right parties whose 
ideology is defined by the identification of a specific national community, different from 
 
14 Note that the distinction between a ‘boundary-building’ and a ‘political’ aspect of nationalism is not the 
same as the familiar ‘civic’ versus ‘ethnic’ distinction (for the original distinction, see Kohn 2005 [1944]; 
for a nuanced take on this debate, see Brubaker 1999). What the civic/ethnic distinction captures is the way 
in which boundaries and national communities are defined. The ‘boundary-building’ and ‘political’ 
distinction adopted here, one the other hand, seeks to capture what nationalism does, rather than how it 
does it. In this sense, the civic/ethnic division is a specification of how nationalism builds boundaries, but 
does not capture what the boundaries are being created for.  
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others and to which belonging has an emotional value attached (Freeden 1998b: 751-
752). For the MSI/AN, this national community is conceived of as an ethno-cultural 
‘spiritual community’, whose existence is not limited to the material world but also 
grounded in a common destiny and a historical continuity of traditions (Tarchi 2003: 146). 
In a similar vein, the FN conceives of France as a millenary civilisation, a territorially 
rooted community brought together by a common history, culture and, less explicitly, a 
shared ethnic lineage (although see Davies 1999: 80-83 on the FN’s ambiguous positions 
on ‘civic’ versus ‘ethnic’ nationalism). For both parties, these national communities 
represent the primary form of identification, trumping all other belongings. The concept 
of Identity, then, serves to define the characteristics of the nation, who belongs to it and 
who should be excluded, and the value attached to being a part of the national community. 
The identification of a distinct community and a reflection on the value attached 
to belonging to it come into play in both the MSI/AN’s and FN’s definition of Europe. 
The former feature does so when the parties identify a series of characteristics that are 
distinctive to Europe and the Europeans, and when they explicitly define where the 
boundaries of that community lie. Their definition of Europe closely mirrors their 
conception of the nation as an organic and spiritual community, brought together by a 
shared history and culture, thus showing how core elements of their ideology are 
redeployed in the definition of Europe. The latter feature manifests itself in their 
expressions of an attachment to the European community that is complementary to the 
national one because they are rooted in the same tradition. The following sections 
illustrate empirically how these elements of the concept of Identity have been 
‘repurposed’ by the parties to define Europe.  
 
DEFINING THE COMMUNITY: WHAT IS EUROPE? 
Identity requires the identification of a specific group that one belongs to. While within 
the context of nationalism, the primary group of belonging – the ‘terminal community’ in 
Deutsch’s words (1966) – is the nation, this does not mean that other communities cannot 
be recognised. The following section illustrates how this first element of the concept of 
Identity has come into play in the parties’ definition of Europe. It shows that the parties 
studied here have all recognised the existence of a specific European group and have 
defined it as an ‘us’ of some kind, a collective with ‘constitutive norms’ that define its 
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‘boundaries and distinctive practices’ (Abdelal et al. 2006: 697). Europe, they have 
claimed, represents a distinct civilization, characterised by a common history and heritage 
that Europeans have expressed through the centuries. They have, however, adopted 
somewhat differing definitions of this shared identity, as well as different views 
concerning its implications. 
 
ROOTED IN THE PAST, TURNED TOWARDS THE FUTURE: THE MSI’S 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF BELONGING 
The MSI’s view of Europe as a distinct community was built around two tenets: the 
acknowledgement of a shared past, and the hope for a shared future. Europe, in their view, 
was both a distinct and unique civilization rooted in the past, but also, a project of unity 
which building on this past, would lead Europe towards a common future.  
To understand how this view has been expressed, and where its origins lie, it is 
helpful to briefly abandon the timeline of this study and take a step back to the 1950s and 
the writings of Filippo Anfuso. Anfuso was a diplomat in Mussolini’s Italy and 
represented the Italian Social Republic in Berlin. Upon his return in Italy in 1950, he 
joined the MSI and was elected to the lower chamber. The reason he is essential to the 
discussion of Europe in the MSI is that several of the MSI’s positions on Europe constitute 
developments of the notion of Europe that Anfuso sketched out in the publication Europa 
Nazione, a short lived party magazine established in 1951 whose aim was to bring 
together the works and reflections of European authors on how to build a ‘Nation Europe’ 
(see also Mammone 2015: 84-85).  
The first number of Europa Nazione is in itself an interesting document. The list 
of contributors reads as a ‘who’s who’ of European fascism: authors included Giovanni 
Gentile, Maurice Bardèche and Julius Evola. In the foreword, Anfuso presented his own 
view of Europe, claiming that to him ‘Nation Europe’ ‘means a free and united Europe’ 
and ‘a bigger Nation’ that the smaller individual nations will be a part of (Anfuso 1951: 
6-7). In this simple sentence, Anfuso expresses what will be the guiding principles of the 
MSI’s vision of Europe: first of all, the idea of a community of smaller individual nations 
united under the banner of a larger, European nation. The idea of nation employed here 
to discuss Europe implies the presence of a shared heritage that guides them towards 
unity. Secondly, underlying the sentence is the idea of Europe as a project, suggesting 
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that while communities need a starting point, they are also built in the future. Finally, 
Europe needs to be ‘free’, a central part of the party’s ideology of Europe and which will 
be discussed in depth in Chapter four. 
While recognising the distinctiveness of Europe by comparing it to a potential 
nation, Anfuso remained remarkably silent on the defining features of this community.15 
This vagueness concerning what makes Europeans unique remains present in later MSI 
documents. In fact, it may be noted that the MSI, while claiming some form of European 
identity, puts little effort into defining the nature of Europe. This can be observed, for 
example, in the following passage from the 1980’s pamphlet ‘Il MSI dalla A alla Z’ (‘The 
MSI, from A to Z’). The pamphlet discusses and comments on the principles of the MSI’s 
doctrine most frequently ‘used to interpret the various aspects of reality and inform its 
[the party’s] praxis’ (MSI 1980: 9), and includes an entry on ‘Europeanism’, defined as    
the ancient and always alive aspiration towards European unity, 
in the conscience of a community of interests and destinies, of 
history, of civilisation, of tradition among Europeans. The MSI-
DN conceives of its Europeanism in this wider spiritual and moral 
sense, in addition to the material one; a Europeanism that is not 
opposed to the concept of the West, but distinct with respects to 
it and connected to it. (MSI 1980: 25) 
Beyond the recognition of a European ‘community of interests and destinies’, coupled 
with vagueness concerning the contents of European identity (although, and this will be 
developed in the following sections of this thesis, it at least adds a point of specificity by 
saying that ‘Europe’ is not the same as ‘the West’), three further elements should catch 
the eye of the reader in this passage. First of all, the mere presence of ‘Europeanism’ in 
the booklet should highlight the importance of Europe as a concept for the MSI. Second 
of all, a further element of the MSI’s ideology is brought into the definition of Europe. In 
particular, this Europeanism, fitting with the MSI’s broader conception of existence and 
well in line with the spiritual conception of life advocated by Mussolini’s Fascist doctrine, 
sees Europe not only as a geographical or economic entity but also as a spiritual body, a 
view which is further reinforced by discussions in other documents of World War Two 
as the last of the European ‘civil wars’ (MSI 1979d). Finally, the attentive reader will 
 
15 Others in the MSI’s early years were less shy: Adriano Romualdi, young Evolian party intellectual and 
son of Pino, for example, clearly defined Europeanness in terms of race (Rossi 2003: 169, Mammone 2015: 
87-88). 
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have also noticed that the passage brings us back to the idea developed earlier of Europe 
as a project in the future – an ‘aspiration’. 
This theme of a common heritage leading towards future unity in the shape of a 
new ‘Homeland’ called ‘Nation Europe’ is most clearly exemplified in a minority 
congress motion brought forward by Pino Rauti, leader of the left-wing revolutionary 
current in the party, in 1982. In a congress in which all three motions stressed the 
importance of further European collaboration in times of international tension, Rauti’s 
motion captured most clearly the future-oriented nature of European unity when 
affirming, ‘[a]nd our continent is Europe, our new Homeland, bigger and more complex, 
a Homeland that needs to be built in its true structures but which already has all the true 
and vital contents such as history, tradition, culture and civilisation. A Homeland that has 
its “soul” even though it has not yet found an adequate form’ (MSI 1982b). Thus, Rauti 
reasserts the dual view of Europe as a common heritage and a project in the future, a new 
Homeland which has its own soul but which has yet to find the right political expression. 
Europe, in this case, appears not only as an identity in the past but also as a future project 
of unity which will allow that ‘soul’ to thrive.  
 
RETURN TO THE PRESENT: AN AND THE ROOTING OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
AN’s view of Europe as a community is discussed most extensively in documents from 
the early 2000s. In fact, while virtually absent from its early documents, the definition of 
Europe features prominently in the party’s 2002 Congress and 2004 Euromanifesto, 
possibly as the result of two factors: first, AN’s return to government and the willingness 
to present itself as a ‘trustworthy’ partner attached to European values (Tarchi 2003: 166-
167), and, second, the intensification of debates concerning the European Constitution. 
The party’s definition of Europe is marked by both breaks and continuities with 
the MSI’s view. Like the MSI, AN recognised the existence of a distinct European 
community and stressed the important place it occupied in its ideology. Unlike the MSI, 
however, AN was more explicit in its description of Europeanness, building its depiction 
of it in such a way as to echo the early 2000s debates on the European Constitution. In 
addition, whereas the MSI presented a view of Europe as a community rooted in the past 
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and turned towards the future, AN built primarily on the former part of the equation with 
the objective not of promoting further European unity, but of supporting its existing form.  
The 2004 manifesto provides a particularly clear illustration of AN’s view of 
Europe, showing both how the party defined it and the breaks and continuities with the 
past. The manifesto opens by defining Europe as ‘one of the most qualifying ideals of the 
Italian right’ and continues by saying that 
when others were looking at Soviet internationalism, the Italian 
Right responded by affirming the identity of the united Europe, 
able to bring back into politics that spiritual homogeneity that a 
millenary spiritual tradition is based on. 
When we affirm “Europe”, in the political debate as well 
as in common speak, we mean to allude to not only a certain 
extension of lands, to a geographical conception of the continent 
[…]. We intend much more, something deeper, a certain form of 
civilisation that has stratified in centuries of history, a “way of 
being” of the human that marks the European, son of a long 
tradition. A history that has been articulated through two 
thousand years of common religious history, legal institutes 
founded on Roman law, reciprocal literary and artistic influences 
that have clearly selected a basis of common [shared] thought. 
It was the Right, in this perspective, to affirm that the 
Union could not only be a simple and sole sum of economic and 
commercial agreements, but should base itself on a spiritual 
yearning able to recall its tradition. (AN 2004) 
As far as the definition goes, the passage provides some more clarity concerning AN’s 
view of what Europe is. Like the MSI, AN’s programme presents Europe as a ‘spiritual’ 
community; however, its defining characteristics are fleshed out more clearly. In 
particular, beyond recognising the existence of a shared civilisation, it also points to 
concrete elements of shared heritage, such as Roman law, art and religion. These are 
further developed in a later passage which addresses the ‘roots of Europe’:  
Europe historically pre-exists the Union that they are trying to 
build today. Its cultural unity is millenary, filtered through 
centuries of history. When we talk about values, such as the 
dignity of the person, the Rule of Law, solidarity, the value of the 
family, the respect for life, without realising it we refer to those 
principles that the Judeo-Christian roots have given to Europe. A 
shared foundation that has become the shared value of European 
identity. It was the Judeo-Christian roots that have made us arrive, 
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[…] to that concept of person, of the centrality of the human that 
represents the distinctive trait of free Europe. 
The European constitution cannot be based on 
“compromises to the lowest common denominator”, which tend 
to marginalise the spiritual aspect and thus reduce the Union to a 
simple market. In the moment where we get ready to approve the 
Constitutional treaty of Europe, the addition of a reference to the 
Judeo-Christian roots becomes the recognition of the secular 
unity that pre-existed a mere convenience deal. It means 
recognising the spirituality of Europe. (AN 2004) 
Beyond restating some of the points discussed in the previous section, the passage above 
further reinforces the view of the existence of a spiritual connection between the European 
peoples, meaning that the European Union should be a construction representing it. 
Importantly, what the passage also shows is that Europe is here put at the service of the 
European Union specifically. In the context of the discussion and ratification of the 
European Constitutional Treaty (which AN’s leader Gianfranco Fini had been involved 
in drafting), the second passage stressing the need to use Europe to construct an identity 
for the European Union appears as particularly relevant. The elements that are mentioned 
as being defining of this European civilisation are not randomly picked, but rather appear 
to resonate with EU’s own values as presented in the Treaty, such as the Rule of Law or 
the dignity of the person. Thus, the language of AN ends up dovetailing rather than 
clashing with that of the EU, anchoring its view of what Europe is to the specific project 
of European integration and the narratives underpinning it.  
A final point concerning not the content of the AN’s definition of Europe but, 
rather, what it allows the party to claim about itself and its history, may also be noted. In 
particular, by identifying Europe as a ‘defining ideal’ in the Right’s history, as well as 
stressing some elements of continuity with the past, the AN’s ideology of Europe may 
allow it to claim consistency with its own past ideals. Thus, in spite of its transition from 
‘neo-fascism’ to ‘post-fascism’, AN could still, through Europe, keep the allegiance of its 
historical members, while attracting new ones in virtue of its transition. 
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EUROPEAN CIVILISATION VERSUS EUROPEAN UNION: THE FRONT 
NATIONAL’S TWO EUROPES 
Compared with the MSI/AN, the FN has been more explicit in terms of its definition of 
Europe as a community; however, it has also shifted its positions more significantly than 
the Italian parties. The FN’s discussion of Europe through the lenses of identity has in 
fact changed rather significantly through time and in conjunction with the evolution of 
the European Union. While in its early years, Europe was discussed primarily as a form 
of identification, and the EU as an acceptable, albeit imperfect representation of this 
civilisation, throughout the years, Europe and the European Union increasingly developed 
as separate entities, with the European Union slowly becoming an ‘anti-Europe’ of sorts.  
Looking at the Front National’s early party literature clearly illustrates the extent 
to which the party recognised the existence of Europe as a distinct and, in many ways, 
glorious entity. In a programmatic book from 1984, for example, Jean-Marie Le Pen 
defined it as 
a historic, geographic, cultural, economic and social ensemble. It 
is an entity destined for action. Europe is currently divided, in 
decline. Europe is retreating to the borders of the Year 1000, but 
it guards the possibilities for rebirth, should she rediscover a 
spiritual, intellectual and political unity and all that has been its 
spirit: that is, a will to act for civilisation, to refuse to be 
submerged and vanquished. (Le Pen 1984: 154)  
Further stressing the centrality of concepts linked to nationalism in the decontestation of 
Europe, it is worth noting that beyond defining Europe as a ‘historic, geographic, cultural 
ensemble’, the discourse employed on Europe mirrors closely that which the party 
commonly uses to define the nation. Thus, for example, Europe is presented in 
romanticised terms and, as is often the case for far right discourse concerning the nation, 
the narrative of a glorious past is contrasted with a narrative of decline and crisis, 
symbolised by the idea of a retreat to the borders of the Year 1000 (this will be further 
discussed in Chapter five). Equally, however, there is a promise that Europe can reacquire 
its prestige and recover its grandeur. It is, as the 1985 programme defines it, ‘a sleeping 
genie who can and must awake’ (Le Pen 1985: 190). Importantly, Le Pen suggests that 
the way to greatness for Europe is no longer an individual, national, path, but a collective 
path to be pursued through ‘spiritual, intellectual and political unity’. In this sense, Europe 
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appears as a collective form of identification which is beyond the nation states and whose 
rebirth is viewed in positive terms. 
Identity is also, however, about awareness of similarity and belonging, and while 
Le Pen is aware of this commonality of Europeans, he laments the absence of a collective 
European conscience in others. This is done on the one hand, by pushing Europeans to be 
proud of themselves and, on the other, by putting forward practical suggestions on how 
to build a European conscience. On the first point, Le Pen considered it necessary for 
Europeans to be ‘proud of themselves and of their contribution to the world, proud of 
their past, their age-old culture and their uniquely rich historical experience’ because they 
‘brought technologic progress to the world, which all countries and all peoples can benefit 
from today’ (1985: 189-190). On the second point, it is worth citing the following passage 
from 1984 at length:  
Today, there is no European conscience, and I regret it. I know, 
in any case, a certain number of reasons [for this]. 
We were not wise enough to start on the right footing after 
the Second World War. To forget the conflicts that tore Europe 
apart in an extremely bloody way […] To build Europe, one must 
not continue to pursue morose delectation […]. It is necessary to 
stop rubbing salt in the wound. It is necessary to forget mutual 
faults, if one is to build or rebuild Europe in an effective and 
emotional way. 
I will say, and I have as much of a right as anyone else, 
that Germany does not bear the entire responsibility of the Second 
World War. 
The Allies in the First World War – and amongst them the 
French government – also bear a great responsibility in the great 
ploy, the civil war, that was the Second World War. I know that 
those who truly suffered, those who really fought, those who 
really resisted, they have already forgiven. (Le Pen 1984: 156-
157) 
This passage is particularly relevant in terms of considering how a European conscience, 
the recognition of an ‘Us’ has to be built. Le Pen both suggests the existence of the 
potential for a European conscience, and seeks to explain the causes of its ‘deplorable’ 
absence. In particular, the lack of a European conscience is not blamed on the objective 
lack of a common basis for the formation of an ‘Us’, but rather, on historic mistakes 
which have prevented this conscience from forming and transforming Europe into 
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something close to a nation. Those who are familiar with Renan will recognise an echo 
of his ‘What is a Nation?’ in Le Pen’s writing. The notion of the forgetting of mutual 
faults is quite clearly a rephrasing of his idea that ‘the essence of a nation is that all 
individuals have many things in common; and also that they have forgotten many things’ 
(Renan 1992 [1882]). The similarities between Europe and a nation continue with the 
discussion of the Second World War as a civil war between Europeans: civil wars, by 
definition, are between members of the same group, be it a nation or a state. Thus, 
Europeans are presented as belonging to a same group, although what that group is 
remains unclear: not a state, not (yet?) a nation, but a body that could become either.  
The passages above all clearly reflect a definition of Europe that goes beyond that 
of the European Union. Europe appears in them as a specific community, a grand 
civilisation in need of a missing collective conscience, which is bound to unite somehow. 
This definition of Europe, however, is in the following years increasingly pitted against 
the European Union. If in fact, at the beginning, the party’s moderate stance on the EU 
suggests that it was considered to somehow represent this ancient and superior 
civilization, or at least have the potential to do so if done correctly, following the Single 
European Act and the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union increasingly became a ‘fake 
Europe’ to be pitted against this ‘true Europe’. The following quotes from a 1991 
pamphlet presenting the Front National to an Anglophone audience, the Front National’s 
2002 programme and a speech from Marine Le Pen in 2017 helpfully highlight this 
evolution and its persistence through time: 
The Europe which is being constructed in Brussels, with the 
complicity of the French political class, is a step on the road 
towards cosmopolitanism. The Front National considers that 
Europe is not only a great market of industrialised nations, but 
above all a community of civilisations. 
Europe should not, therefore, be “constructed” in Brussels 
according to Utopian schemes of Eurocrats who dream of a 
European super-state in charge of everything, destroying nations 
and opening Europe to third-world immigrants and American or 
Japanese products. Europe should be organised around the 
common identity of Europeans and should form a force against 
external threats. [Original in English] (Groupe des Droites 
Européennes 1991) 
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If we first and foremost fight for the continuity and rebirth of 
France […] we also know that European nations share the same 
civilisation and face the same planetary threats.  
[…] Cooperation between European nations then rests on 
the sovereignty of all nations that geographically belong to 
Europe. But these are free nations who ally: they are not forced 
to suffer against their will the decisions taken by others. (FN 
2002) 
 
For us, Europe is not an idea. Europe is a culture, it’s a civilization 
with its values, its codes, its great men, its accomplishments its 
masterpieces. For us Europe is not only a history but also a 
geography, where Turkey does not belong. Europe is a series of 
peoples whose respective identities exhale the fecund diversity of 
the continent […] I believe in a common destiny of the nations 
and peoples of Europe impregnated by the millenary civilization 
that they share. 
I believe in the need for a European organisation in the 
great uproar of the world and of globalisation, but in no case can 
this construction provoke the disappearance of the nations that 
form it. Our European project will be that of the Nations and 
peoples, their diversity and their respect. To their European Union 
we will substitute the Union of European Nations. (Le Pen 2017a) 
The citations above all share a common thread: while identifying a common European 
civilisation shared by all European nations and expressing an attachment to it, they also 
point to the inadequacy of the European Union as a form to represent it, and even suggest 
that it is a kind of ‘anti-Europe’ because it destroys what is distinctive of Europe: its 
division in nations. Thus, the European Union ends up becoming a threat to this common 
European civilization - suggesting that while Europe may be a space for identification, 
the European Union, by actively endangering that space, is not. This point will be further 
developed in the concluding sections of this chapter, when discussing the relationship 
between the European and national identities, as well as in Chapter five, when the concept 
of Threat will be discussed.  
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SETTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE COMMUNITY: WHO BELONGS? 
The previous section illustrated how the core concept of Identity has been employed by 
the studied parties to integrate Europe in their ideology. In particular, it highlighted how 
it led them to define it as a community of some kind, characterised by certain features 
which, while common to a group of ‘Europeans’, do not extend beyond them. If the notion 
of Identity requires the definition of a certain group, it also implies that the group has set 
limits and that not everyone can belong, thus creating both an ‘in-group’ and ‘Others’ 
(Triandafyllidou 1998). In fact, while boundaries can be fuzzy or ‘blurry’ (Alba 2005), 
groups need to have some criteria for membership to avoid losing meaning.  
In line with the view that communities need to be bounded, the MSI/AN and FN 
did not limit themselves to defining Europe as a community with specific characteristics. 
They also insisted on its bounded nature, particularly by addressing, both directly and 
indirectly, the question ‘who belongs to Europe?’ This is done particularly in reference 
to the two debates where the parties discuss this boundary question most extensively: 
firstly, the issue of European irredentism following the division of Europe after World 
War Two, and, secondly, the extensive debates on EU enlargement and the emerging 
considerations on who is sufficiently ‘European’ to belong to the EU. These reflections 
add an element of definition to the European community identified earlier by specifying 
who is a part of it, and who needs to be excluded. Creating insiders and outsiders tightens 
the boundaries of the community and further defines who belongs by building this in 
opposition to those who do not belong. While the role of the ‘Other’ will be further 
explored in Chapter five, it is pertinent for now to consider where the MSI/AN and FN 
placed European boundaries. 
 
CONTESTING THE BORDERS OF EUROPE: THE MSI’S EUROPEAN 
IRREDENTISM 
The MSI constructed its view of Europe as a bounded community primarily by stressing 
the inadequacy of its existing borders. In fact, while the MSI insisted on the idea that 
Europe did have defined borders, it did not recognise the existing ones as being true 
representations of the previously defined European community. To understand the roots 
of this claim, it bears to remember two things: first of all, at the national level, the MSI 
rejected the territorial losses inflicted upon Italy following World War Two (in particular, 
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the loss of Istria). Second, and most importantly, the MSI acted principally in the context 
of the Cold War, when Europe was split in two by the Iron Curtain. As a result, countries 
which were ‘spiritually’ European, ended up being excluded from Europe. This informed 
much of its critique of the shape of Europe in the 1980s and led it to support a form of 
European irredentism against the ‘infamous partition’ of Yalta. It also informed its 
support for the European integration of Spain and Portugal.  
The party’s rejection of the Yalta agreements is the most pertinent place to observe 
how the MSI’s critique of the existing order led it to posit the existence of a bounded 
European community. Yalta, in fact, represented in the party’s view a distortion of the 
natural shape of Europe, leading to the exclusion from the continent of countries whose 
natural place was in it. In this sense, it ‘displaced’ the natural boundaries of Europe, 
making its form highly imperfect. The following passage from a 1982 minority congress 
motion (which, however, reflects positions expressed elsewhere) illustrates this nicely 
when it says, 
Europe, condemned to partition by the infamous and stupid 
market of Yalta, [...] condemned for decades to political 
impotence and to the fall, at times slow and at times very fast of 
its most glorious institutions and of its prestige, cannot and will 
not resign itself to consider closed, with the ignoble division of 
its peoples and its territories, the unitary story of its life. Forced 
to take note of the brutal political and military reality that keeps 
it divided without the possibility of quick changes, it cannot 
however not feel in the depths of its soul that its destiny cannot 
stop at 1945 or at the Oder-Neisse. An infamous border that the 
never kept promises on human rights and security and the 
freedom of peoples, signed as a payment in Helsinky [sic] by 
Russia and its satellites, have neither paid nor cancelled from 
political memory. (MSI 1982c)  
By opposing the existing order, and calling upon a shared destiny, the motion reclaims a 
return to the ‘natural’ borders of Europe, borders which would include the captive nations 
of Eastern Europe as an integral part of it. This form of irredentism remained a strong 
marker of the party, which, throughout the 1980s, kept stressing the need to review the 
European boundaries and ensure their congruence with the ‘spiritual community’ of 
Europe. Coherently with this position, when the revolutions of 1989 and the fall of the 
Berlin wall came, the MSI expressed itself in favour of EU accession for the countries of 
68 
 
Central and Eastern Europe  (CEE) as to ensure that Europe truly went from ‘the Atlantic 
to the Urals’, with a united Germany at its heart (MSI 1990c). 
The view of Europe as a ‘spiritual community’ which should be enclosed in fitting 
boundaries also influenced the MSI’s positions on EU enlargement. The MSI supported 
Portugal and Spain’s EU accession in the 1980s. Perhaps most interestingly, it insisted on 
the fact that their accession should be based on ‘spiritual’ rather than economic criteria. 
Therefore, even if their accession would represent a cost for certain countries, including 
Italy, the party claimed that such considerations should be secondary in deciding who 
should belong to the EU. This is visible in particular in an editorial by politician and 
newspaper editor Cesare Mantovani in the Secolo d’Italia, in which he takes the occasion 
to criticise the existing political class on their approach to enlargement and highlight what 
the MSI milieu considered a more sensible approach: 
It is about choosing between the Europe of contingent interests 
and the Europe of volitions (that has to be built and that must find 
its ancient and perennial soul, in which there are France, England, 
Germany, Greece, Italy and the other “five” of the “ten”, but also 
Spain and Portugal). For the grey and growling managers of the 
“existent”, whether they be socialist or not, the choice is that of 
interests. It is totally normal, then, even obvious, that for them, 
the Spanish and the Portuguese appear first of all as competitors 
to fear rather than partners to use. For us, on the other side, they 
are brothers to build Nation Europe with. Ours is not 
“romanticism”: far from that. It is on the contrary, an 
“investment” for the future, because Europe will either become a 
Nation, or it will not have any sense and importance. Not even for 
interests. (Mantovani 1985) 
Here again, we see a point mentioned in the earlier section of ‘Europe as project’, but also 
of the idea of Europe as a spiritual community which is beyond a community of interest. 
It is a community of volition, in which the nations are ‘brothers’ rather than mere 
economic partners.  
A discussion on the borders of Europe would not be complete without mentioning 
the EU’s most controversial enlargement: Turkey. While this was not an issue that was 
particularly important to the MSI or particularly salient in its time, it is worth mentioning 
because it will acquire a prominent place in the FN’s discussion of Europe. The MSI did 
not discuss the issue of Turkey in any of its manifestos or of its congress motions; 
however, in an article on the Secolo d’Italia (Mollicone 1986), there was a reflection on 
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whether Turkey should or should not join the European Community. The author, 
journalist and politician Nazareno Mollicone, interestingly, seems to take a rather neutral 
stance, highlighting both the arguments in favour of Turkish accession, such as its tight 
political and commercial relations with Europe, which, albeit often conflictual, ‘bred 
reciprocal knowledge’, and its place in NATO; and those standing against it, namely the 
Common Agricultural Policy, the risk of Islamisation and the issue of immigration in 
Germany. While the article does not come to a solution on the question of Turkish 
integration, it is important to highlight that it does not exclude it a priori but that it 
considers it a political question, in need of a political answer.  
 
PRAGMATISM IN ACTION: ALLEANZA NAZIONALE AND THE POLITICS OF 
ENLARGEMENT 
Compared with the MSI, AN developed its political existence at a time in which the need 
to define who belonged to Europe was less pressing. In fact, while the previous section 
showed that it considered Europe to form a distinct community, it dedicated little space 
to identifying who concretely belonged to it. Reflections of this type emerged exclusively 
in discussions of EU enlargement, where, however, AN displayed a more practical and 
less spiritually inclined position on the challenges posed by European integration. Thus, 
for example, on the accession of Central and Eastern Europe, its first 1994 programme 
held that  
the new Eastern democracies need to be able to count on 
guarantees with respect to a future membership of NATO and of 
the European Union. To enter the “European club”, however, it is 
necessary for them to correspond to specific standards of 
economic, civic and social maturity. A rushed and premature 
entry would aggravate the detrimental influences on Western 
Europe. In any case the eradication of any residue of “real 
socialism” appears indispensable and especially in virtue of the 
recycling of the Communist “nomenklatura”, even if it is under 
the label of socialist or social-democratic. (AN 1994a) 
Maintaining the MSI’s tradition of anti-communism, the early AN highlights the potential 
negative effects that an enlargement to Eastern countries still under the influence of ‘real 
socialism’ could have. In line with the MSI’s previous commitments, the programme also 
claims that additional conditions would apply to Croatia and Slovenia, whose accession 
should be conditional upon successful renegotiation of the Treaty of Osimo (AN 1994a). 
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Thus, instead of insisting on their ‘natural’ belonging to Europe, it stresses the practical 
obstacles that stand in Central and Eastern Europe’s way, moving away from the MSI’s 
idealism towards a more pragmatic stance concerning European borders.  
While the 1994 programme has an ambiguous status in the history of the party 
because it was published before the official transformation of the MSI into Alleanza 
Nazionale and could therefore be seen as an essentially ‘repackaged’ MSI programme16, 
the positions expressed within it concerning the Europeanness of CEE countries, but also 
the challenges posed by enlargement, remained a marker of the party in subsequent years. 
This ambivalence is well illustrated in the 2004 Euromanifesto, which welcomed the 
‘reunification’ with the East, but also highlighted its problematic nature: 
Now that Europe has recovered those cultures and nations from 
which it had been separated by the “Iron Curtain imposed by 
socialism”, the European mission realises a historic objective, but 
it becomes even harder because it will have to guarantee that 
social and structural cohesion fixed in its principles. The 
reunification with the East realises with success an ideal which 
has been cultivated for long and that had been made possible by 
the fall of the Berlin Wall. A great opportunity but at the same 
time a challenge, not without difficulties, which has just started. 
(AN 2004)  
Finally, Alleanza Nazionale also adopted an open mind about Turkey, with Fini speaking 
openly in favour of Turkish accession to the European Union (Il Giornale 2005). In this 
sense, we can suggest that for AN, the borders of Europe, or at least of the EU, are rather 
different from those of the Front National, to which the next section now turns. 
 
EUROPEANS AND THE REST: THE FRONT NATIONAL’S DELIMITED EUROPE 
The principle of ‘boundaries’ and ‘borders’ is one that is particularly relevant to the Front 
National. Mirroring the idea that the notion of identity creates outsiders and insiders, 
boundaries, in the party’s view, are essential because they allow to not only tell apart ‘Us’ 
and ‘Them’, but also keep the two separated. As Mégret put it clearly, ‘Border’ is ‘an 
essential principle’ since ‘a civilisation exists only through organised groups, institutions, 
 
16 In fact, while the MSI already ran under the new name of AN in the 1994 election, it did not complete its 
transition until the Fiuggi Congress of 1995. The 1994 programme can thus be seen as one seeking to 
present a new project while maintaining an attachment to the traditional themes of the old party 
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norms and rules that constitute it, and that none of those things can exist with no limits, 
no borders, between those who belong to a group and the others’ (Mégret 1989b). Thus, 
particularly in its early years, it identified the need for Europe to establish clear 
boundaries and ‘underline what differentiates it from the rest of the world, not what makes 
it like the rest of the world. It must have limits’ (FN 1991: 118). Unlike the MSI/AN, who 
discussed borders in a primarily ‘positive’ sense which sought to claim Europeanness for 
a group of countries, the Front National traced the limits of Europe by discussing both 
who could be considered European, and who should not belong to the European 
community.  
The boundaries of Europe traced by the Front National in terms of who does 
belong to Europe resemble closely those identified by the MSI/AN. Like the MSI, the 
1980s’ FN placed significant emphasis on the misplaced borders of Europe. Speaking 
from a heavily anti-Communist perspective, it criticised the division of Europe between 
a Western and an Eastern part, viewing it as an unnatural partition. For example, Le Pen 
argued that  
the people are not quite aware, today, of what is happening in the 
occupied Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania. For a simple 
reason. For forty years, they have been taught history under the 
control of teachers who are favourable to the Soviet thesis. Thus, 
they have little by little, the impression that these countries no 
longer belong to Europe; that Eastern Europe is the traditional 
zone of influence of the Slavic world and that that is ok. (Le Pen 
1984: 155) 
In presenting the borders of Europe as the fruit of a Communist manipulation of history, 
rather than a reflection of Europe, Le Pen thus challenged the idea that Eastern Europe 
belonged to a Slavic area of influence (itself an interesting claim in terms of thinking of 
the ethnic composition of the FN’s Europe), and the laziness of the ‘people’ who had 
gotten used to thinking of it that way. As an aside, it might be added that this border 
discussion also brings in other elements of the FN’s ideology, such as its previously 
mentioned rabid anti-communism, and even a measure of populism in the attack on 
Soviet-sympathising teachers.  
The Front National also had to deal with the second border issue that the MSI had 
to discuss: the borders of the EU and its enlargement to Spain and Portugal. While having 
no doubts concerning their Europeanness, the FN was less enthusiastic than the MSI in 
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its assessment of their membership bid, suggesting the need to be cautious in the 
continuous enlargement of the European Union. These dynamics are captured in the 
following passage from Le Pen’s 1984 programmatic book, which also includes some 
critical reflections on an existing member of the EU:  
Spain and Portugal [...] are surely destined [to belong to Europe]. 
Who could, without complacency and insolence, refuse to these 
two great nations, who each wrote some of the most unforgettable 
pages in European history, to access at the right time? But I say 
this honestly, this time has not yet come. Europe will first have to 
demonstrate that it can work with 10 members, before it tries to 
work with twelve or more. There are some examples that lead one 
to reflect For example the attitude of England in the concert of 
Europe, as well as, if I may say, its previous attitudes. One could, 
based on its traditional politics, doubt its European will. Should 
London place itself in the position of blocking the regular 
functioning of Europe, I believe one would have reason to 
propose a referendum on the leaving or remaining of Great 
Britain. [...]  
In substance, Spain and Portugal have such an importance 
in the history of Europe, they filled so many glorious pages that 
no one could dispute, one day, their entry in the Common Market. 
It is the same for the captive nations on the other side of the iron 
curtain and who are historically destined to access the union of 
Europe. (Le Pen 1984: 161-162)  
The passage above is of interest in several respects. First of all, it confirms a point raised 
earlier in which it was suggested that at least in the mid-1980s, the Front National 
considered the EU to be at least partially representative of Europe, as the idea of allowing 
Spain and Portugal to join is based on their relevance in the history of Europe. A similar 
point is raised about the nations of Eastern Europe, who have a ‘historical vocation’ to 
belong to Europe. These points also restate the importance of the previously studied 
notion of ‘shared civilisation’ in defining who belongs and who does not belong to 
Europe. Interestingly, however, belonging to Europe does not only appear to be an issue 
of belonging to that civilisation, but also of being committed to it. In this sense, the 
reference to Britain is interesting, because it suggests that it is not enough to be 
geographically close to Europe to be European: one also needs to have a ‘European will’. 
The EU’s enlargement has also been an occasion for the FN to stress who should 
not be considered European, thus reinforcing the notion of a boundary between Europeans 
73 
 
and non-Europeans. If the previous passage already suggested some doubts concerning 
the Europeanness of Britain, the most extensive discussion of who is not European comes 
into play by reference to Turkey’s accession to the EU. The Front National has 
extensively opposed the accession of Turkey to the EU, tracing clearly the border between 
Europe and ‘Others’ to the country. The bulk of the Front National’s argumentation is 
nicely summarised below in a 2000 article by Olivier Martinelli, Jean-Marie Le Pen’s 
chief of staff at the time: 
We are told that “Turkey is a European nation”. This statement is 
false on four counts. Geographically, only one thirtieth of the total 
area of the territory, snatched from the Greeks in 1453, belongs 
to Europe (the region of Constantinople). Linguistically, Turkish 
does not belong to the group of European idioms, since it does 
not stem from Sanskrit, the Indo-European mother-tongue. As far 
as the population criteria go, the ancestors of the Turks descend 
from nomadic tribes close to the Mongolians, with the exception 
of the inhabitants of Thrace, who mixed with the prisoners from 
the Balkans (Greek, Albanian, Serbo-Croatian and Bosnians). On 
the cultural plane, finally, the progressive conversion to Islam of 
this anciently shamanic people, sealed its exclusion from the 
European sphere, which is fundamentally Christian. (Martinelli 
2000) 
In a discussion on borders, Martinelli’s passage has the advantage of highlighting a 
variety of ways in which one might think of the notion of boundaries. Starting from the 
most basic one of geography and ending on the stronger definition of a cultural boundary, 
which is really a religious boundary, he proceeds to explain all the ways in which Turkey 
is not European. Here it is worth noting in particular the last two points, which appear to 
be the ones that truly motivate the Front National and which are restated in several other 
points as well, for example when the party expresses fear for the ‘pluri-ethnicisation’ of 
Europe (FN 2004) and its rampant ‘Islamisation’ (FN 2009). The result of this procedure 
is that it excludes Turkey from the borders of European civilization and places it squarely 
into the category of ‘Others’, thereby implicitly restating Europe as a specific entity and 
defining its features more clearly by reference to that which it is not.  
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EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND BELONGING: ‘WE THE EUROPEANS’? 
The previous section has illustrated how the notion of ‘boundaries’ that is part of the 
concept of Identity allowed the parties to further delimit and differentiate the European 
community identified in the first part. It has shown how the MSI/AN and FN both claimed 
that certain countries clearly belonged to Europe by virtue of their civilisation, but also 
how the FN identified certain countries as not European. But what did the parties think 
about their own belonging to that community? 
This section focuses on the dynamics of the parties’ attachment to the European 
community. It argues that all parties considered themselves to belong to Europe; however, 
their understanding of the relationship between the two identities, national and European, 
varied, with the Front National seeing them as highly hierarchical and the MSI/AN as 
moderately hierarchical and complementary.  
 
‘AS ITALIANS, WE ARE AND WE INTEND TO REMAIN EUROPEAN’: THE MSI’S 
DUAL ATTACHMENT  
The Movimento Sociale Italiano expressed no doubts about its belonging and attachment 
to Europe. In spite of an ideology that placed the nation at its centre, the party considered 
European identity as a derivation of and complement to national identity. Their view on 
this issue is exposed most clearly in the aforementioned pamphlet ‘Il MSI dalla A alla Z’. 
Beyond providing the party’s definition of Europe, the entry on Europeanism also 
discusses more in depth the party’s feeling of belonging to European civilisation and the 
relationship between European and National identities:  
The national character which is specific to the MSI-DN does not 
consider the nation as a particularistic and static datum, but as a 
dynamic and spiritual fact, whose natural tendency is the 
universal. 
Individuality (in this case national) and community (in 
this case European) are not in opposition but in reciprocal 
integration and vivification. A community that ignores or steps 
on individualities would be an abstraction; the same way that an 
individuality that would deny itself a possibly communitarian 
destiny would condemn itself to a suffocating atomism. 
As Italians, we are and we intend to remain European. 
(MSI 1980: 25) 
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The passage above highlights several key elements of the MSI’s view of Europe. If we 
break it down to its constituent elements, the entry consists of three key assertions: first 
of all, it restates the ‘national character’ of the MSI, all the while clarifying that this 
‘national character’ does not imply a ‘static’ and closed understanding of the nation, but 
rather a ‘dynamic’, ‘spiritual’ and ‘universal’ view of it. Secondly, it suggests that there 
is a positive relationship between ‘individuality’ and ‘community’. The two are not in 
mutual opposition, but rather in ‘reciprocal integration and vivification’, suggesting that 
a European community does not weaken the nation but rather contributes to its 
strengthening. ‘Atomism’ and absolute isolation is considered as undesirable, and as a 
factor that would lessen, rather than reinforce, the nation. Also of interest is the 
understanding of the nation as a somewhat ‘individual’ body, suggesting a unified 
conception of the national body rather than a pluralist view of it. The final segment draws 
a conclusion based on the previous two: since European and national identity are not in 
conflict, the party can safely state its belonging to the wider community of Europeans.  
While it is true that the MSI claimed a European identity compatible with the 
national one, their Europeanism was somewhat nuanced by the relationship they saw as 
existing between the two. For the MSI, in fact, national identity was prior to European 
identity insofar as only the conscience of a national identity could, in their view, lead to 
participation in a broader European nation. In this sense, the relationship was hierarchical, 
with the nation coming first. Romualdi (1979) put it most clearly in an interview on 
Europe in which he claimed that 
to believe in Europe as a nation, one must have believed in 
England, in Germany, in France, in Italy as Nation; one must have 
believed and believe in the values that the concept of Nation and 
Homeland bring with them. Felt that the nation is not only a 
people, a closed territory within certain boundaries, in which 
certain feelings and prides and traditions and interests to defend, 
live. The nation is an idea, a conception of the spirit, it is culture, 
civilisation, and destiny. (Romualdi 1979: 52) 
In line with this view, a later speech by Maurizio Gasparri, at the time president of FUAN 
(the MSI’s university movement), highlighted that ‘only he who preserves his historical 
memory, he who knows how to love his Homeland, he who knows how to defend his 
identity in front of the globalist homogenisation desired by economic power, will be able 
to be a good European’ (Gasparri 1988). The ‘Good European’, in this sense, is a ‘Good 
Italian (or French, British, Spanish etc.)’ first because only at the national level is one 
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clearly aware of one’s identity. Thus, as the Congress motion ‘Impegno Unitario’ from 
1990 put it, while there is an attachment to Europe, it is safe to say that one ‘is European 
because one is Italian and not vice versa’ (MSI 1990b). 
 
QUIETLY EUROPEAN? ALLEANZA NAZIONALE’S SILENCE ON EUROPEAN 
BELONGING 
There is an interesting silence in AN’s documents on European identity. The relationship 
between the European and the national is in fact barely touched upon, indicating possibly 
that it was a ‘solved issue’ or simply one that the party did not consider particularly 
important. The following passage from an interview with Fini would appear to support 
the former interpretation, suggesting as it does that European identity was considered as 
important to European integration and broadly accepted by the party:  
There is no antagonism but synergy between the supranational 
and intergovernmental aspects of the process of integration. No 
European institution – he concluded – will be really able to affirm 
itself without a full European citizenship: the sense of a shared 
civil and social identity of the Union, a European “demos” that 
will assert itself in time. The plurality of traditions, of cultures 
and of the constitutional assets is not a limit to integration but an 
irreplaceable resource. That is why one reads rightly in the 
Laeken declaration, Europe is the continent of Liberties, and, 
above all, of diversities. (Parlato 2002) 
Unlike the more abstract discussions of the MSI, Fini here is speaking within a clear 
debate on the relationship between national and supranational decision making; however, 
this still allows the advance of some suggestions about the implications of this view on 
the specific question of the relationship between belonging to a nation and belonging to 
a supranational construction such as the EU. In particular, it is possible to see the ‘synergy 
between the supranational and intergovernmental aspects of the process of integration’ as 
a modern adaptation in EU jargon of the ‘integration and vivification’ of the MSI. 
Whereas the MSI spoke more generally about the relationship between identities, AN 
here places itself more squarely within the discussion of EU decision-making; but it 
always suggests that the supranational (in this case, equivalent to community) and the 
intergovernmental (equivalent to the single nations) decision making processes are in a 
synergic and, one might add, mutually reinforcing relationship rather than in an 
antagonistic one. The preceding sentences also display a highly positive view of European 
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citizenship as a ‘demos-building’ exercise, which does not, however, seem to destroy 
identities but rather to build on them as ‘irreplaceable resources’. Thus, this idea of 
creating a European demos based on Europe’s ‘plurality of traditions’, ‘cultures’, 
‘constitutional assets’ and ‘diversities’ appears to be reflective of a view in which the 
national and the supranational have a complementary relationship. 
 
MORE FRENCH THAN EUROPEAN (BUT EUROPEAN NONETHELESS): THE 
FRONT NATIONAL’S CONCENTRIC IDENTITIES 
The Front National’s position on its own Europeanness is characterised by the previously 
discussed separation between ‘Europe’ and ‘the EU’. One can, in fact, detect a dual 
discourse, not unlike the one found on the question of the definition of Europe: on the one 
side, there is attachment to Europe as a civilizational construct, and, on the other, the EU 
is seen as an institution that destroys national identities, thus standing against Europe. 
While the early documents display a more ‘understanding’ approach to the EU as at least 
holding the potential to express this European civilisation, over time the two are 
increasingly pitted against one another, or, most frequently, the party only focuses on the 
EU. 
The FN’s view of European and national identity as complementary is explicitly 
discussed in the party guide ‘Militer au Front’. The guide, put together by the Institut de 
Formation National (the body charged with the training and development of FN members) 
with the objective of ‘educating’ new partisans on the values of the party, stated that 
Europe and Nation are complementary 
The European will is not opposed to our idea of the nation because 
both pertain to the unifying principle of identity that is one of the 
foundations of our doctrine. 
In front of cosmopolitanism, we are the defenders of 
identity, and our identity is made up of the multiple communities 
we belong to. The family, the blood community, the land, 
community of roots, the nation, community of history, Europe, 
community of civilisation, religion, spiritual community. We are 
attached to all these entities and there is no contradiction between 
them. One can be attached to Brittany, proud of being Breton, all 
the while being a French patriot. One can also be French and 
proud to be European, a descendant of the most formidable 
civilisation to exist on the planet. (FN 1991: 115-116) 
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Heavily influenced by the more intellectual current of the party and the ideas of the 
Nouvelle Droite (on which see Bar-On 2007, 2008, Taguieff 1994), this passage 
illustrates well the extent to which the FN drew on the notion of Identity to define its view 
of Europe, as well as Identity’s central relevance in their ideology. Once again, in line 
with what was discussed in the first section of the chapter, Europe is defined as a distinct 
community ‘of civilisation, religion, spirituality’. Most importantly, the idea that national 
and European identities are complementary is stressed from the beginning, and is further 
developed in the rest of the passage when the idea of multiple identities is defended.  
The relationship between national identity and European identity is, however, 
conceived of as a hierarchical one. Perhaps one of the most famous sentences pronounced 
by Jean-Marie Le Pen concerning the relationship between being French and being 
European is presented in his 1984 programmatic book, in which he states that 
I find it very easy to reconcile the double idea of a strong 
homeland in a strong Europe. In the same way that I feel more 
Morbihanais than Breton, more Breton than French, more French 
than European, more European than Atlanticist, more Atlanticist 
than Globalist. I feel for the Homelands what the people feel for 
their own. (Le Pen 1984: 164) 
There are a few points worth highlighting in this paragraph. The first one is that belonging 
to a European civilisation, and working for the development of a European community, 
in line with the discourse of the MSI of the same years, is not considered to be in 
opposition with maintaining national traditions. On the contrary, reconciling ‘A strong 
France in a strong Europe’ and ‘acting for France and for Europe’ appear as a feasible 
task. However, and more importantly for reflections on identity, the sense of belonging 
to communities moves from centre to periphery. Le Pen, in fact, presents a variety of 
communities, suggesting that the relationship between them is based on concentric circles 
in which the ones closer to the author are also the most important ones. While the 
relationship is not mutually exclusive, the ‘terminal community’ (Deutsch 1966) is the 
one closest to home. Interestingly, of course, in this passage the terminal community 
would appear to be the department rather than the nation – highlighting some of the 
tensions in the FN’s early years between nationalism and regionalism (see Davies 1999: 
88ff for a more extensive discussion of this point). 
If in the 1980s and early 1990s this relationship between European and national 
identity was viewed as positive, from the mid-1980s onwards, as a result of the evolution 
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in the EU and the disappearance of the Soviet Union as the existential threat that should 
have led Europe to unite (Le Pen 1984: 153), the party’s view of Europeanness started 
clashing with its discourse on the European Union. From the 1980s, in fact, the FN began 
to employ the concept of Identity not only to define Europe, but also to criticise the 
European Union. Thus, for example, the FN MEP Jean-Marie Le Chevallier published an 
article advocating that the EU, in the name of a ‘European spirit’, was seemingly 
imposing a new identity that might destroy the national one by undoing the nation (Le 
Chevallier 1988). The ‘new identity’ that the author refers to here and which is criticised 
in other documents as well is a cosmopolitan identity that is neither national nor 
European, in which borders become secondary, both within the Union, through for 
example the introduction of voting rights for foreign citizens, and between the EU and 
the rest of the world through the pursuit of primarily economic integration. The line of 
criticism of the EU as harming national identities remains relevant throughout the years, 
with the EU accused at various times of wanting to ‘destroy the identities of the peoples’ 
through standardisation, immigration and European ‘destruction’ (Lang 2002), by 
‘balkanising’ nations (Le Pen 2003) or by removing sovereignty (Le Pen 2016). 
This conflict between ‘European identity’ and the EU’s effects on national identity 
led the party to increasingly resort to the Europe/EU distinction discussed in the first 
section. This has allowed them to still claim to be attached to Europe, while rejecting the 
political project of the EU. Thus, for example, the concluding section of the 2009 
Euromanifesto insisted that  
just like Africans are not “against Africa” or Asians “against 
Asia”, neither are the French patriots and their friends and 
European allies “against Europe” as a geographical, human and 
cultural reality, nor against any form of European cooperation. 
They are aware of the fact that their Nations belong 
geographically to Europe. They acknowledge, beyond the 
extreme diversity of national characters, a certain shared cultural 
patrimony in the peoples of Europe. And since vicinity imposes 
some relationships, they want them to be peaceful and fruitful. 
But they are resolutely against the fraud that consists, under this 
cover of cooperation, to build a super state that will destroy their 
individual identities, their sovereignties, their liberties, without 
even building a truly European ensemble but a euro-globalist 
space, open to all winds, to all human fluxes, to goods and 
capitals, especially when these people are the vanguard of a 
settlement colonisation […] In other words, the Nationals fight 
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resolutely the criminal evolutions of the European Union. This 
refusal of a euro-globalist super State is compatible with the true 
European tradition, since Europe, this peninsula situated at the 
extremity of the huge Asian continent, is the space that, 
throughout the History of humanity, has invented the freedom and 
equality of Nations, governing themselves freely without external 
interference, a unique model without equivalent elsewhere. (FN 
2009: 4) 
The citation above summarises several points of the Front National’s most recent view 
on the question of its Europeanness. In particular, it highlights an attachment to a ‘true 
Europe’ as a shared cultural space and criticism of the ‘fake’ European Union as seeking 
to create a ‘globalist’ Europe that will destroy national identities and Europe with it. 
Marine Le Pen advanced a similar point more succinctly in her previously cited speech 
in Poitiers when she said ‘[e]ven though we are resolutely opposed to the European union, 
we are resolutely European, I’d go as far as saying, I’d go as far as saying [sic] that it is 
because we are European that we are opposed to the European Union’ (Le Pen 2017a). 
While one might want to read this statement as a means for Le Pen to backtrack on the 
positions on Europe that negatively affected her 2017 campaign, it also inserts itself well 
into the history of the party, suggesting that a ‘silenced’ discourse merely re-emerged 
after a campaign focused on the EU rather than Europe. Being European, then, is not in 
question for the FN: what is in question is the extent to which the EU has anything to do 
with Europe. 
 
The previous sections have shown that beyond viewing Europe as a specific 
bounded community, the MSI/AN and FN have also considered it to be a community of 
belonging. They have expressed an attachment to Europe which, while secondary to the 
national one, still made an appearance in their ideology. Thus, their use of the notion of 
Identity has not only served to define Europe but, also, to express their links with it and 
its place in their broader self-definition.  
Before moving on to the next section, it is pertinent to briefly address some of the 
differences that have emerged in the parties’ understandings of European identity and 
offer some reflections on why these may have appeared. In fact, while the parties all drew 
on the concept of Identity to define Europe, the analysis showed that there were also some 
areas of divergence in their interpretations of it. Two elements of difference were 
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particularly striking: first, the different ways of constructing identity, especially in terms 
of its temporality; and second, the different positions concerning its relationship with the 
EU. Only the first point will be discussed now, while the second one will be addressed in 
the following chapters.  
On the first element of difference, the section on the definition of Europe 
highlighted that the parties displayed a divergent understanding of the temporality of 
identity, represented typically by the MSI’s vision of Europe as a project in the future, as 
opposed to the FN’s view of it as rooted exclusively in the past. Offering a conclusive 
answer to why the parties expressed different views of Europe as a project in time would 
require further research beyond the scope of this thesis; however, two explanations appear 
plausible. 
The first explanation is strictly linked to the evolution of the European Union 
itself: while in the 1970s and 1980s the EU had yet to acquire a more definite form, the 
1990s ‘fixed’ a certain course of integration and defined the boundaries of the project 
more clearly. Thus, while in the 1970s and 1980s it was still possible for the MSI to think 
of it as a project in the future, this was less pertinent from the 1990s onwards. While 
helping understand why the AN, compared to the MSI, focused less on Europe’s future, 
it does not help understand why for the FN, Europe was always something in the past.  
Here it is possible to advance a second explanation: namely, that part of the 
difference stemmed from different experiences with national identity being projected on 
the European level. The MSI, in fact, unlike the FN, had to deal with a national identity 
‘in progress’: unlike France, Italy lacked a clearly defined national identity due to its late 
unification. Massimo D’Azeglio’s famous quote ‘Italy has been made, now we have to 
make Italians’ pointed clearly towards the difficulties in finding a shared sense of 
Italianness at the time of unification, and the problem remained alive even in later years. 
In this sense, the party may have been keener on espousing the idea of identity as 
something that, while drawing on the past, was also built in the future. It may also have 
made its understanding of boundaries more fluid and less based on exclusion (a 
characteristic that the AN maintained) because it was aware that a common identity could 
be constructed. The FN, in contrast, came from a country with a more unitary history and 
strong sense of its own identity (although when and where French identity was born is 
subject to dispute; e.g. Weber 1976). It also, as a result, had a clearer sense of boundaries 
between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, with these notions being unlikely to shift because boundaries 
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were fixed in the same way that identity was. As a result of these different experiences, 
for the MSI, an incomplete national identity translated into a vision of Europe as a project 
in the future, and, for the MSI and AN, as a project in which inclusion mattered more than 
exclusion. For the FN, on the other hand, it informed a view of Europe as a community 
in the past, rather than a ‘work in progress’, and European identity as something objective 
and already there, which did not only include insiders but, also, excluded outsiders.  
 
OPENING THE CORE? FROM EUROPE TO IDENTITY 
The sections so far have been concerned with detailing how the MSI/AN and FN 
mobilised the core concept of Identity to integrate Europe in their ideology. They have 
shown that they used it to define Europe as a bounded community to which they claimed 
to belong. This section turns the question on its head and asks how this inclusion of 
Europe may have altered their ideological core; in other words, since the morphological 
approach suggests that decontestation can go from centre to periphery, as well as from 
periphery to centre (Freeden 1998a: 79-81), what are the implications of this inclusion of 
Europe via the concept of Identity for the concept itself and the parties’ ideology more 
broadly? 
In the context of parties famously defined by a ‘nativism’ that considers non-
natives as ‘fundamentally threatening’ (Mudde 2007: 19), the most conspicuous effect of 
the inclusion of Europe through the concept of Identity would appear to be the opening 
of their ideological core to a supranational element. The parties’ claim to belong to 
Europe, in particular, appears not merely as a recycling of the concept of Identity in a new 
setting, but also as a transformative factor that ‘opens’ that concept of Identity so as to be 
able to include transnational allegiances. Thus, the Nation, while remaining the fulcrum 
of the ideology, is not conceived of as an exclusive community of belonging but as one 
among others (for a similar point, see also Zúquete 2008: 329).  
To illustrate this, let us analyse further two previously mentioned citations: the 
MSI’s ‘Europeanism’ entry in the party’s A-Z booklet; and Marine Le Pen’s 2017 speech 
in Poitiers:  
Europeanism: it is the ancient and always alive aspiration towards 
European unity, in the conscience of a community of interests and 
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destinies, of history, of civilisation, of tradition among 
Europeans. […]  
The national character which is specific to the MSI-DN 
does not consider the nation as a particularistic and static fact, but 
as a dynamic and spiritual fact, whose natural tendency is the 
universal. 
Individuality (in this case national) and community (in 
this case European) are not in opposition but in reciprocal 
integration and vivification. A community that ignores or steps 
on individualities would be an abstraction; the same way that an 
individuality that would deny itself a possibly communitarian 
destiny would condemn itself to a suffocating atomism. 
As Italians, we are and we intend to remain European. 
(MSI 1980: 25)  
 
On Europe, the MEPs and their assistants will be charged with 
developing the European project because, even though we are 
resolutely opposed to the European Union, we are resolutely 
European, I’d go as far as saying, I’d go as far as saying [sic] that 
it is because we are European that we are opposed to the European 
Union. [Le Pen then discusses the regional programmes, as well 
as Macon’s speech on Europe in the Sorbonne University. She 
opposes to Macron’s view of Europe to the Front National’s one 
and continues.] 
For us, Europe is not an idea. Europe is a culture, it’s a 
civilization with its values, its codes, its great men, its 
accomplishments, its masterpieces. For us Europe is not only a 
history but also a geography, where Turkey does not belong. 
Europe is a series of peoples whose respective identities exhale 
the fecund diversity of the continent […] I return to the definition 
brought forward by Paul Valery in considering as European all 
peoples of each land that has been successively Romanised, 
Christianised and subject, in matters of the mind, to the rigour of 
the Greeks. I believe in a common destiny of the nations and 
peoples of Europe impregnated by the millenary civilization that 
they share. (Le Pen 2017a) 
The passages above are interesting because they are practical illustrations of how the 
parties have sought to accommodate a transnational element in their nationalist 
ideologies, ‘opening’ them as a result. For the MSI, the way forward was to stress the 
commonalities of Europeans and insist on the relationship between ‘individuality’ and 
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‘community’. Thus, it reassessed the importance of the individual nations, as well as the 
need for a communal destiny that allowed for their full realisation. The result was a notion 
that a transnational belonging strengthens the national belonging, and should, therefore, 
be embraced and valued.  
For the FN, in the specific passage above, reclaiming Europeanness proceeded in 
three steps. First, it reclaimed the meaning of Europe as opposed to the EU, an element 
which allowed for the identification of a certain view of Europe that the party could 
credibly profess to belong to. Second, by defining the nature of that Europe and arguing 
its heritage lives in all European nations, the party introduced an element of 
transnationalism into national identity. Third, by identifying Europe’s ‘fecund diversity’ 
(and, by extension, national diversity) as its defining characteristic, it implied an idea 
expressed explicitly elsewhere (e.g., FN 2009) that the nation is the highest achievement 
of European civilisation. This creates an equivalence between belonging to the nation and 
belonging to Europe by implying that ‘all national identity is European identity’, thus 
opening the ideology while retaining a national attachment.  
One might, of course, argue that perhaps it is not the integration of Europe that 
opens the ideology, but that the ideology was already open to start with. While this is 
certainly a possibility, the fact, for example, that the MSI’s entry feels the need to stress 
that the national and the European are not in opposition would suggest that even if the 
ideology already held the potential to be open, this was not how it was usually construed. 
Thus, the notion that national and European were compatible was not an obvious 
statement, but one that needed some form of justification. 
This process of ‘opening’ has its limits, clearly, and the citations captured that as 
well when the FN stressed that no form of European unity should harm the nations that 
form it, or when the MSI stressed that as Italians they wanted to remain European, 
suggesting that the former precedes the latter. The parties are European because they are 
Italian and French. Their allegiance to Europe is based on the fact that it is the civilisation 
that created the Nation, their primary community of belonging. One may also wish to 
question the extent to which being ‘European’ signals openness, or if it just a dubious 
ethnic frame being recast at a higher level.  
Overall, however, the reading of Europe through the prism of identity would 
appear to at least moderately open the parties’ ideological core by suggesting that the 
85 
 
nation is not the only ‘natural’ community. While the recognition that nationalism does 
not preclude transnational allegiances is hardly exceptional in itself, as a quick look at 
minority nationalist parties might show, it does appear somewhat more counterintuitive 
in the case of far right parties where a ‘closed’ and hierarchical view of belonging 
dominates.  
This acknowledgement of a ‘European belonging’ may also be expected to affect 
the definition of who is considered a treacherous outsider by the parties. Fellow 
Europeans may, in this sense, be viewed as less dangerous than other ‘Others’, or even 
be viewed as ‘brothers in arms’ who, by virtue of a shared identity, are not a threat to that 
nation. Thus, while not being ‘nationals’, they would still not qualify as ‘Others’. This 
certainly appeared in party documents when, for example, Le Pen called for a ‘European 
preference’ (Le Pen 1988), or in both parties’ view that Europeans could and should 
collaborate across borders because they are alike. This may also lead to a broader question 
concerning whether this has any impact on their nativism as a whole. In particular, it may 
lead to ask whether they would consider all non-native people as equally dangerous to the 
state’s cultural homogeneity, or if it would be possible to identify a less threatening 
category of non-natives which, while not strictly belonging to the native group, could still 
be considered sufficiently similar not to present a threat to it.  
  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter advanced two arguments concerning the far right’s ideology of Europe. First 
of all, in response to the research question ‘how do far right parties view Europe through 
ideological lenses and how do they incorporate it in their system of beliefs?’ it argued 
that the studied parties employed the core concept of Identity to define and incorporate 
Europe in their ideology. This contention was considered to be broadly in line with the 
expectation set out in chapter two that far right parties would draw on the old to explain 
the new, because, since far right parties are primarily nationalist parties, their ideology 
draws heavily on the idea of specific identities that distinguish groups from one another. 
The empirical sections illustrated this argument by showing how the MSI/AN and FN 
employed the notion of Identity to define what Europe and the Europeans were, to set 
clear boundaries between the European ‘us’ and the foreign ‘other’, and to claim 
allegiance to this European community. The table below summarises the findings of the 
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analysis, highlighting both the sense in which identity was discussed as well as the time 
period in which each understanding was dominant or present.  
 
TABLE 2: SUMMATIVE TABLE OF IDENTITY AND EUROPE 
 
Second, the concluding part of the chapter suggested that this decontestation of 
Europe through the notion of Identity led to an opening of the parties’ ideological core, 
making them appear as less ‘closed’ than commonly assumed. Thus, through their 
ideology of Europe, the MSI/AN and FN, while still falling well within the nationalist 
camp, could signal a level of ‘openness’ to other identities and peoples.  
  
Main 
concept  
Subthemes Present in 
MSI AN FN 
Identity Europe as a common 
civilisation:  
• Europe distinct civilisation, 
with unique history 
• Europeans specific 
community representing this 
civilisation 
Present 
throughout 
 
 
Present 
throughout 
 
Dominant 
1980s, present 
throughout 
 
Europe as a bounded 
community: 
• Europe an area with inclusive 
and exclusive geographical 
borders 
• Europe symbolically bounded 
and distinct from ‘Others’ 
Dominant 1980s 
in relation to 
Spain, Portugal 
and CEE 
Present 1990s in 
relation to CEE, 
absent 2000s 
 
 
Present 
throughout, in 
relation to 
Spain, Portugal, 
CEE and 
Turkey 
National and European 
identities: 
• European and national 
identity complementary and 
placed in hierarchical relation 
(1) 
• EU a potential threat to 
national identity (2) 
(1) Present, 
complementary, 
moderately 
hierarchical 
 
(1) Present, 
complementary, 
moderately 
hierarchical 
 
(1) Present, 
complementary, 
strongly 
hierarchical. (2) 
Present 
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4. THE BATTLE FOR FREEDOM: EUROPE 
AND LIBERTY 
 
 
The previous chapter started answering the question of how the MSI/AN and FN have 
viewed Europe through ideological lenses and how they have incorporated it in their 
system of beliefs. It argued that the parties drew on the core concept of Identity to define 
Europe as a distinct social grouping with discrete boundaries and a specific relation with 
national identity. It also suggested that the incorporation of a supranational element in 
their ideology led to its ‘opening’ to a transnational form of identification.  
This chapter continues the exploration of the concepts used by far right parties to 
define Europe. First, it argues that, beyond the concept of Identity, the MSI/AN and FN 
have drawn upon the concept of Liberty to decontest Europe. Second, it suggests that the 
way in which Europe is decontested through Liberty draws on concepts which are not 
exclusive to the far right, but rather are part of a broader tradition of thinking about the 
nation.  
The following sections develop these two contentions. The chapter opens by 
explaining why Liberty may be seen as a core concept of nationalism. It then illustrates 
how the studied parties employed the concept in two different ways: first, equating 
Liberty with ideas of European and national autonomy and democratic self-rule; and 
second, linking it to expansionary ideas of power and projection outside European 
boundaries. The concluding section reflects on how the integration of Europe may have 
shifted the balance in far right ideology, bringing more attention to questions of Liberty 
which, rather than being exclusive to the far right, may be viewed as aligned with broader 
discourses about the nation and Europe.  
 
MOBILISING THE CORE: FROM LIBERTY TO EUROPE 
The previous chapter suggested nationalism is an ideology of two parts: first, a ‘boundary-
building’ element which allows one to define the national group and who belongs to it, 
and create a sense of solidarity between them; and second, a ‘political’ (as in concerned 
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with power, Breuilly 1993: 1) element that reclaims certain rights for that group. It is on 
this side that the parties draw to further integrate Europe in their ideology, specifically by 
appealing to the concept of Liberty. 
The concept of Liberty is undoubtedly one of the ‘essentially contested concepts’ 
(Gallie 1955) of the political world, so it is worth discussing briefly the way in which it 
is employed here and why it is viewed as encapsulating ideas of ‘political’ nationalism. 
If we start with the second part of the question, it bears repeating that the boundaries that 
nationalism creates through notions of identity are often being created for a reason, 
usually the representation and self-government of the identified nation (Ichijo 2009: 156; 
Patten 1999: 1; Kedourie 1993: 1). While this can be seen as being possible only in the 
framework of a nation-state, where the nation controls the administrative and territorial 
apparatus of the state (e.g., Gellner 1983: 1), we may see this as a broader demand for 
recognition of the national group which may take varied forms that are not state-seeking 
(Brubaker 1998: 266-267) or even take place within established but allegedly threatened 
national boundaries, as proponents of ‘neo-nationalism’ suggest (Eger and Valdez 2015: 
127). These ideas of political representation are here summarised as forming part of the 
concept of ‘Liberty’ because they encompass the notions that the nation is free to make 
its own rules, and free from external interference.  
Along with Identity, the concept of Liberty occupies a core place in far right 
ideology because it encapsulates the idea that the nation, beyond being a specific 
community, is also endowed with certain political rights that require expression and 
protection. Unlike the individual Liberty of the liberal tradition, this form of Liberty is 
understood as a collective one, where the unit of analysis is the nation as a holistic 
community, rather than the individual citizen.17 The collective character of this Liberty 
which leaves little space to considerations about individual citizens is perhaps the most 
distinguishing aspect of how it is employed by the far right, although the concluding 
sections of this chapter will illustrate that, while it is a core part of their ideology, it is 
built on shared discourses about the nation. 
Like the concept of Identity, this core nationalist concept of Liberty is redeployed 
by the studied parties in their definition of Europe. When the parties use Liberty to 
 
17 While one may note significant overlap between this understanding of Liberty and the more familiar 
notion of ‘national sovereignty’, this thesis opts for the former in an attempt to reflect the language of the 
parties and provide a more fine-grained analysis of what Liberty has meant through time. 
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decontest Europe, they adopt two different meanings of Liberty that are consistent with 
the ideas identified in the previous passages. Firstly, they equate it with concepts of 
autonomy and self-rule to restate the importance of those principles for Europe and, in 
the case of the Front National, for the nation. In the realm of external relations between 
Europe and the world, they discuss Liberty as a form of power and projection to present 
Europe as a community endowed with (or in need to regain) power outside its borders 
and the ability to shape world politics. While the individual meanings of Liberty discussed 
by the parties shift over time, it is important to note that the notion of Liberty remains in 
one form or another, highlighting its central role in the parties’ ideology of Europe.  
The parties’ use of Liberty to decontest Europe results in a dual discourse where 
the concept’s relationship with Europe shifts. On one hand, Liberty is used to present the 
European community as one that has specific rights in terms of autonomy and self-
government and, equally, in a rather expansive understanding of self-expression, has the 
right to express them outside its own boundaries. On the other hand, it is used to restate 
the specific, political rights of the nation against the EU as a body that limits autonomy 
and self-rule. 
The meanings of Liberty employed by the studied parties to add definition to their 
view of Europe are addressed in turn in the following sections. The concluding section 
reflects on these meanings and suggests that it may pay to underline their similarities with 
understandings of the nation and Europe that are not specific to the far right.    
 
FREE IN THEIR OWN COUNTRIES: RECLAIMING AUTONOMY AND 
SELF-RULE  
The concept of Liberty has many facets, but in the ideology of the MSI/AN and FN it 
appears predominantly in connection with ideas of autonomy in the external realm and 
self-rule in the domestic realm. This entails pushing both for the need for the nation to be 
free from external constraints on political action (such as having one’s policies dictated 
from abroad), and defending its right to advance whatever political measures it sees fit 
within its borders. This can encompass the notion that such decisions should be taken in 
a democratic form, although, as the next sections will show, ‘democratic self-rule’ was 
not equally important to the different parties.  
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With respect to Europe, ideas of an autonomous Europe free from external 
influence dominated the MSI/AN and FN in the 1980s. In the context of a divided Europe 
and the Cold War, the autonomy of Europe was a key concern of the MSI/AN and FN, 
who saw Europe as being largely subjugated by external powers and hence unable to 
make its own decisions. Following the end of the Cold War, however, the parties took 
rather different routes. In the course of its transformation into Alleanza Nazionale, the 
MSI dropped concerns about autonomy from external actors and began to focus more on 
issues of democratic self-rule within the European Union. In contrast, and particularly 
following the changes introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, the Front National turned 
from worrying about the autonomy of Europe to being concerned with reclaiming 
domestic self-rule against the European Union.  
 
EUROPE BETWEEN DECLINE AND REBIRTH: THE MSI’S CALL FOR 
EUROPEAN AUTONOMY 
In the bipolar world of the Cold War, the concept of Liberty occupied a central place in 
the MSI’s definition of Europe. In particular, the Italian party stressed the need for Europe 
to be free from extra-European influences. This call for a ‘free Europe’ was built around 
two pillars: first of all, the observation of a problematic lack of European autonomy; and 
second, the call for a return of autonomy to Europe.  
As far as the first pillar is concerned, in the MSI’s definition of Europe, Liberty 
was mobilised to identify an element that Europe was missing: Europe was defined as a 
space under foreign influence and in decline because it was unable to make its own 
decisions and exert influence in the world. The assessment of Europe as a continent in 
decline can be observed quite clearly in the following passage from the 1978 
programmatic book ‘Intervista sull’Eurodestra’, published on the occasion of the first 
open elections to the European Parliament. It details the programme of the Eurodestra 
(Euroright), which brought together the MSI, the French Parti des Forces Nouvelles 
(PFN) and the Spanish Fuerza Nueva (F/N). In the preface of the Intervista, the book 
editor and MSI member Michele Rallo commented on the current situation of Europe, 
noting how 
Europe, after the two world conflicts, has lost its role as 
protagonist of History. The Yalta agreements have subjected its 
oriental regions to Soviet imperialism, while its western regions 
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are today exposed to a double pressure, military (reinforcement 
of the Warsaw Pact) and political (Eurocommunism), from that 
same imperialism. (Almirante 1978: 7) 
Beyond lamenting the sorry state of Europe, the passage above also offers some clues 
concerning who is to blame for Europe’s loss of clout. The ‘Yalta agreements’ appear as 
the main culprit of this state of affairs, because they made it possible for the Soviet Union 
to exert unprecedented pressure on Europe and deprive it of its autonomy.  
The tight link between the Yalta agreements, European decline and the lack of 
European autonomy is addressed more explicitly by Pino Romualdi, another one of the 
MSI’s historical leaders in his Intervista sull’Europa:  
In Yalta, in the name of anti-fascism, the United States and Russia 
[…] carved up the world and Europe as well. In that moment, 
even before then, of the so-called liberation from the Germans 
and the Fascists, therefore before the occupation of its territory by 
the Soviet and Anglo-American armed forces, Europe was 
deprived […] of its freedom and its political independence; and 
destined to become – from centre of the world as it still was at the 
time […] a huge territory divided in two and subjected on the one 
side to the brutal Soviet imperialism and on the other side to the 
decisive influence of the American imperialism. It was in Yalta 
that Stalin was authorised to annex [...] more than a hundred 
million Europeans; and that America made all the great peoples 
of Europe its protectorate. (Romualdi 1979: 47) 
Romualdi’s passage is significant because it highlights the way in which Europe’s loss of 
political independence as a result of Yalta was inextricably linked with its decline. It also 
signals that the responsibility for European decline and lack of autonomy lay with both 
the Soviet Union and the USA. Thus, while recognising a qualitative difference between 
the two superpowers, especially as further in the passage he opposes the notion of 
‘empire’ and that of ‘protectorate’ by conceding that the USA at least left the liberty and 
democracy of its protectorates intact (Romualdi 1979: 48), the position of Europe is still 
an unpalatable one, made of weakness and submission to external control.  
The acknowledgement of a lack of autonomy fed directly into the MSI’s second 
use of the notion of Liberty, namely, as something that Europe needed to reclaim as a 
defining element. Only by retrieving autonomy could Europe, in the MSI’s view, recover 
from its decline and start making its own decisions. Thus, for example, the 1979 party 
manifesto highlighted that ‘[t]he realisation of the autonomy and independence of Europe 
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is therefore an historical goal of the European national Rights, aware that by doing so 
they are also serving the cause of their respective Nations’ (MSI 1979c: 5). In a similar 
vein, in the 1979 majority congress motion ‘Continuare Per Rinnovare’, speaking of the 
tense international situation between the USA and the USSR, Giorgio Almirante and his 
faction highlighted that the crisis was 
also an evolutionary crisis that could have positive outcomes as 
far as Europe is concerned, in the limits in which Europe will 
realise that it is a continent, that it does not have to accept to be 
tied by the shackles of Yalta, to have within its hands the 
instruments to affirm its autonomy, to have the obligation and 
even the interest to look globally to its people, getting out of the 
restricted view of the North Sea, and to be able to weight on the 
fortunes of the world. (MSI 1979a) 
Similar points were also iterated in the minority congress motion brought forward by the 
leader of the MSI’s left-wing revolutionary current Pino Rauti, in which his faction 
highlighted the need to make Europe a ‘Third Way’ between the two imperialisms that 
could mediate between them so as to ‘re-establish equilibrium’ and ‘lead world politics 
out of the duopolistic logic in which it has been closed for thirty five years’ (MSI 1979b). 
In all these passages, autonomy appears as an essential goal worth pursuing, as a way to 
return Europe to its rightful place in the world. 
This need to reclaim autonomy translated into concrete policy measures and 
particularly into the demand for a European common defence. In fact, the MSI considered 
necessary the creation of a specifically European defence, which would be close to, but 
independent of, NATO and would allow Europe to take care of its own, as the passage 
below from the 1979 Congress majority motion illustrates: 
If it is true, in fact, that the defence of the European continent 
requires and will still require for some time the solidarity and 
military alliance of the United States, it is even more true that, as 
long as Europe will not be in the condition to defend itself on its 
own and will not determine conditions of absolute parity with the 
other continents, the same north-American alliance will continue 
to have blackmailing implications and it might happen, as it has 
already too many times, that a poorly masked dialogue of 
collaboration between Russia and the United States develops on 
its [Europe’s] shoulders. (MSI 1979a)  
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Perhaps the most important part of the passage above is the idea that only by having an 
independent defence would Europe be able to be free of the twin imperialisms of the 
USSR and the USA. In fact, while acknowledging the necessity to work within NATO, 
the motion also highlights the high levels of suspicion existing in the party vis-à-vis the 
American ally.  
This suspicion towards the USA reflects the broadly conflicted relationship that 
the MSI had with NATO as yet another external constraint on European autonomy. While 
opting for support for the Atlantic Alliance in its early years, the MSI always remained 
uncomfortable in that position and had a minority that opposed it, considering it necessary 
to overcome NATO and move towards a purely European pact (see for example the 
congress motions 1987a: 59; 1987b: 32; see also Parlato 2005: 140ff). Even among those 
who supported it, however, there was the concern of avoiding a ‘servile’ relationship and 
reclaiming parity in the relationship between Europe and the USA, as highlighted by the 
slogan ‘Allies yes – Double crossing no – Slaves never’ (MSI 1987d: 5) and by the 
following passage from the same manifesto: 
Since our first political battles and congresses, we always said 
that we would be allies, but that Europe must take part in its own 
destiny, must be permanently consulted at all levels, actions must 
be coordinated, Europe cannot be placed in front of the fait 
accompli; Europe must count more than it has until now; but, 
because of this, it must have conscience, Europe, of its own future 
and indispensable unity. (MSI 1987d: 5) 
The MSI’s definition of a ‘free Europe’ remained very much confined to the idea that 
Europe should be free from external constraints. While the party reclaimed autonomy for 
Europe and viewed this as a precondition to European power (an element which will be 
discussed in later sections), this autonomy did not appear to be the precondition to a 
clearer domestic programme of self-rule, either for the nation or for Europe.  
Unlike AN and the FN, the MSI also appeared uninterested in the relationship 
between Europe and democracy as a specific form of self-rule. In fact, as the following 
sections will show, AN and the FN increasingly involved discussions of democratic self-
rule in their ideology of Europe. This concern, however, remained muted in the MSI, and 
this is perhaps unsurprising given the negative view the party held of democratic 
institutions as ineffective and unable to fulfil their stated purposes. In line with this, when 
the party did use the notion of democracy to discuss the European Union, it used it to 
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criticise the EU for its excessive attachment to parts of democracy. Thus, for example, in 
an article from 1985, the MSI politician and director of the Secolo d’Italia Cesare 
Mantovani, argued that: ‘[Europe] says that it believes in democracy, peace, economic 
and social progress, in its civilisation. And it is true. But as far as the process of political 
unity is concerned, these ideals turn against Europe like paradoxes’. This is a starting 
point for a critique of the rejection of the majority voting principle in the EU which, in 
his view, stifled progress for the process of integration. In a similar vein, the 1987 
minority congress motion ‘Proposta Italia’ (1987c) highlighted how the EU’s 
parliamentarianism made the construction essentially inconclusive and subject to partisan 
interests. As a result, democracy was not presented as a value in itself and one in need of 
protection, but, rather, as an imperfect system of governance which prevented the 
European institutions from being truly effective. In this sense, it is possible to see a clear 
echo of the MSI’s opposition to parliamentary democracy as a form of rule, along with 
an attachment to European integration. 
 
OVERCOMING DEMOCRATIC DEFICITS: ALLEANZA NAZIONALE AND THE 
MAKING OF A DEMOCRATIC EU 
Whereas the MSI focused primarily on the notion of Europe as a continent needing to 
become free from external control, such concerns disappeared in Alleanza Nazionale’s 
post-Fiuggi documents. Fostered by a historical context in which the autonomy of Europe 
was no longer in question and the growth in power of the European Union post-Maastricht 
brought new issues to the fore, Alleanza Nazionale shifted its focus on questions of 
democratic self-rule within the European Union. In particular, AN started tackling 
questions about the balance between a nation’s ability to pass its own laws and the need 
for shared European commitments, and how this balance could be assured with respect to 
democratic procedures. 
Unlike the FN, which will be discussed later, in which the EU institutions are 
criticised for being undemocratic, or for the MSI, where democracy was seen as a 
hindrance to the European project, in Alleanza Nazionale there was a constructive 
engagement with ‘giv[ing] Europe Institutions that have the necessary competence to 
democratically manage the policies of the Member States which, under the subsidiarity 
principle, will be a prerogative of the Union’ (AN 1995). This commitment to finding an 
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appropriate balance between the national and the supranational, as well as to fostering 
democratic participation, is well captured in the following passage from the tellingly 
called 2002 programmatic conference ‘The Homeland wins, Europe is born’: 
In a Europe that, by now, manages from Brussels more than half 
of the decisions that have an impact on national politics (with 
significant peaks in the economic and agricultural sectors), it is 
necessary to guarantee the maximum involvement of citizens and 
their respective representative bodies: the future of Europe cannot 
be marked by the uniformity of centralism but by unity in 
diversity. In the enlarged Europe it will be even more evident that 
there is an actual recognition of the principle of subsidiarity: the 
Union deserves those areas which benefit clearly from a European 
discussion (foreign and security policy, monetary stability and 
commercial rules, immigration, asylum law, counterterrorism, 
agricultural policy, research and innovation, etc…). Edmund 
Stoiber, recalling for that matter a concept expressed by Tony 
Blair, recently summarised it: “Integration where necessary, 
decentralisation where possible”. (AN 2002)  
If AN drew on the notion of democracy in its attempts to define the correct balance 
between the national and the supranational in the EU, it also employed it to critique 
certain features of the latter. In particular, its commitment to subsidiarity and national 
democratic involvement came with a strong opposition to bureaucratic and technocratic 
bodies in Brussels, perhaps the main point of convergence with the Front National (albeit 
with some important differences). In fact, if the AN considered the ‘technocratic 
structures’ of the EU as reflective of a ‘Jacobin, technocratic, dirigiste and elitist Europe’ 
(AN 2004), or as contributing to endangering the European project by taking ill-judged 
decisions (Carrino 2008), it did not take this as a reason to reject the EU in toto. 
Democracy in this sense served to define the appropriate contours of the EU, but not as a 
concept to be used against it. While the familiar debate on the EU’s democratic deficit 
and its remoteness from its citizens made itself heard, this was mostly done in a pragmatic 
way in which the focus was on correcting perceptions and structures that gave rise to the 
issue, rather than merely pointing towards them as a source of illegitimacy for the EU as 
an actor. 
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FROM AUTONOMY FOR EUROPE TO SELF-RULE AGAINST THE EU: THE 
FRONT NATIONAL’S SOVEREIGNTIST EVOLUTION 
There are strong similarities between the MSI and the early FN’s early use of Liberty as 
something Europe needed to recover. Like the Italian party, in fact, the Front National 
conceived of Europe as a space in decline, deprived of autonomy, and in need of retrieving 
it. However, whereas AN abandoned concerns about autonomy, the FN retargeted its own 
worries against the European Union, claiming the need for the nation to re-establish 
(democratic) self-rule against an ever-encroaching EU. 
As for the MSI, the FN’s concern with autonomy in the 1980s was preceded by 
the acknowledgement of a ‘Europe in decline’. As Jean-Marie Le Pen put it: 
The Allies in the First World War – and among them, the French 
government – carry a responsibility in this great ploy, in this civil 
war that was the Second Word War […] What appeared to post-
war men is that, following the occupations of Europe by the 
Soviet army, the appearance of the two super-giants on the world 
scene, our European nations, who made the law in the world in 
the previous century, had brusquely fallen to the status of, if one 
may say it, second order nations. (Le Pen 1984: 157) 
Le Pen’s passage presents us with a reading of the state of Europe in the 1980s and clearly 
highlights why the party leader felt that Europe was in decline following the ‘great civil 
war’ that was World War Two. In particular, the decline of Europe and its nations is put 
down to the partition of Europe and the appearance of the ‘two super-giants’, the USA 
and the USSR. Thus, like the MSI, Le Pen also identifies a clear culprit for the decline of 
Europe in the ‘twin imperialisms’. 
As with the MSI, this observation of the decline of Europe paved the way for an 
analysis that pushed for the return of autonomy to Europe and ‘the right of the European 
peoples to rule themselves, to self-affirm and search for power and global reach 
[rayonnement] in the respect of their roots’ (Le Pen 1985: 189). Autonomy, in this sense, 
appeared as a precondition to the other meaning of Liberty which will be discussed in the 
next section of this chapter, and clearly aligned with the goals of ‘political’ nationalism 
discussed in its opening parts.  
To retrieve autonomy, the FN proposed a number of measures involving liberation 
from foreign dominance and the introduction of policies that would restore Europe’s 
independence. For example, starting from the principle that Europe could not be ‘a Soviet 
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colony reduced to slavery’, Le Pen identified the need to ‘pursue European irredentism’ 
by opposing the measures taken in Yalta and Helsinki (Le Pen 1984; see also Lang 1987). 
The following year, these principles were further restated in this passage in the 1985 
programmatic book ‘Pour la France: Jean-Marie Le Pen présente le programme du FN’, 
where Le Pen identifies the steps needed to return autonomy to Europe: 
GIVE ITS FREEDOM BACK TO EUROPE 
Faced with the Soviets’ subversive will and their use of 
revolutionary, Muslim fundamentalism, Europe must defend its 
freedom, like it did in the battles of Marathon, Salamis, the battle 
of the Catalonian plains, in Poitiers, in Lepanto, in Vienna. 
She cannot separate her destiny from that of the captive 
nations of Eastern Europe. Are they not destined to be an integral 
part of Europe? 
Finally, for Germany to be reunited one day without 
falling prey to the temptation of being united under the authority 
of Moscow, it is necessary to do everything to moor Western 
Germany to the Western Community. (Le Pen 1985: 190) 
Beyond identifying Liberty as an objective to pursue, the passage above is also interesting 
because it highlights the way in which the different concepts that make up the far right’s 
understanding of Europe can interact. In this case, the passage addresses Liberty, but it 
also ties it in with the concept of Identity discussed previously (particularly by reclaiming 
the need for a united Europe) and with a concept that will be discussed in the following 
chapter: the notion of Threat. Europe, in this sense, must reunite and defend its Liberty 
from treacherous others such as the Soviet Union and Muslim fundamentalists.  
Ensuring collective security was a second means through which the FN hoped to 
achieve European autonomy in the 1980s. A common defence, in fact, appeared as an 
essential aspect of autonomy and was mentioned in the party’s early programmatic 
documents (e.g., Le Pen 1984, Le Pen 1985). As with the MSI, the FN considered that a 
European defence would need to be linked to the Atlantic Alliance but should also be 
more European in nature, as the following passage illustrates: 
The Atlantic Alliance remains a necessity, but the main issue is 
to understand until what point friendship can turn against itself 
and become servility. Because differences in strategic interests 
remain with the Strategic Defence Initiative for example […] 
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Thus, Europe will have to be “pro-European” or will not 
be: it is better to risk periodical frictions with our great allies than 
to give up altogether to a collective resignation. Europe’s way to 
the control of its own destiny remains narrow, but it is the one 
that must be resolutely taken if we still want to count on the eve 
of the 21st century. (Le Pen 1986) 
Thus, if the Front National accepted the necessity of NATO as a means to ensure 
protection from the Soviets, there was also the recognition that Europe should be able to 
protect its own security if it was to restore its autonomy and escape the humiliation of 
having ‘350 million Europeans asking 230 million Americans to defend them from 270 
million Soviets’ (Mégret 1986, cited in FN 1989: 59). The restoration of autonomy 
through defence was also entwined with a concern for power, as Mégret highlighted when 
claiming that ‘[t]he Europeans have not yet understood that Europe will be free only if it 
is powerful’ (1987). This point, however, will be discussed further when addressing the 
notions of power and ‘rayonnement’. 
As for the concept of Identity, the Front National’s positions started pivoting at 
the end of the 1980s, with the EU increasingly becoming the subject of attacks. Following 
the emergence of a ‘New World Order’ and the exponential growth in the powers of the 
European Union that started with the Single European Act and continued through the 
Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon treaties, the FN shifted its focus away from 
reclaiming ‘European autonomy’ and brought the theme of Liberty as domestic self-rule 
front and centre. Thus, it developed its trademark critique of the EU as a construction 
stifling domestic sovereignty, defined in the 2002 manifesto as ‘the collective form of 
liberty: the freedom of a people to decide about its future, that which is also known as 
independence, the freedoms of individuals to live in the framework of laws they have 
consented to’ (FN 2002).  
The Front National’s radical critique of the EU through the prism of democracy 
and self-rule is built around two axes: that the EU is a body that shifts power away from 
the nation through encroachment and a questionable institutional architecture; and, as a 
result, that it is deeply unrepresentative of popular claims. The concept of Liberty is thus 
redeployed to oppose the European construction and redefine it as a threat to the nation’s 
ability to pass whatever measures it considers appropriate. 
If we start with the first axis of critique, the party’s 2004 Euromanifesto offers a 
good illustration of the Front National’s opposition to the EU on grounds of institutional 
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design and encroachment. Prepared in the context of the European elections of 2004, the 
manifesto claims that 
a nation’s sovereignty is its ability to take decisions freely and for 
itself. It refers then to the notions of independence and exercise 
of political power by a legitimate government.  
The entire history of the European construction consists 
of depriving States of their sovereignty. Firstly, because Europe 
has seen its areas of intervention becoming larger, to the point that 
today they cover the whole of the economic, social, and political 
spheres. Then, because the organisation and functioning of the 
European institutions, as well as their decision-making, tend more 
and more to lead the notion of Nation-State itself to disappear and 
to entrust power to technocrats in Brussels. (FN 2004) 
The passage is helpful because it opens with a definition of national sovereignty that 
focuses on the aspect of self-rule, before explaining how the EU fundamentally violates 
this principle through its design and workings. Encroachment, as the passage suggests, 
expands the powers of the EU at the expense of the member states, potentially limiting 
their ability to take decisions freely. Its functioning, on the other side, tends to bypass the 
nation and empower ‘technocrats’ with no visible national allegiances or democratic 
legitimacy.  
The link between encroachment and limits to self-rule is exemplified more clearly 
by Jean-Marie Le Pen in a campaign speech from 2007, where the then leader expressed 
the feeling that the centre of decision-making had ‘quit the Elysée and Matignon to install 
itself in the European quarter of Brussels’ (Le Pen 2007), leaving France without much 
control over its own destiny. As the same speech detailed it further:  
They know that we no longer decide anything by ourselves, that 
all is decided elsewhere, most often against us, against our 
interests, against our traditions and our values. We no longer 
decide of our own laws, they are made in Brussels. We no longer 
decide by ourselves who comes in and out of our country […]. 
We no longer decide what goods come into our country because 
there are no commercial barriers. We no longer decide by 
ourselves on our economic policies, because we no longer have a 
national currency, no more budgetary and monetary room for 
manoeuvre, no right to lead any industrial policy. We no longer 
have the right to make, by ourselves, our labour law, our 
commercial law, our environmental laws. 
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So let’s say it, distinctively, clearly, high and loud: Europe 
has been a market of fools, in which we have received, in 
exchange for our sacrifices, hammering blows on our face. (Le 
Pen 2007) 
Le Pen here makes a rather exhaustive list of the ways in which the EU limits the political 
sovereignty of its member states, making it increasingly unfeasible for them to exert self-
rule. In addition, there is a clear sense in which this is done against the interests of the 
nation, which ends up receiving ‘hammering blows’ to its face instead of the purported 
advantages of membership.  
The opposition to the EU’s impingement on each of the types of sovereignty 
named above appears in several other places, with legal sovereignty and, increasingly 
since the introduction of the euro, economic sovereignty occupying a particularly central 
role. Both, in addition, also allow for a more thorough critique of political classes in 
general, drawing on populist tropes. Thus, for example, the loss of legal sovereignty is 
associated with a critique of the national political class, which merely ‘translates 
directives from Brussels’ and is ‘reduced to the level of translators for laws coming from 
elsewhere’ (Langlois 2014), while the loss of economic sovereignty feeds into discourse 
about the ‘global elites’ and the dominance of economic power over national decision 
making.  
In the eyes of the party, the legislative procedures and institutional design of the 
European Union also do nothing to mitigate the effects of encroachment. Elements such 
as harmonisation, for example, further limit the nation’s ability to set its own rules by 
forcing ‘one size fits all’ measures to all EU member states, a view well captured in the 
following passage from an ‘orientation’ article in La Lettre de Jean-Marie Le Pen: 
 […] harmonisation, that is the guiding principle of the Brussels 
technocrats. In their globalist view, the 20,000 European civil 
servants want to harmonise everything and do so in an 
authoritarian and systematic way. While the French Parliament 
votes on average 120 times a year, the Commission in Brussels 
enacts some 8,200 judicial acts, a real judicial flood! And 
everything goes through it, to the point that in some areas, 
integration is more advanced between European countries than 
between the states of the United States of America. Consider that 
the death penalty is abolished because of a European provision, 
while in the USA the states are sovereign and some apply it while 
others have abolished it. (Mégret 1989b) 
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This ‘authoritarian’ and ‘systematic’ homogenisation that limits national self-rule by 
imposing thousands of rules is further problematised, with reference to who makes the 
laws, when Mégret refers with some suspicion to the ‘Brussels technocrat’, a figure that 
occupies a special place in the party’s imaginary of Europe. Brussels technocrats (also 
referred to as ‘Brussels bureaucrats’), in fact, are often depicted by the party as suspicious, 
rootless figures, unrepresentative of the ‘true people’. 
The result of the empowerment of the EU and the ‘Brussels bureaucrats’ feeds 
into the second line of criticism of the EU as a body that is deeply unrepresentative of 
popular claims and even opposed to recognising them. Concerns over self-rule here merge 
with considerations on democracy and further develop the party’s criticism of the EU on 
grounds of Liberty. Thus, Brussels is accused of pushing for the ultimate demise of 
national democracy, with popular sovereignty being replaced by ‘expert’ decision making 
(FN 1999) or, even worse, by external domination by the ‘EUSSR’. As Bruno Gollnisch 
put it in a speech: 
These are the different steps by which the European Soviet Union 
is formed: an ensemble whose leaders are not picked by the 
people and are often unknown to them, meaning that they cannot 
control or revoke them, and who however tend to rule over all the 
domains of political, economic and social life […] 
This totalitarian evolution does not go without resistance, 
but resistance, even when it has the law on its side, is 
systematically hidden, bypassed, despised. Thus, for example, on 
29 May 2005, with 15 million and a half votes, the French people, 
in large majority, and against the political will of 90% of the 
political class, said no the European Constitution, no to the 
disappearance of France, no to a Eurocratic Super-State over 
which people have no control, no to the obscure forces of 
globalism, no to the dictatorship of abject interests of anonymous 
and stray finance, no to the euro-globalist policies that ruin our 
economies, our jobs, and our purchasing power. (Gollnisch 2008) 
The passage above elucidates some of the most problematic features of the European 
construction in the view of the Front National and highlights how concerns about 
sovereignty and self-rule slowly became ones about ‘democracy’ more broadly, mostly 
via a negative critique of the European Union’s non-democratic procedures. The 
comparison between the EU and a totalitarian state here is telling, as it exhumes the FN’s 
anti-communism and restyles it in a new way, all the while adding new populist tropes 
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via the introduction of a stark division between ‘the people’ and the ‘unelected elite’. In 
addition, it manages to also cast the elected elite as illegitimate, by highlighting the level 
of disconnect between ‘90% of the political class’ and the ‘large majority’ of French 
voters who rejected the European Constitution. Finally, although this will be discussed 
further in the next chapter, it brings forward the idea that there are ‘external enemies’ and 
obscure forces at work to endanger the nation’s liberty, its democracy and its prosperity.  
While the speech above is from a single member of the Front National, and a 
particularly anti-EU one at that, many of the points Gollnisch raises are present elsewhere, 
including the division between the people and the elite, the idea that the national political 
class is somewhat contributing to ‘selling off’ the nation or simply uncaring of what 
constituents really want (see for example, Mégret 1989a, Salagnac 1992, Le Pen 2010), 
and the overwhelming sense of danger that looms over the nation (see Chapter five). All 
these elements lead the FN to reclaim sovereignty for the nation (a regular theme in party 
programs and one which has survived two leadership changes), because, as Jean-Marie 
Le Pen puts it, ‘no good is more precious than independence, the collective manifestation 
of the collective liberty of peoples’ (Le Pen 2004). 
The sections so far have focused on how the FN employed the concept of Liberty 
to discuss questions concerning core state powers; however, it pays to briefly note that, 
in the eyes of the FN, discussions of Liberty also encompassed more practical 
considerations about self-sufficiency and the ability to ‘take care of one’s own’. This 
more economic concern about the ability to survive without relying on external support 
was mostly mobilised in opposition to the European Union from the 1990s onwards and 
remained relevant in the 2000s, with issues such as the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), deindustrialisation and economic protectionism dominating the discussion.  
The example of the CAP is particularly telling, as it touches deeply on ‘food 
sovereignty’ and alimentary self-sufficiency, but also entails more identity-driven 
concerns about ‘déracinement’. Thus, the Front National vocally opposed (and still 
opposes) the CAP on grounds that it destroyed agriculture, rural spaces and, along with 
other phenomena such as liberalisation and the exponential rise in the number of trade 
agreements, led to dependence on the outside world. This passage from the 2012 
programme summarises the issues nicely and can be considered in agreement with 
positions expressed in the two previous decades on the CAP: 
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With the progressive drift of the CAP, the enlargements of the EU 
and even more since the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty in 
2010, France completely lost control of its agricultural policy, 
then of its food exports, in favour of a bureaucratic and ultra-
liberal globalist Europe […] 
France cannot continue to abdicate its sovereignty in this 
sector without endangering its national interest. Since the Europe 
of Brussels is incapable of freeing itself of the globalist constraint, 
we must draw our conclusions. (FN 2012a) 
While considering the EU as a threat to self-sufficiency in recent years, it should however 
be noted that the Front National’s position has been somewhat ambiguous in this area in 
the past. In fact, although the EU has been considered as a threat to prosperity and has 
been criticised in the past as limiting economic freedoms and competition by imposing 
excessive laws, it was, at least in the early 1990s, also considered as a potentially positive 
body if adapted to become a closed continental market in which an intelligent form of 
protectionism could be pursued (see for example Mégret 1992, 1997: 228-229). In this 
sense, it also represented a way to ensure self-sufficiency, although this hope faded with 
time, leaving the EU as a limit to self-sufficiency. 
 
THE QUEST FOR POWER: THE EUROPEAN MISSION 
The previous sections showed how the MSI/AN and FN mobilised ideas of Liberty as 
autonomy and self-rule to further define Europe and insert it in their ideological schemata. 
It stressed how in the 1980s, the MSI and FN spoke about the need for Europe to retrieve 
its autonomy and get rid of negative external influences. It also showed that, while the 
MSI paid little attention to questions of democracy and self-rule when defining Europe, 
the AN referred to them mostly as part of a discussion concerning the division of power 
between the EU and its member states. By contrast, from the mid-1980s onwards, the FN 
mobilised the notions of self-rule and democracy against the European Union, claiming 
that the latter violated them through its design and its political practices. 
In addition to thinking of Europe as a space that should retrieve autonomy, the 
MSI/AN and FN also considered that Europe’s Liberty should travel beyond its borders. 
Europe, in this sense, should not only be autonomous, but also free to project power, 
express its ‘freedom of will’ in the external realm and influence the world around it. 
Echoing narratives of European missions and white men’s burdens, the MSI/AN and FN 
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thus further drew on this idea of Liberty to define what was in Europe’s nature to do. This 
section shows how they have done so by discussing these ideas of external power and 
‘rayonnement’, considering the expansive idea of Liberty as a form of ‘will of power’ and 
external influence, and detailing the role of Europe in projecting power and reinforcing 
(or not) the nation’s external power. 
 
A CONTINENT WITH A PLAN: THE MSI AND EUROPE’S ‘SECULAR MISSION’ 
The notion of power characterised both the MSI and the FN’s understanding of Europe. 
In fact, both the MSI and its successor party viewed Europe as a source of power and 
vehicle for external influence. While interpreting the nature of this power differently, they 
saw Europe as having some kind of ‘mission’ in the world which required it to intervene 
beyond its own borders and project power externally. In short, its nature was to be free to 
express its will in the outer world. 
The MSI’s notion of a European ‘secular mission’ (Romualdi 1979: 17) was 
rooted in their understanding of the continent’s history. While viewing Europe as 
currently in decline and having lost its leading place in the world as a force acting for 
civilisation, the party claimed the need for Europe to retrieve its glorious influence. The 
results of the European mission, as well as its future, were well captured by Pino 
Romualdi in his ‘Intervista sull’Europa’ when he spoke of Europe’s mission as  
a secular mission, certainly not free from mistakes and cruelty, 
but that cannot keep being considered as a crime, a disgusting sin 
[...] which one must make amends for through inconceivable 
concessions in all fields to countries and people still or in good 
part incapable of the great cultural, moral and political 
commitments and of those of the development of the human 
conditions of their peoples, in the respect and defence of the 
fundamental values of civilisation. A civilising endeavour which 
Europeans and the whole Western world need to be proud of in 
terms of what it represented concretely for the growth of the idea 
of liberty and feeling of national independence […] in territories 
and between populations otherwise destined to remain for 
centuries or millennia in a backward state. (Romualdi 1979: 17) 
Romualdi’s vision here expresses a few familiar ideas. First of all, underlying the entire 
paragraph is the view of European civilisation as superior to all other civilisations, as 
highlighted by the view that countries colonised by Europeans would have otherwise 
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remained for ‘centuries or millennia in a backward state’. Secondly, however, and more 
importantly for this idea of external power, is the will to reclaim that heritage which, 
while not ‘free from mistakes’, should not stop Europe from fulfilling its role in educating 
and developing those parts of the world in which the fundamental values of civilisation 
have not been fully acquired. Interestingly for the purposes of this chapter, Europe’s main 
contribution comes in the form of ‘the growth of the idea of liberty and feeling of national 
independence’, confirming the central place that such ideas have in the party’s definition 
of Europe.  
The recognition of a European mission thus led the MSI to view Europe’s natural 
role as that of a great power, a ‘Third Position’ between the USA and the USSR which 
should ‘express its will in the international scene’ (MSI 1980: 25) and ‘return to be a 
protagonist in the world’ (MSI 1982c). Liberty as power, in this sense, served both to 
characterise Europe’s nature and define its future role. 
In the MSI’s case, the notion of power also came through in the criticism of the 
European Union. In particular, this distinctive view of Europe as a potential great power 
with a secular mission informed a critique of the EU based on the idea that it did not 
permit fulfilment of this mission. Romualdi already lamented that part of the problem 
with Europe’s lack of external power lay in the fact that the EU had not been built with 
the political idea of becoming a great power at its heart (1979: 23). The following citation 
by the then leader of the youth branch of the MSI (FUAN) and subsequently MP, 
Maurizio Gasparri, summarises well the MSI’s criticism of the European Community in 
this area, as well as its view for Europe: 
A united Europe can be a protagonist, strengthened by its culture, 
traditions […] Our path […] will be long and hard. We will run 
into hostility and incomprehension. But we know that it is the 
right way, the only one that Europe can follow if it wants to return 
to thinking big, if it wants to build a future of political, military 
and cultural autonomy, if it wants to measure up with its great 
past. It is a “long march” that awaits us. We must face it because 
we are the only ones who are aware of this, that do not mistake a 
deal on legal tenders or on passports for an historical change. We 
need more! Our Nations alone cannot compare with the great 
empires. A common policy and a common defence are a binding 
necessity. We must launch ideas and projects against cultural 
colonisation, against military subjection, against the ploys of 
economic power, to defend a spiritual conception of life, to 
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defend the historical memory and the roots of our peoples, to use 
the economic resources to serve a great political design […] that 
will not be able to ignore social problems, and employment first 
among them, to seize back history. To return to making history, 
not being subject to it! (Gasparri 1988) 
Written in the years leading up to Maastricht, the document is interesting in that it 
highlights the party’s scepticism towards the EU’s merely economic and symbolic deals. 
This is a common line of criticism of the MSI, which throughout its history considered 
that economic union was only a step towards a ‘political Europe’ (see for example MSI 
1990c), by which they meant an EU with a strong foreign policy component. The 
document above also details the MSI’s view of the necessity for this more ‘political’ 
Europe, considered as a corollary to the return of autonomy to the continent and to its 
‘civilising mission’ in the world. In other words, Gasparri here claims that Europe needs 
to be great again, if it is to compete with the great empires and return to ‘making history’. 
This commitment to European power translated into concrete policy positions to 
bring about a ‘political Europe’ which could project influence in the world. First, it fed 
into the previously discussed view of the need for a European defence and a more 
balanced relationship with NATO. In addition, and consistent with the MSI’s claim for 
the need to establish a ‘political Europe’, the party advocated the establishment of a 
common foreign policy for the European Union. The party in fact considered that all 
Italian foreign policy would have to be founded on ‘that great civic and historical reality 
called Europe’ (MSI 1984); or, as the 1987 programme highlighted, Europe would need 
a common foreign policy: that will face the issues of the 
worsening of the international situation, that will place the single 
European states in a situation of parity, in condition to defend 
themselves, revoking limitations, discriminations and privileges; 
that will make Europe in the Western block, in the fullness of its 
rights, determinant in the choices for peace and security, for the 
function that she deserves in the world, in political and economic 
projection, especially in the Mediterranean, the Third World and 
Latin America. (MSI 1987d) 
The passage above ties together several of the considerations about ‘power’ and Europe 
brought forward in previous parts of this chapter: the need to restore European autonomy 
and rebalance relations with the USA, the return to a prominent role in international 
relations for Europe, and the need for Europe to ‘project’ itself in the world and build 
relations with other countries. It also allows, however, to add one final observation 
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concerning the MSI’s commitment to this ‘political Europe’, namely, the extent to which 
it was self-interested.  
The MSI, in fact, was not simply a disinterested supporter of European power, but 
rather a supporter of European policy with a strong Italian component to it. The 
geographical focus of the MSI’s political Europe, in particular, was heavily influenced 
by its hope to be able to restore Italy’s influence in Europe. In the case of Latin America, 
the MSI hoped that Italy would be able to play a role thanks to its numerous immigrant 
communities (a recurrent theme in party documents). The Mediterranean focus, on the 
other hand, was intimately related to another core issue for the party: the Italian 
Mezzogiorno (the MSI’s main electoral constituency), and the hope to contribute to its 
development by shifting the focus of politics and Europe from a Northern to a Southern 
perspective. In this sense, European power was a vehicle to pursue the European mission, 
but also a way to pursue national goals and restore Italy’s own power.  
 
SOFT POWER EUROPE: ALLEANZA NAZIONALE’S REFRAMING OF 
EUROPEAN POWER 
Power remained a relevant concept in the definition of Europe for AN, although it ceased 
to refer to an ‘expansionist’ project based on superiority of European culture and shifted 
to a commitment more in line with mainstream discourses on the European Union’s ‘soft 
power’. AN thus moderated its view of power, removing its hierarchical characteristics, 
while remaining committed to the idea that Europe in the shape of the EU had some 
mission to fulfil in the world. 
Evidence of AN’s moderation in terms of its understanding of power was already 
evident in the Fiuggi theses which marked the party’s transition from ‘neo-fascism’ to 
‘post-fascism’ (although in its early phases, the difference between the two was moderate 
at best, see Griffin 1996, Ignazi 2003: 46, Tarchi 2003). While maintaining some elements 
of the old MSI, the theses also marked a shift in terms of embracing a less hierarchical 
vision of the relationship between Europe and the world. Thus, in the 1995 theses, the 
newly created AN insisted on some traditional themes of the MSI, such as pursuing the 
objective of giving weight to the ‘Great Europe’ by strengthening the European pillar of 
NATO and ensuring that the fall of Communism in central and eastern Europe did not 
distract from the need for a Mediterranean policy and a stronger focus on the Middle East, 
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MSI staples that will remain throughout the AN’s lifespan. However, it also predicated a 
role for Europe in international development, ‘encouraging a cooperation aimed at self-
centred development of the beneficiary countries, the selection of credible political 
classes in the Third World, the education of the technical and managerial personnel that 
can manage long-term projects in developing countries, [and] renegotiating the debt 
accumulated by poor Countries’ (1995: 48). While, as highlighted before, ideas of helping 
the development of the Third World had already been present in the MSI, it is notable to 
remark how they are shed here of some of their most problematic assumptions of 
European superiority. 
This gradual shift to a ‘soft-power’ project continued in subsequent years, at first 
remaining rather faithful to old lines, but then integrating them with new commitments. 
Thus, if the 1999 manifesto highlighted the need for political union and a common foreign 
policy to restore Europe’s power in the external realm (AN 1999), later documents 
coupled this with concerns such as human rights, human dignity, stability and prosperity, 
including a call in 2000 for different relationships with totalitarian countries that violate 
them (AN 2000). This brought AN’s notion of power broadly in line with that of the EU, 
all the while reassessing the notion that Europe had a mission to fulfil in the world. Thus, 
rather than leading to the disappearance of power in the definition of Europe, it merely 
altered its meaning in a more acceptable way. 
If the notion of power changed, AN’s commitment to establishing Europe as a 
force to be reckoned with and to reinstating it in history did not. Thus, the party kept 
employing the notion of power to decontest Europe, albeit drawing on a ‘softer’ definition 
of it. The permanence of this commitment to a powerful Europe is evident in the following 
passage from an article in which former politician Riccardo Pedrizzi, reflecting on 
institutional reform for the EU claimed that 
more Europe means pushing the European Union towards a 
shared and recognised destiny as a great geopolitical actor, as an 
actor that cannot delegate to others the responsibilities that history 
has given it. […] 
However the starring role of the subcontinents, Indian and 
Chinese, and the end of the bipolar division of East-West, should 
push the European Nations towards the construction of a strong 
and united political subject […] 
Given these experiences and in the presence of such 
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changes of perspectives, it is necessary to start a new season of 
institutional reforms to relaunch the debate on the idea of 
European unity, aware that it will be necessary to safeguard the 
identity, exalting their roots, of the single peoples and of all the 
nations. Starting from the belief that only a cohesive and united 
continent will be able to perform the leading role in the upcoming 
times. (Pedrizzi 2006) 
To sum up, both the MSI and the AN had a strong sense of the ‘historical mission’ of 
Europe and its need to project power in the external realm so as to ensure balance in the 
world. Thus, the concept of Liberty as power was essential in their ideology of Europe, 
in so far as it is through the prism of power that they understood its past, its nature and its 
future mission. While for the MSI this was bound up with a strongly hierarchical view of 
relations between Europe and the rest of the world, this was mitigated in the discourse of 
the AN which, while broadly maintaining the same policy objectives and the willingness 
to engage Europe in the world, appeared to do so more on the basis of a collaboration 
with other countries and the willingness to promote ‘universal’ values such as human 
rights and human dignity. In this, it appeared to be broadly in line with the stated aims of 
the EU’s relations with the world (see for example, article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty), 
highlighting the extent to which AN became ‘mainstream’ in its positions. 
 
‘L’EUROPE SERA IMPÉRIALE OU NE SERA PAS’: THE LIMITED ROLE OF 
EUROPEAN POWER IN THE FRONT NATIONAL 
The FN, like the MSI, viewed power as an ideal to be pursued by Europe. Like the Italian 
party, it claimed the need for Europe to have power because this would allow it to be truly 
autonomous and fulfil its historical, civilising mission. However, it also accorded less 
importance to the notion than the MSI/AN did. In particular, the use of the notion of 
power to define Europe was time-bound and limited to the period between the second half 
of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, as the result of an opposition to the 
increasingly economic direction taken by European integration.  
The FN’s considerations on power and Europe started from a similar place as 
those of the MSI. Like the MSI, the FN viewed Europe as a power in decline, but with 
the potential to recover its righteous place in the world. Le Pen summarised this state of 
affairs in his 1984 book when he said that ‘Europe retreats, and civilisation and liberty 
retreat with it; Europe is no longer Europe because it has resigned itself to not being the 
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world’ (1984: 164). This single sentence captures both the feeling of European decline as 
well as the assessment that this is problematic, because the retreat of Europe has negative 
implications for ‘civilisation and liberty’.  
Underlying the passage above, as well as the FN’s view more broadly, was also 
the idea that Europe had some form of ‘historical mission’ to make the world more 
European, a mission that its decline did not allow it to pursue. This was further stressed a 
few years later by Bruno Mégret (cited in FN 1989), when he exhorted, ‘let us 
[Europeans] stop announcing everywhere in the world that we have no design to expand, 
let us stop behaving like guilty and assisted parties’. Just as for the MSI, then, there was 
a view of Europe as a civilisation ‘in retreat’, made to feel guilty by other parties, but 
which should, on the contrary, reclaim its heritage and acquire a more active role in the 
world in the name of its clear superiority. In other words, Europe should exert power in 
the external realm because it is in its nature, and its duty, to do so. 
But why was power so important for the FN, and why should Europe have had it? 
Power, as Mégret (1987) put it, was essential because, in a similar way to autonomy, it 
allowed one to ‘be a master of one’s own fate’ (‘maîtriser son destin’, Mégret 1987). This 
did not apply exclusively to the nation in his view but also needed to be an attribute of 
Europe, as the following passage from the FN’s ‘Passeport pour la victoire’, a short 
booklet detailing the party’s organisation and positions, including a number of 
‘memorable quotes’ associated with key partisan issues, illustrates: 
One cannot build a true community except by affirming oneself 
as autonomous and different compared to others. Let us state 
clearly what objective the European construction must pursue. 
For us, it is [a] triple [objective]: firstly, power; secondly, power; 
thirdly, power. 
Power, because without power, Europe will lose its 
independence, its identity and will cease to be a master of her own 
fate. 
Power, because power is life and nations are like living 
beings: if they are not expanding, they are regressing. 
Power, because, without it, nothing great can be done […] 
(FN 1989) 
Extracted from a speech given by Mégret in the French parliament at the time of the 
debates on the Single European Act and reproduced in the Passeport, this passage is worth 
111 
 
dissecting because it helps tease out the links between Liberty and Europe. Presenting an 
alternative, non-economic form of development for the EU, underlying the entire passage, 
is the idea that a nation or continent which is not powerful cannot be free, as it is always 
going to depend on others to preserve its autonomy. This leads Mégret to assert the need 
for a European construction endowed with ‘puissance’: firstly, because it is the only way 
for the European community to be ‘a master of its own fate’; secondly, because power 
allows nations to expand; and thirdly, because only power allows for great 
accomplishments. The first point is rather familiar, and points towards the fact that there 
can be no autonomy unless there is also the ability to defend oneself from the outer world. 
The second point is more interesting and points towards this ‘expansionary’ view of 
Liberty as a means to project one’s will onto others. Thus, only an expanding body can 
be truly free, not only because it is free from external influence, but also, because it is 
free to express its will abroad and influence others. The final point is a consequence of 
this, and goes back to the idea of Europe as a force acting for civilisation: unless it is 
powerful, the European community cannot hope to repeat the great things Europe has 
done in the past and continue acting for civilisation as it should. Power, hence, becomes 
a constitutive part of Europe, as the sine qua non for true autonomy, as a Europe which 
cannot express itself outside its own borders cannot be truly free. 
While the argument that Mégret brought forward in the previous passage pushed 
for a more powerful European Union, it should also be noted that it was not entirely 
unselfish or aimed at the construction of a federal Europe. In the bipolar world of the 
1980s, and the unipolar one of the early 1990s, the FN was unsure about the individual 
nation’s ability to exert power by themselves, although they also thought that France was 
stronger than others, and hence better placed to act as a guide for everyone else. As a 
result, Europe was seen as a necessary ‘means for the Nation States to find together the 
power they have lost during the fratricidal wars they engaged in and that they asked the 
USA and the USSR to arbitrate’ (FN 1991: 118). The idea of power was also selected as 
key to the project of European unity because it was the only principle that ‘respects the 
identity and sovereignty of European nations’ (Le Pen 1995: 41; see also FN 1993). Thus, 
power became central to the construction of Europe on one hand, as a marker of its 
collective freedom, but also as a means to protect the internal freedom of the individual 
member states, embodied by the ideas of sovereignty and identity mentioned in the 
passage above.  
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The following decades marked a fall in the discourse of power in relation to 
Europe, especially after the departure of Bruno Mégret, one of the architects of the party’s 
position on European power. The concept notably disappeared from the party’s ideology 
of Europe after 1997, only to reappear, in a new fashion, in Marine Le Pen’s 2012 
programme (FN 2012a). In a striking parallel with what happened with autonomy, when 
Marine Le Pen reconsidered Europe and power, its relationship with Europe was 
redefined: it was no longer question of ‘European power’ but of ‘France’s power’ which 
was being limited by the EU; or, to be even more specific, by a political class that was 
‘subjugated’ by a globalist ideology and that reduced France’s foreign policy to the 
European horizon by aligning it with the United States. Thus, it was no longer a question 
of creating a European power as an alternative to the European Union, but rather of re-
establishing the power of the individual nation vis-à-vis the EU.  
 
As with the previous chapter, this chapter has highlighted a number of differences 
in the parties’ use of Liberty which it is worth briefly discussing before moving on to the 
next section. In particular, it noted the following areas of divergence: the disappearance 
of the focus on European autonomy in AN and the FN, coupled with different positions 
on questions of (democratic) self-rule; and the permanence of notions of power (albeit in 
a ‘soft’ form) in AN, as opposed to the FN.  
Three plausible explanations for these divergences may be mentioned: one 
focusing on context, a second one on ideological aspects, and the third one on strategic 
objectives. As far as context goes, the Cold War and the European Union’s changes 
between the 1980s and 1990s could explain the disappearance of calls for European 
autonomy. Thus, while in the 1980s the autonomy of Europe may have appeared as 
endangered, this was no longer the case in the 1990s, explaining why it disappeared from 
AN and the FN’s ideology of Europe. At the same time, the evolution of the EU following 
the Maastricht Treaty raised questions about the extent to which it would curtail 
autonomy, leading the FN to shift its positions towards opposing the EU on grounds of 
domestic self-rule. The broad changes that occurred between the end of the 1980s and the 
early 1990s do not, however, explain why the MSI and later AN did not turn against the 
EU in the same way the FN did, an element also noted in the previous chapter. In fact, 
while the MSI did criticise the Maastricht Treaty (and voted against it), its critique of it 
was not primarily built around concerns about autonomy or self-rule, but around the 
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notion that the presence of opt outs did not create a level playing field, and that Maastricht 
engraved on Europe a certain (economic) idea with which the party disagreed (AN 
1994a). 
Ideological elements such as different views on the relative power of their nations 
and differing attitudes towards the democratic system prove more useful to understanding 
why the parties diverged. When it comes to the size of the nation, it pays to note that the 
MSI and AN did not seem to view participation in the EU as a zero sum game in which 
growing EU powers would lessen the nation, but rather as a process that could enhance 
the nation’s power. The MSI and AN were, in fact, aware of Italy’s status as a ‘medium-
size power’, and may have felt as a result that the EU did not really restrict autonomy or 
self-rule, or that there was a valid trade-off between autonomy and increased power which 
justified their continued engagement with the project. This also aids the understanding of 
why concerns about power remained more relevant to them than they did to the FN: the 
MSI/AN was never sure that Italy could make it on its own, so they tried to maintain its 
relevance through Europe. The FN, on the other side, viewed France as a great power and 
natural leader in Europe, making them less willing to accept trade-offs and more 
confident, especially from the 1990s onwards, about the country’s ability to make it on 
its own.  
The parties’ different attitudes towards the democratic system, on the other hand, 
could explain variations in the levels of concern with democracy. Here it is worth 
returning to the distinction between ‘old’ ‘extreme right’ parties and ‘new’ ‘radical right 
parties’ (Hainsworth 2008: 8-9, Ignazi 2003: 25-34), which might help explain why the 
MSI was never too concerned about democracy, seeing the established democratic order 
as an imperfect one. In contrast, AN and the FN accepted the existing order and could 
therefore more credibly include democracy in their ideology of Europe, albeit in different 
ways. For the FN, this can also be seen as the result of their populist features, which led 
them to place focus the democratic self-rule of ‘the (national) people’ against a corrupt 
and unelected (Euroglobalist) ‘elite’. 
Finally, it is also possible that the MSI/AN did not turn to outright opposition to 
the EU because there were no strategic incentives to do so. In this case, one could argue 
that the parties’ ideology could have been ‘tweaked’ if they thought it might be helpful 
to increase their vote share or relevance. However, the MSI/AN worked in the context of 
a broadly EU-positive public opinion, where Euroscepticism would not have paid a 
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particularly high dividend (Quaglia 2008: 60). Turning to Euroscepticism, as a result, was 
unlikely to lend them any votes and may have even alienated a part of their electorate 
used to a positive approach to the EU, carrying costs in terms of credibility. Furthermore, 
for a party in search of respectability as AN was in the early 1990s, anti-EU positions 
might have signalled an anti-establishment attitude incompatible with a ‘coalitionable’ 
and legitimate party (on this, see Vasilopoulou 2018a).  
These different factors could have plausibly had a role in explaining what 
happened. Further research may want to focus on their interactions and relative weight, 
but for the time being it is pertinent to return to the main objectives of this thesis and 
specifically, to reflecting on the implications of the parties’ use of Liberty to decontest 
Europe. 
 
LIBERTY AS A SHARED CONCEPT: REVISITING 
NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN NARRATIVES 
The sections so far have sought to show how the MSI/AN and FN drew on the concept of 
Liberty to further define their positions on the European Union. They have shown that 
the parties defined Europe both as a place that needed to be free and the European Union 
as a limitation to that freedom. This section delves deeper into the implications of this 
argument by addressing two aspects: first, the increased focus it brings to questions of 
Liberty; and second, the extent to which these ideas of Liberty are exclusively far right. 
The contention advanced here is that the inclusion of Europe via the concept of Liberty 
may have brought more attention to an aspect of far right ideology that is broadly shared 
with other political actors.  
Starting from the first point, it is possible to argue that the integration of Europe 
in far right ideology through the concept of Liberty may have altered the balance between 
the concepts of Identity and Liberty, bringing the latter into a more visible position. In 
fact, while both ‘boundary-building’ and ‘political’ aspects of nationalism matter to the 
far right, the former seems to have more prominence in their ideology and manifests itself 
in a variety of their flagship policies, such as opposition to immigration or their intense 
attachment to the nation itself. However, the inclusion of European issues in the parties’ 
ideology, within the context of a divided Europe and, afterwards, an increasingly political 
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EU, may have indeed forced them to dedicate more space to Liberty, giving it more 
prominence in the ideology as a whole.   
Beyond altering the balance between concepts, the fact that the EU is a moving 
target also means that its evolutions can trigger changes in the ways in which concepts 
are interpreted and employed. This was perhaps most evident in the Front National’s 
responses to the Maastricht Treaty and the way in which it engendered a shift in the usage 
of Liberty by anchoring it to ideas of self-rule, rather than to the alternative interpretation 
of Liberty as power. This suggests that, while the understanding and positions expressed 
on Europe are guided by nationalism, the inclusion of Europe necessarily provokes 
adjustments that shape the overall structure of the ideology and the individual meaning 
of the concepts used to decontest it.  
Importantly, however, it should be noted that, in spite of their shifting meanings, 
notions of Liberty have been consistently present in the parties’ ideology of Europe, 
whether in one form or another. While the individual meanings associated with it have 
tended to shift over time and, as discussed in the chapter, in relation to changes in context 
and the developments of the European Union itself, the conceptual realm has remained 
broadly the same. This highlights a certain level of consistency and continuity in the far 
right’s ideology of Europe.  
In addition to altering the shape of far right ideology and certain concepts within 
it, the increased focus brought to questions of Liberty may have the effect of stressing 
elements that are not exclusive to these parties, but which are shared more widely across 
the polity. In fact, the concept of Liberty as well as its individual understandings studied 
so far are not specifically far right, but rather part of a broader tradition of thinking about 
the nation and Europe. Thus, while being part of the far right’s ideology, they are not 
exclusive to it or developed externally to national and European traditions. 
Two examples should help highlight these similarities: on one hand, the parallel 
between the role of Liberty as a collective form of autonomy and self-rule in the parties’ 
definition of Europe, and the central role played by sovereignty in the definition of the 
State; and on the other, the analogies between their vision of European power and the 
EU’s self-understanding. 
On the first count, the attentive reader will have noted that, while the thesis does 
not use the term ‘sovereignty’ in an attempt to mirror the parties’ language, the notions 
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of autonomy and self-rule largely retrace the internal and external facets of national 
sovereignty. Internal sovereignty corresponds most clearly to the idea of self-rule, 
suggesting that ‘the state has the absolute power to make decisions on every aspect of 
human life’ (Troper 2012: 354-355); whereas, external sovereignty can be defined as 
indicating that the state is ‘independent of every other external power’ (Troper 2012: 354-
355), and hence autonomous, as our parties would have it. Sovereignty, as Troper also 
points out, while remaining contested in several empirical and theoretical terms, remains 
a central concept in constitutional law and discourse, and is thus heavily embedded as a 
core part of politics (2012: 351).18  
National sovereignty, in fact, is far from being a principle that matters exclusively 
to far right parties. While, given the place the nation occupies in their ideology, it may 
matter to them more than others, it is also a key principle in the functioning of the state 
and as a result part of a common way of thinking about the nation. Within the Italian and 
French context specifically, the relevance of the principle of sovereignty, as well as its 
nature as an attribute of the nation and not merely of the state, can be inferred by its 
presence in the opening sections of their Constitutions: the French constitution proclaims 
an attachment to the principle of ‘national sovereignty’ in the preamble and dedicates its 
second constitutional article to it, while the Italian constitution consents to limitations of 
sovereignty ‘in parity with other states’ for the maintenance of peace and justice among 
nations. As a result, when the parties draw upon these concepts to define Europe and their 
policies on the EU, they are tapping into widely accepted constitutional principles to 
advance their claims.  
Liberty as power in the external realm, on the other hand, resonates with narratives 
about European and national ‘missions’. It will be remembered that the MSI, AN and the 
FN all suggested that Europe and their respective nations had a duty to fulfil in the world. 
While this claim may be seen as problematic because of its imperialist undertones, it also 
shares some commonalities with national and EU narratives about what Europe is for, 
and what its role in the world should be. Thus, for example, the views expressed by the 
Front National in the 1980s, about France leading a ‘great power’ Europe, appear as 
 
18 One might, of course, want to object that sovereignty and the powers associated with it are but a mere 
legal fiction in an interconnected global order. However, even while admitting that the legal relevance of 
sovereignty is limited by the international order, its political relevance has not declined, as the most recent 
discussions on Brexit as a vote about ‘taking back control’ would suggest (see also MacCormick 1993 for 
an earlier articulation of this argument with respect to Maastricht). 
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strongly aligned with French perceptions of Europe as ‘France written large’ and the EU 
as a means to project power lost following decolonisation (Frank 2002).   
It is equally possible to find echoes of EU statements in the positions held by the 
parties in the 1970s and 1980s. For example, it may be worth noting the parallels between 
the 1970s declaration on European identity which stated that  
the Europe of the Nine is aware that, as it unites, it takes on new 
international obligations. European unification is not directed 
against anyone, nor is it inspired by a desire for power. On the 
contrary, the Nine are convinced that their union will benefit the 
whole international community since it will constitute an element 
of equilibrium and a basis for co-operation with all countries, 
whatever their size, culture or social system (European Union 
1973) 
and our parties’ claims to make Europe an ‘element of equilibrium’ in the world. While 
the EU declaration arguably rejects the concept of power so keenly espoused by the 
MSI/AN and FN (an element, however, which suggests that ‘powerful’ is how the EU is 
commonly perceived), it still expresses similar ideas about its need to take an active role 
in guaranteeing the international order.  
This awareness of a European ‘mission’ remains present in today’s EU, where the 
Treaty on European Union insists on its role in seeking to advance key values such as 
‘democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and 
solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international 
law’ (Art. 21, European Union 2007). While the MSI/AN and FN no longer use this type 
of argument, this suggests that the EU maintains a mission to export its values beyond its 
borders, and project its power in the world. When the parties draw upon such ideas, then, 
they are drawing on ideas that are already there, and while they present them in a more 
radical and perhaps unapologetic fashion, they are not acting in a void but reinterpreting 
and radicalising views that are already in the mainstream.  
In short, when far right parties employ Liberty to decontest Europe, they do indeed 
draw on core concepts in their ideology; but they also align with wider, shared narratives 
about the nation and Europe. Thus, while maintaining their distinctiveness because they 
are redeploying core concepts in their ideology, they are also managing to put focus on 
elements that are not unique to them.  
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As a matter of conclusion, it is possible to offer a final consideration on what this 
focus on Liberty may tell us about definitions of the far right more broadly. In particular, 
the weight of issues of Liberty in the far right’s ideology of Europe encourages reflection 
on the appropriateness of the concept of ‘nativism’ discussed in the previous chapter by 
considering what it obscures about the far right’s appeal. In particular, the concept does 
not allow one to capture much about why the ‘natives’ are so concerned with ‘Others’, or 
what the purposes of nationalism more broadly are. While the rejection of the Other 
certainly has something to do with fear of cultural or racial mixing which would dilute 
national identity, their positions on Europe suggest that it might also be seen as concerned 
with more political aspects of nationalism, such as issues of representation and who the 
beneficiaries of the laws made by the state are. While the lack of focus on this second, 
political aspect might be warranted by the primacy of the first one, or by the willingness 
to distinguish between ‘good’, civic and ‘bad’ xenophobic nationalism, it is important to 
note that the far right’s ideology of Europe (and most likely their ideology in general) 
draws on both.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Following the chapter on Identity, this chapter has advanced two further arguments 
concerning the far right’s understanding of Europe. First, it argued that far right parties 
do not rely exclusively on the concept of Identity to discuss Europe, but also employ the 
concept of Liberty to further define the meaning of Europe and integrate it in their 
ideological frames. This was considered as falling in line with the expectation explored 
in chapter two and the findings of chapter three suggesting that parties redeploy core 
concepts in their ideology to make sense of new ones. The empirical sections showed 
how this worked in practice by highlighting how far right parties used the concept of 
Liberty both to define Europe as a place in need of freedom and, in the case of the FN, as 
a place that limited such freedom. Table three summarises the meanings associated with 
the concept and how it was used to decontest Europe.  
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TABLE 3: SUMMATIVE TABLE OF LIBERTY AND EUROPE 
 
Second, the chapter suggested that the way in which Europe was decontested 
through Liberty drew on concepts that are not exclusive to the far right, but rather are part 
of a broader tradition of thinking about the nation and Europe. This could help the parties 
appear as more ‘normal’ and embedded in their societies than the term ‘far right’ would 
suggest.  
 
  
Main concept  Subthemes Present in 
MSI AN FN 
Liberty Autonomy and self-rule:  
• Europe as a space that needs 
to retrieve autonomy (1) 
• EU as a body that limits 
autonomy and self-rule (2) 
• Democracy value that needs 
to be present in EU (3) 
(1) Dominant 
in 1980s, 
present 
1990s 
 
 
(3) Present but 
infrequent 
1990s 
onwards  
 
 (1) Present 
1980s, (2) 
Dominant 
1990 onwards 
External power and 
‘rayonnement’: 
• Europe and EU as bodies that 
must exert power in external 
realm 
Present 1980s, 
1990s 
 
Present 1990s, 
2000s 
 
 
Present 1980s, 
early 1990s 
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5.  STATES OF EMERGENCY: EUROPE 
UNDER THREAT 
 
 
Up until now, the thesis has explored the core concepts that the MSI/AN and FN have 
used to decontest Europe. The two previous chapters have shown that when the studied 
parties defined Europe, they drew on the concepts of Identity and Liberty to present 
Europe as a distinct community and as a space defined by ideas of autonomy, self-rule 
and power. It was suggested that the inclusion of Europe in their ideology through these 
terms led to an ‘opening’ of the parties’ ideological cores, and to placing an increased 
focus on elements that are not exclusive to them but shared with other actors as well. 
This chapter moves away from the core to the area of adjacency to discuss a third 
concept that both fleshes out the conceptual core further and helps define the positions of 
far right parties on the project of European integration: the concept of Threat. Developing 
the insights of the two previous chapters, it argues that in the MSI and the FN’s ideology 
(but not AN’s), Europe, its Liberty, its Identity and the lifestyle associated with it are 
described as endangered by a series of threats which, in time, could lead to the demise of 
Europe itself and of its nations. The chapter maintains that the effect of this rhetoric of 
danger is to place Europe in a situation of emergency which helps parties present 
themselves as prophetic actors.  
The argument is developed as follows. The chapter opens by discussing why 
Threat can be considered an adjacent, but nonetheless rather important, concept in far 
right ideology. It then proceeds to illustrate how the parties have mobilised it in their 
definition of Europe by showing how they have presented the continent as endangered by 
a series of internal, external and diffuse threats. Following this descriptive enterprise, the 
chapter shows how this constant reference to danger feeds into a ‘politics of emergency’ 
where far right parties present themselves as the only ones aware of the grave danger 
Europe is in.  
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ANCHORING THE CORE: EUROPE IN DANGER 
Drawing on the contention advanced in chapter two that parties would use existing 
elements in their ideology to integrate new issues into it, the two previous chapters argued 
that Identity and Liberty were ‘core concepts’ of the far right’s nationalist ideology which 
were being ‘repurposed’ by the parties to define Europe. This chapter develops this 
contention, showing how parties have drawn on a third concept to define Europe, namely, 
the concept of Threat.  
Before presenting this concept, it is important to address a question about how ‘far 
right’ the concepts employed so far have been. While this may appear as a tangential 
question in principle, it is one that this chapter can help address and should therefore be 
tackled as a matter of priority. 
Following the two previous chapters, a critical reader may feel the need to ask 
about the extent to which the concepts of Identity and Liberty are specifically far right. 
They may want to argue that there is nothing particularly far right about them, and that 
these may be expected to play a role in the ideology of any nationalist party (and 
potentially even beyond them). They may cite the contention advanced in Chapter four 
that, in focusing on Liberty, far right parties end up sounding strikingly close to other 
actors and thus lose their distinctive far right character. They may, in short, want to ask 
what makes the far right’s ideology of Europe any more far right than, say, the ideology 
of Europe of any non-far right nationalist party?  
Two answers rooted in the morphological approach may be given to the reader’s 
question, one drawing on the individual meanings of concepts and the other on their 
assembly. Central to Freeden’s understanding of ideologies is the contention that all 
ideologies are formed by clusters of concepts, and that all ideologies will employ similar 
concepts (1998a: 54ff). A concept such as Liberty may be present in liberalism, but also 
in conservatism or, in our case, nationalism. What gives ideologies their distinctiveness 
is the way in which concepts are decontested, their relative position in the ideology and 
the overall selection of concepts being utilised. Thus, Liberty may be understood in a 
radically different way in liberalism and nationalism, or it may be understood in similar 
ways but associated with different concepts, giving the ideology as a whole a different 
‘shape’. Similarly, a concept such as Equality may be core to socialism, but only marginal 
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(or even absent) in conservatism, thereby altering its relative weight in the ideology as a 
whole.  
One possible answer to our critical reader’s question, then, consists in saying that 
while the concepts themselves are not particularly far right, the way in which they are 
decontested and their overall position in the ideology is. The previous chapters have 
addressed this point when they have claimed, for example, that the far right’s Liberty is 
of a collective type, and that their understanding of Identity is rooted in a closed 
conception of groups. In this sense, their definition of these concepts, and the way in 
which they have applied them to Europe, would appear to give them a distinctively far 
right touch. Their position is equally important because it highlights that these are the 
concepts around which the rest of the ideology is built.  
The second answer to our reader is that what matters is not just the individual 
presence of the concepts of Identity and Liberty, or the way in which they are decontested 
and their place, but also their association with other concepts that are more specific to the 
far right and which may ‘anchor’ the core in a more distinctive cluster of concepts. This 
is precisely the role of the concept analysed in this chapter, namely, the concept of Threat. 
The concept of Threat refers to the notion that something (or someone) cherished 
is placed in an unwelcome situation of danger which may, in the most extreme cases, lead 
to its very disappearance. As such, it involves the identification of something that is 
valued, of something (or someone) that threatens it and the claim of a negative 
relationship linking the former and the latter. Who is threatened and who poses a threat 
and why may change, but the recognition of a Threat will usually require the discussion 
of such elements.  
The concept of Threat may be thought of as an adjacent concept that ‘colours’ the 
party family’s nationalism.19 Adjacent concepts are concepts that, while not ubiquitous 
as core concepts are, have the role of ‘finessing the core and anchoring it—at least 
 
19 The concept of Threat could credibly be subsumed under an articulation of ‘Us versus Them’, and 
therefore as a mere manifestation of the identity-building part of nationalism discussed in Chapter three, 
however, this thesis treats it as a separate concept. In particular, it considers that reading the concept of 
Threat as a simple matter of ‘Us versus Them’ does not make it possible to fully appreciate that Threat 
often refers to broader phenomena which cannot be imputed to a specific ‘them’ (e.g., globalisation, social 
decline etc.). Therefore, while it can lead to scapegoating and what Wodak (2015) calls a ‘politics of fear’, 
this reading encapsulates a broader selection of elements than relying on a simple ‘Us versus Them’ 
distinction would capture.  
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temporarily—into a more determinate and decontested semantic field’ (Freeden 2013: 
125-126). In this case, the concept anchors the far right’s ideology in a field of emergency, 
presenting the elements that the far right cares about as constantly endangered. It creates 
a vision of the world in which politics is not just about policies but about the very survival 
of the political body. This also results in giving a high prominence not only to the 
consequences of the Threat, but also to its causes, whether they be material or immaterial. 
In this sense, it populates far right ideology with dangerous peoples and phenomena 
which may appear as less relevant in other variants of nationalism.  
The importance of this concept in far right parties is often stressed when it comes 
to analysing their views on ‘Others’ and presenting their nationalism as one that is 
‘closed’ to outsiders, whether this closedness be on ethnic or cultural grounds. In fact, the 
idea of belonging to a group and wanting to express it politically need not imply 
exclusionary features, as the classic debate opposing the (allegedly) open ‘civic’ versus 
the closed ‘ethnic’ nationalism shows (Kohn 2005 [1944]). In the case of the far right, 
however, the closed conception of the nation, along with the feeling that it is endangered, 
leads to a significantly more exclusive nationalism, in which others are not only 
unwelcome but also seen as dangers. This specific ‘colour’ of far right nationalism has 
led authors such as Mudde (2007: 19) to define them specifically as ‘nativists’.  
In the context of the parties’ ideology of Europe, the concept of Threat is 
mobilised to characterise Europe as an endangered space and the EU as a threatening 
body. Thus, it provides further definition to the parties’ understanding of Europe by 
placing the continent in a specific situation of emergency, where Europe is presented as 
threatened on all sides and at risk of disappearing, bringing its heritage of Identity and 
Liberty down with it. In defining Europe itself as endangered, the parties characterise 
Europe in the same way as they characterise the nation, showing that familiar tropes are 
redeployed and applied in new settings. At the same time, however, the EU is presented 
as a Threat, highlighting once again the ‘dual nature’ of the far right’s understanding of 
Europe.  
The following empirical sections present an overview of the sources of danger 
identified by the MSI/AN and FN and illustrate how they threaten the other concepts that 
the parties used to decontest Europe. Three forms of Threat are identified in turn – 
internal, external and ‘diffuse’– and their relationship with the concepts of Identity and 
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Liberty is explored.20 The cumulative effects of this constant reference to Threat are then 
examined in the concluding section, where it is argued that they give rise to a ‘politics of 
emergency’ where the studied parties present themselves as the only ones who are aware 
of the dangerous situation that Europe is in.  
Before moving on, it is important to introduce a caveat: with this concept in 
particular, the boundaries between what threatens the nation and what threatens Europe 
are particularly blurry. This chapter focuses more on what threatens Europe, but it will be 
clear that, in many cases, Europe may simply be a place on which to project national 
fears. 
 
DECLINE, BREAKDOWN AND INTERNAL ENEMIES: THE DANGER 
WITHIN 
In the MSI/AN and FN’s view, Europe and its nations are endangered by a series of threats 
of various natures, including a series of internal ones. Internal threats are of a varied 
nature; however, their main characteristic is that they either originate or are placed within 
the nation and/or state (see Mudde 2007: 64-65). The following sections discuss the main 
internal threats identified by the studied parties, such as demographic decline, the corrupt 
political class and immigration. Then, they show how they endanger Europe and the 
previously studied concepts of Identity and Liberty.  
 
EUROCOMMUNISM, DECLINE AND ‘POLITICIANS’: THE MSI’S INTERNAL 
THREATS TO EUROPE 
The MSI’s ideology of Europe was rich in references to threats of various kinds, although 
internal threats were not the dominating ones. The threats the MSI identified for Europe 
were broadly the same as the threats it identified for Italy and were well integrated in the 
party’s ideology. In fact, they were indicative of what the party considered worthy of 
defending and, conversely, what it considered necessary to oppose.  
 
20 Note that while different threats are discussed, this chapter is more interested in showing the relevance 
of the concept of Threat itself than in exploring the specific forms it takes. As a result, some familiar threats 
which receive significant attention in the literature (such as immigration or Islam) may be given less space 
because the focus is on the category of Threat rather than the individual threats that fall into it. 
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Given the MSI’s stark anti-communism, it should appear relatively unsurprising 
that the first internal threat it identified for Europe was Eurocommunism, the specific 
European (rather than Soviet) variant of communism. The MSI perceived 
Eurocommunism as a destabilising force which could entail a loss of Liberty by leading 
Europe to be placed under external domination. Thus, it acquired its full threatening 
power in relationship with the external threat represented by the USSR. The danger posed 
by Eurocommunism is illustrated quite clearly by Romualdi in the following passage, in 
which he comments on the Eurodestra initiative and on the likely outcome of the 
European elections: 
The European Parliament will have, it is true, an overwhelming 
majority of anti-communist forces. It is however important to 
remember that not all the political forces represented in that 
Parliament […] precisely because they are far from having in 
place a communist threat in their own States, are able to 
understand well and promptly the dangers of certain communist 
initiatives. […] It would be hasty and superficial to think that once 
reduced to its just proportion, about 10% of the deputies in the 
European Parliament, communism will cease to be a danger. 
From this derives the extremely important and delicate job 
of the politicians of the Eurodestra. Certainly not a very numerous 
group, but without a doubt interpreting much higher, broader and 
important interests, concerning political health and the guarantee 
of liberty and development of the entire European and Western 
world. A world that is decidedly in a crisis, but especially too sick 
with communism to be sure of being able to save itself without 
settling in advance on positions of increased cultural and political 
engagement, centred around the great values of civilisation and 
of the very same European civilisation. (Romualdi 1979: 17) 
Beyond defining Eurocommunism as a threat, the passage is also of interest because it 
presents the European Right as having a clear ‘mission’ to ‘save’ Europe (and the entire 
Western world) from the decline brought about by this threat. Thus, it mobilises an 
element of the parties’ ideology to define Europe as endangered and presents the MSI as 
its ‘saviour’.  
The MSI was also particularly concerned about internal decline threatening the 
survival of the nation and Europe. Brought about by factors such as demographic decline 
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and immigration,21 but also by the acquisition of consumerist behaviours which led 
Europeans to ‘grow lazy and cowardly, ready only to avoid deciding, seeing, used to 
giving up and forgetting’ (MSI 1982b), internal decline worried the MSI because it 
endangered the existing social order and the way of life associated with Europe; in other 
words, two constitutive elements of its identity. The following passages from the 1990 
majority congress motion ‘Destra in movimento’, and from documents produced by the 
1994’s unitary congress Foreign Policy Commission respectively, capture these fears, as 
well as their interaction with other pet issues such as drugs and abortion: 
Italy, Europe, no longer have the strength and will to reproduce 
themselves, imprisoned by a hedonistic and consumerist logic. 
There are undoubtedly issues in the social order that make this 
issue worse (crisis of the metropolis, work and housing issues, 
lack of fiscal policies for families). Demographic decline, 
connected with a broader battle for the right for life (against 
abortion and drugs), is one of the great questions that we must 
face, a question where we can show the “difference” between us 
and others. (MSI 1990a) 
The ever more serious issues of the demographic and 
employment imbalance between the northern and southern shore 
of the Mediterranean, present to Italy and Europe the issue of the 
uncontrolled invasion of foreigners. In this sense, we have for 
years proposed a European plan for 20 million Africans in Africa, 
with an economic return for Europe, and to develop in those 
countries the necessary conditions of a profitable economy that 
will prevent the haemorrhage of work from those lands towards 
Europe. (MSI 1994) 
Just like in the case of Eurocommunism, the passages here identify threats to Europe, but 
also place them in a broader ideational context by tying them to other social issues 
frequently discussed by the party in other settings. Thus, they identify a threat, but also 
stress what matters to the MSI and what they stand for.  
Finally, the MSI also indicated a specific category of people as being partially to 
 
21 Immigration was conspicuously absent from the MSI’s early documents, and only started appearing 
around the end of the 1980s as the result of cross-pollination with the FN and the emergence of immigration 
as an issue in Italian politics. However, the MSI’s relationship with the issue was more complex than the 
FN’s, with the party leadership being reluctant to embrace anti-immigration as an issue (Ignazi 1994: 85-
86 and 1998: 414-415; see also Camus 1996: 202 on Rauti’s break with the FN over immigration). AN also 
sought to maintain a more balanced position on immigration, although it still presented rather restrictive 
policy preferences (Ignazi 2005, ter Wal 2000). 
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blame for Europe’s decline: the political establishment. Considering the MSI’s place as 
an anti-establishment party in permanent opposition (especially from the mid-1970s—see 
Ignazi 1998), this attack on the political class should appear as consistent with both their 
beliefs and their position on the political spectrum.22 For them, European governments 
and the political class more broadly were guilty of weakness and lack of vision, unable to 
‘prepare it [Europe] for the great world challenges’ (MSI 1982c) and, as Romualdi (1986) 
put it in an article, dedicated only to ‘speak of nothing but pacifism, disarmament, 
neutralism and operate as if every day they would like to ditch their commitments, to 
transform Europe in a denuclearised area, the soft belly of the world, exactly as the 
Soviets would like’. The European political class was thus presented as an accomplice in 
Europe’s loss of power, and, as a result, in its internal decline and potential fall.  
 
TREATING INTERNAL THREATS AS REGULAR POLITICAL CHALLENGES: 
THE AN’S MOVE AWAY FROM DANGER 
Compared with the MSI and the FN, the concept of Threat occupied a marginal position 
in AN’s ideology. The party, in fact, progressively moved away from claiming that 
Europe was threatened by some kind of existential threat, and started viewing issues that 
in the past has been so defined as regular issues in day to day politics. Europe, as a result, 
no longer appeared as endangered or in decline, but merely faced with ‘normal’ political 
choices in need of balanced solutions. 
In the realm of internal threats, the shift away from emergency and into normal 
politics can be observed in the specific case of immigration in the following passage from 
the party’s Verona Congress documents: 
The quantitative weakening of certain peoples, the incremental 
explosion of others, the territorial transfers that tend to take on a 
mass character, pose, with an intensity that risks becoming 
pressing and destabilising, the question of the relationship 
between rather different cultural visions […]. In addition to a 
certain numerical consistency, in fact, the migratory flux leads to 
 
22 The use of anti-establishment over the more familiar ‘populist’ is a deliberate choice. Populism implies 
a rejection of all elites as inherently bad, while the MSI’s criticism of elites limited itself to a specific 
political class. The MSI also did not frame its political battle as one opposing ‘the good people’ against ‘the 
corrupt elite’. For more in-depth discussions of populism and the difference between populism and anti-
establishment see Barr 2009, Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2017, Mény and Surel 2001, Müller 2016, Stanley 
2008. 
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the presence of many men uprooted from their home milieu and 
many more men that see their home milieu occupied by men that 
were not there before and that come from afar. For the respective 
cultural sensibilities (because the milieu is not only a physical 
fact) this is not void of consequence. 
In the same way that it reclaims the cultural identity of the 
Italian nation and the broader European identity, Alleanza 
Nazionale recognises the specificities and differences of the other 
identities, which it respects in their original constitution and with 
whom it aspires to promote and find, with an open spirit, 
reciprocally acceptable appropriate forms and ways of peaceful 
cohabitation. In other words, Alleanza Nazionale knows that the 
other face of identity (in the singular) is identities (in the plural). 
At the same time, the Italian Right feels the duties deriving 
from history […]. Alleanza Nazionale knows that the Italian 
people is a founding part, along with other European peoples, of 
a civic, judicial, aesthetic, ethic, philosophical identity that does 
not deserve – in spite of the many mistakes made by Europe in 
exhausting itself in internecine wars – to dissolve or to be 
dissolved in an indistinct, magmatic, pseudo-cultural miscellany 
[…] (AN 1998: 11-12) 
The passage is interesting because it offers a view of how the issue of immigration was 
reinterpreted, going from being a threat to identity to an issue in need of a balanced 
solution. While immigration was still presented as problematic, and the loss of identity as 
a possibility, there was also an attempt to find a solution that did not involve presenting 
other identities as dangerous. In fact, the passage openly acknowledges the plurality of 
identities and the need to foster peaceful cohabitation, rather than segregation, between 
them. As the passage later adds, the protection of identity must respect all identities and 
take place within the understanding that mankind shares a common ‘humanitas’. In short, 
while references to dangers persisted in AN’s definition of Europe, these were no longer 
existential or all encompassing, but merely in need of careful management.  
 
A THREAT IN EVERY CORNER: THE FN’S FEAR OF INTERNAL EUROPEAN 
DECLINE 
Like the MSI, the Front National also presents Europe as endangered by a variety of 
internal threats closely resembling those identified by the Italian party. However, unlike 
AN, the party never moved away from this mind set, and the concept of Threat was never 
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pushed to the bounds of marginality. Thus, throughout its history, the Front National 
maintained the notion of an internal threat leading to social decline, although the forms 
this has acquired have been varied, as has been the party’s relationship with Europe. 
The 1980s Front National appeared particularly concerned about the internal 
decline of Europe, which was threatened, as it saw it, by a series of negative 
developments. The elements leading and contributing to Europe’s decline (which are 
presented elsewhere as ‘the same that threaten France’, Le Pen 1984: 163) were helpfully 
summarised in the 1986 document ‘L’Europe, d’abord une volonté’, an article presenting 
the FN’s freshly elected MPs’ and MEPs’ vision for Europe: 
Struck by senility, blocked by unqualified immigrant labour, led 
by governments that are happy to manage for the short term; 
Europe, which had compensated for its political decline through 
an exceptional economic development after World War Two, 
appears no longer able to successfully face the great technological 
revolution to come. (FN 1986) 
Four sources of Europe’s decline are identified: demography, immigration, the political 
class, and economic welfare and development. To the four issues identified in the 
paragraph above, one might also add a general ‘spiritual’ decline. These issues are present 
across the history of the Front National, although their relative weight changes over time, 
as does the extent to which these are European problems.  
But why, exactly, were the factors mentioned above viewed as dangerous and 
contributing to internal decline? Starting with ‘spiritual decline’, the most time-bound of 
the elements since it carried weight mostly in the 1980s, its main responsibility was that 
of weakening Europe and its values. The following passage from Jean-Marie Le Pen’s 
1984 book illustrates this well, also highlighting the FN’s role as a party committed to 
fighting such decline:  
I believe that one of the main dangers that influences France as 
well as Europe stems from moral laxity, from the spiritual void, 
from the intellectual sloppiness that is its own. I believe that the 
easing of the necessary disciplines, the abandonment of 
fundamental principles have led to a weakening of the abilities to 
resist and the abilities to react of Europe. In all domains, I believe 
that the weakening of family ties, of familial solidarity and of 
national solidarities have led to a phenomenon of dispersion and 
consequently of impoverishment. The Front National articulates 
its political project around a recovery, a renaissance, a renewal. It 
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claims that one must not only recognise the spiritual and moral 
and national and patriotic dimension, but also organise it, exalt it. 
(Le Pen 1984: 164-165) 
This ‘spiritual weakness’ was further reinforced by the primacy acquired by economic 
over spiritual concerns, which led to the (deplorable) ‘reduction of man to his purely 
economic dimension’ (Pichon 1989). 
While spiritual decline was viewed as endangering Europe’s identity, it was 
largely trumped by the threat of demographic decline and its sister issue, immigration. 
Both issues feature in the party’s definition of Europe since its early years and appear to 
threaten its Identity and its Liberty. They also, rather helpfully, tied the European issue 
to a core domestic policy for far right parties in general (e.g., Fennema 1997, Ivarsflaten 
2008, Hainsworth 2008: 70-77). 
The danger posed by demographic decline to Europe was already discussed in the 
party’s 1979 European election manifesto23 which claimed that  
Europe, as the rest of West, suffers from a drop in the birth rate 
that can lead to the slavery and even to the disappearance of its 
nations. To overcome the crisis of civilisation that started this 
change, it is necessary to re-establish the moral values that have 
made it supreme and elaborate an ardent family policy. No effort 
in this direction will be too expensive given the danger one is 
exposed to. (Le National 1979) 
The passage illustrates well the way in which demographic decline threatened the 
concepts of Identity and Liberty that the party used to decontest Europe, especially 
through the references to ‘slavery’ and the ‘disappearance of nations’. In the party’s logic, 
a smaller European community would not be able to defend its own freedom, and would 
also risk disappearing because of its inability to transmit its own heritage and, hence, the 
elements that constitute its identity to younger generations.  
Immigration further reinforced this form of demographic decline in the FN’s view, 
especially because the party expected it to lead to the progressive replacement of native 
populations with foreign ‘Others’, thus diluting and ultimately destroying Europe’s 
distinctive culture. The link between the two is captured in this speech by Jean-Marie Le 
 
23 While the party produced a manifesto, it did not participate in the actual election because, following the 
failure to broker a deal with Tixier-Vignancour’s Parti des Forces Nouvelles (the MSI’s partner in the 
Eurodestra), the Front National withdrew its list (see Camus 1997: 43, Reungoat 2015: 228). 
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Pen, where he argues that fostering immigration is based on some deeply flawed 
assumptions about communities:  
It is striking to note that all reports converge on the demographic 
difficulties that Europe will face, without however being able to 
come to the necessary conclusions, that is, the relaunch of 
European fertility. We are assisting to the beginning of a planned 
population replacement on the European continent through 
massive immigration (UN: 240 million in 25 years). We are here 
at the heart of the globalist puzzle that considers that men are 
interchangeable without consideration for identities, cultures and 
history. The “Old Europe” as the Americans call it can by now 
disappear as a homogenous continent. (Le Pen 2003) 
Europe as a community thus appears as threatened with losing its homogeneity and 
ultimately morphing into something radically different unless birth-rate policies are 
pursued. In their absence, Europe, in its current form, appears as threatened by oblivion. 
While there was a concern with the overall effects of immigration on Europe, it is 
important to note that the main way in which Europe came into this conversation was 
through the negative role played by the European Union in fostering immigration. Thus, 
for example, and inserting herself in a familiar lineage within the party (see for example, 
the 1988 statement by Chevallier on the EU’s pro-immigration policies, or Carl Lang’s 
2003 article in which Turkish accession is presented as a means to dissolve Europe’s 
nations in ‘an ensemble devoid of unity, without a soul, without borders, subject to 
immigration from the entire world and to the sole rule of the market’), Marine Le Pen 
recently defined immigration as ‘the child of the European Union’ (Le Pen 2016). In this 
sense, the EU is an accomplice in the process of internal decline, thus presenting a distinct 
threat in itself which will be further discussed in later sections of this chapter when 
considering the EU as a ‘diffuse’ threat.   
Finally, like the MSI, the FN identified the political class as an ‘enabling factor’ 
of internal, national and European decline, and hence as a threat. Unlike the MSI, 
however, this was also inserted within a populist narrative where the party claimed to 
represent ‘the people’ and defend them from the ‘corrupt (and, one may add, threatening) 
elite’. The core elements of the critique to the political class as an internal threat are 
relatively stable over time and well expressed in the following passage from the article 
‘L’engrenage de Maastricht’ published in La Lettre de Jean-Marie Le Pen, in which the 
parliamentary votes on the Maastricht Treaty are discussed:  
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The “euro-federasts” [sic], to start. Socialists and UDF have met 
to sell off France to the Brussels technocrats. Out of the 
federation, our country would in fact be condemned to become a 
sort of underdeveloped Republic and its government forced to 
submit to external (translated: German) pressures, which would 
undermine its sovereignty and the room for manoeuvre of the 
State. Europe itself would leave history through the small door, 
having lost the chance to unite. A slow death, a terrible agony, an 
apocalyptic picture in front of which our democratic visionaries 
close their eyes with horror and sadness. And that justifies that 
one does what is good for the people in spite of what the people 
want, by ratifying these shameful treaties in its place.  
Those who voted against: the Front National, clearly, 
faithful to its principles and concerned about the interests of 
France, of the French and of the European peoples; the 
communists, who consider the Europe of the future too liberal and 
bureaucratic, insufficiently social and coveting the votes of the 
anti-Europeans of the left; the Greens, finally, because they would 
like to have it all and have it now, that is from 1994 or just after, 
a federation that owns up to it. Without forgetting two honourable 
representatives of the RPR, touched by a stroke of lucidity or 
having pressed the wrong button. Because their co-religionists 
abstained with the conviction and firmness that usually 
characterise the stands of their movement. […] (Salagnac 1992) 
Salagnac here does two things. First of all, she homogenises the French political class by 
resorting to scare tactics in presenting those in favour of Maastricht as colluding to 
dissolve the nation, and those who oppose it as motivated by instrumental or deeply 
misguided concerns. As a result, the elite as a whole is presented as either selling off the 
nation (or being ready to do so) or not working towards its protection, thereby becoming 
a threat to its survival and to its ability to remain sovereign. Second, she presents the FN 
as the only political force that has the interests of Europe and its nations at heart and that 
is somehow committed to maintaining its existing form. Thus, she stresses the presence 
of a threat to Europe and especially its nations, all the while presenting her party as the 
only true defender of European and national values. 
This form of critique remains similar across time, with the domestic political class 
being most frequently accused of: selling off France to Brussels and financial lobbies 
(e.g., FN 2004, Le Pen 2005, FN 2012a), actively working to dissolve it in a globalist 
magma (a critique which will be further discussed in the sections concerning ‘diffuse’ 
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threats), or abandoning national sovereignty and European autonomy to which they do 
not attach importance (see on this the 2002 programme which accuses French leaders of 
‘regretting’ Yalta because it made their life easier) in their march towards European 
integration. Thus, the ‘mad’ political class does nothing but bring the country (and 
Europe) towards a cliff edge where they incite the French to move ‘En avant!’ (Le Pen 
2005).  
 
HOSTILE STATES AND FOREIGN OTHERS: THE DANGER FROM 
OUTSIDE 
The previous section showed how the MSI and the FN, but not AN, viewed Europe and 
its nations as endangered by a series of internal threats which needed to be fended off as 
a matter of urgency. While the first two created a ‘politics of emergency’, the latter tended 
to view problematic issues as elements in need of resolution, rather than jumping to the 
worst possible scenarios.  
Similar dynamics are at play in the identification of external threats. Unlike 
internal threats, external threats come from elsewhere and are located outside the national 
and state boundaries, presenting external Others and the ‘Outside’ as inherently 
dangerous. The following sections discuss the main external threats identified by the 
studied parties, focusing most prominently on the Soviet Union and the United States, by 
far the most concerning among them. They show that these external threats were 
particularly taxing on the notion of Liberty, as they reflected the fear of control from a 
non-national body, but also presented a challenge to Identity.   
 
THE SOVIET UNION, INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM AND THE USA: THE 
MSI’S EXTERNAL THREATS TO EUROPE 
The MSI’s understanding of Europe was largely dominated by the view that the continent 
was endangered by two external threats: the Soviet Union (and international 
communism), and the USA. In the party’s view, communism and its state embodiment 
represented the main threats to Europe’s Liberty by limiting its agency, endangering its 
‘spiritual’ way of life and forcing it within unnatural borders. The USA, however, also 
presented a threat to Europe by altering its way of life and limiting its autonomy.  
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The Soviet Union occupied a preeminent place in the MSI’s ideology, 
representing an immediate threat to Europe’s survival. The sense of impending danger 
generated by the Soviet Union is perhaps best captured in the two following passages by 
Michele Rallo and Fernando Crociani, both from the end of the 1970s and both presented 
in introductions to interviews with party leaders. In the introduction to the Intervista 
sull’Eurodestra, in which Almirante discussed the logic underpinning the collaborative 
effort of far right parties to present a shared programme for the European elections, 
interviewer and MSI politician Rallo summarised the positions of the Eurodestra as 
follows:  
In international politics, finally, the Eurodestra stands for 
Western solidarity. The defence of the part of Europe free from 
Soviet imperialism (which, as we have seen, is one of the 
fundamental needs leading to the birth of the Eurodestra) is today 
a topic of such burning urgency that it does not allow hesitations 
of sorts, it does not justify any third-force ambiguities, it does not 
allow for any pause for reflection. The Eurodestra is certainly in 
favour of a larger and more committed participation of Europe in 
the defence of the Free World, but it is also in favour of stronger 
Atlantic solidarity, and, even more, in favour of a concrete, 
operational western solidarity between all the nations that fight 
for their survival in front of the menace of sovietism. (Almirante 
1978: 10-11) 
A similar sense of urgency can be identified in the following passage from the 
introduction to Romualdi’s Intervista sull’Europa, in which party activist Crociani 
discusses what Europe represents to the party:  
Europe. Not only the one of our dreams, let us be clear, but that 
of our sacrifices; of the memorable existence and of the fight of 
the Italian and European political right, that have made and make 
of the political unity of Europe a flag and, together, the meeting 
point of all the knots that need to be untangled or cut to solve 
together the tragedy of our Homelands and of our civilisation, that 
international communism seeks to extinguish and remove from 
the memory and hope of men. (Romualdi 1979: 5) 
The two passages concern different aspects of the MSI’s European policy (the first being 
concerned with the Atlantic Alliance, and the second focusing on European unity), but 
share a similar understanding of Europe as deeply threatened by the Soviet Union and 
international communism. In both passages, Europe is presented as clearly threatened by 
135 
 
an external enemy who might wipe it off the surface of the Earth. Thus, they highlight 
both the existence of a threat and the sense of emergency associated with it.  
The Soviet Union was defined as a threat to Europe both because it could 
potentially physically annihilate the continent, and also because it endangered its core 
elements, and particularly its Liberty. In other words, because the party viewed Europe 
as a space of Liberty, the Soviet Union was defined as a danger because it deprived 
Europe of this key characteristic. Thus, on the one side, it endangered Europe by means 
of military power because of its imperial ‘expansionist logic’ (MSI 1982b) and its 
proximity to Europe, which would make the latter ‘a target, hit by the presence of the 
Soviet theatre nuclear weapons; the Soviet’s SS-20 could and can destroy Europe in a few 
minutes’ (MSI 1987d); on the other, it limited Europe’s power and autonomy by means 
of hostile politics aimed at neutralising Europe so as to have on its doorstep an ‘immense, 
dead political bog and at the same time a formidable laboratory of goods made available 
to its proletarian collectivized markets’ (MSI 1982c). To put it briefly, the Soviet Union 
threatened Europe’s very being by endangering not only its existence, but also its nature.  
A final element worth noting about the Soviet Union and communism in general 
is that they were so embedded in the party’s ideology that they retained the qualification 
of threat even after the fall of the USSR. Thus, as late as 1995, the theses of the Fiuggi 
Congress, which marked the beginning of a formal transition from the far right to the 
conservative right, still highlighted the need for the new democracies in the East to 
‘eradicate any residue of “real socialism” and even more so the recycling of the 
communist “nomenklatura”, albeit under the label of “socialist” or “social-democratic”’ 
(AN 1995: 46; see also AN 1994b). Failure to do this, the passage insisted, would present 
a serious threat to the Union’s future, suggesting that communism remained a threatening 
element even after the demise of the Soviet Union.  
Beyond the Soviet Union, the MSI was also concerned, albeit to a lesser extent 
and with less urgency, with a second external threat: the United States of America. The 
party, in fact, largely depicted Europe as dominated by ‘twin imperialisms’ which both, 
in their own way, threatened its survival. It is possible to detect two reasons why the MSI 
considered the USA dangerous: first of all, they were unsure about their loyalty to Europe 
and suspected they might want to undermine the continent; second, the USA imported a 
way of life that was threatening to European traditions. This short passage from the 
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majority congress motion ‘Continuare per rinnovare’ illustrates both reasons when it 
claims that  
we must reassess, motivate and document our opposition to the 
‘civilisation of Coca-Cola’ coming from the United States of 
America, which disaggregates the spirit and the soul of our 
popular and national traditions. In particular, the deep link that 
unites the USA presidency and the USSR, at the expense of 
Europe and the free world, must be highlighted. (MSI 1979a) 
In singling out the USA as the ‘civilisation of Coca-Cola’, the passage reveals that the 
MSI saw the USA as a clear threat to European identity, while the denunciation of the 
USA for its closeness to the USSR ‘at the expense of Europe and the free world’ 
underlines the party’s concern for American loyalty.  
Doubts about the USA’s loyalty to Europe worried the MSI and led it to view the 
USA critically, although not necessarily as a threat. In fact, the MSI was rather ambivalent 
about the American ally: on one hand, it suspected the latter of deliberately limiting 
Europe’s autonomy and power; on the other, the party was also painfully aware of the 
necessity of the Atlantic Alliance as a way to defend Europe from Soviet aggression.24 
The MSI’s ambivalence is well captured by Romualdi in the Intervista, when he says that  
we have said many times and repeated that that which has 
mortified and keeps mortifying Europe politically, was not so 
much the defeat with its disastrous consequences […]; rather, it 
was the harsh diktat of Yalta, which dividing it, has intended to 
destroy it politically, to make it on the one side the colonial 
empire of communism, and on the other side, the zone of 
influence of the democratic imperialism of the USA. The 
Americans do not know it, and do not want to talk about it, but 
this is the truth. The reality that has obstructed so far and still 
keeps obstructing practically and psychologically the 
development of the process of political unity of the continent. 
(Romualdi 1979: 51) 
While Romualdi was broadly positive about the necessity of Europe-USA relationships, 
in this passage he nonetheless displays clearly the belief that the USA and Russia were 
 
24 The MSI had a troubled relationship with NATO. As Parlato (2005: 140ff) argues, the MSI was divided 
between those who opposed the Alliance on political and cultural grounds, looking at the USA as the 
defeaters of fascism and as embodying an anti-spiritual lifestyle, and those who considered that joining the 
Alliance was the only way to defend Western civilisation and reframe the political battle in terms of 
communism versus anti-communism. While the latter ended up imposing itself, and the MSI declared its 
allegiance to NATO in 1951, the wisdom of the choice was frequently questioned in party debates. 
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both to blame for the partition of Europe after World War Two and its subsequent political 
destruction. As a later article by the same author in the Secolo d’Italia put it, the USA 
failed ‘to understand the importance in the great fight against communist imperialism, 
eternally in expansion in the world, that a great, economically and politically united 
Europe, able to take on its own responsibilities, could have’ (Romualdi 1986).  
The fear that the USA might continue to limit European autonomy remained even 
after 1989, when the party started being increasingly concerned about the advent of a 
‘second Yalta’ which would divide Europe on the ‘territorial objectives’ achieved by the 
winners, rather than on ideological grounds, leaving Eastern Europe in particular as a 
space of limited sovereignty (MSI 1990c). In a similar vein, the 1994 programme of AN 
claimed that ‘the Europe that has seen the states of the East return free and sovereign 
cannot be mutilated again in its perspectives and in its unitary decisions by new 
agreements between the USA and the USSR’ (AN 1994a). Thus, the USA, while not as 
dangerous as the USSR, clearly restrained Europe’s freedom and its unitary aspirations.  
Somewhat more threatening in the case of the USA was its cultural influence on 
Europe, which imported a distinctly unfamiliar and negative model into the continent. 
This sense of American cultural domination is well presented in this paragraph from the 
Secolo d’Italia, where Mantovani, the editor at the time, wrote that 
Europe, in theory so aristocratically proud of its own civilisation 
by now finds itself let us not say unitary, but homogenous, only 
in the acquisition of the fashions, styles, behaviours that reach it 
from the other side of the Atlantic, from a new Nation, formerly 
a daughter of Europe, but become with time an original and 
autonomous melting pot of peoples, races, cultures from all parts 
of the world. (Mantovani 1985) 
This cultural domination was perceived within the party as a negative development 
because it imposed a new way of life ‘based on the negation of all that Europeans have 
always considered as such [a model of life], because it is founded on agnosticism, on 
materialism, on egoism, on hedonism, on a self-serving consumerism absurdly 
transformed into a “value”’ (MSI 1987a). The USA, then, were considered as a threat to 
European identity because they imported a foreign model of culture based on values 
contrary to those of the continent’s original identity. This was further tied in, in later 
documents, with new emerging issues such as immigration via the fear of Europe 
becoming like the USA, a ‘melting pot’ that has ‘given up on its roots and origins’, losing 
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all ‘national specificity’ to replace it with an ‘amorphous and indefinite’ new model (MSI 
1990a). 
 
ENEMIES INTO FRIENDS: AN’S REVISED VIEWS ON FORMER EXTERNAL 
THREATS 
As with internal threats, the idea of a threat endangering Europe from the outside is almost 
absent in the writings of the AN, and occupies, at best, a marginal position. Thus, while 
the party may have criticised external actors such as the European Commission or fellow 
European partners, their positions lacked the sense of urgency of the MSI’s and did not 
suggest that it was the entire European civilisation that was at risk from their actions. As 
a result, they did not fulfil the criteria to be threats in need of urgent addressing.  
Furthermore, and reinforcing the sense of a transition, some former threats were 
openly embraced, as in the case of the USA which, as this passage from the 2004 
manifesto illustrates, became clear friends rather than untrustworthy allies: 
Europe, in the Right’s perspective, constitutes one of the founding 
pillars of the West […] The European role can never be 
understood in opposition to the other side of the Atlantic. The 
United States, let us remember this, were born from a rib of 
Europe and all the national cultures of Europe are represented 
there, starting from the Italian one. The role of Europe is to bring 
into the alliance its wisdom, its millenary ability to filter cultures, 
to converse with the South of the world. Intelligent allies, able to 
raise critiques and affirm their perspectives when necessary. But 
without betraying the loyal relationship with America […]. The 
awareness of Occidentalism, then, and the particular link with 
America, are a great truth that must accompany the European 
processes. (AN 2004) 
The passage is striking in comparison with previous positions expressed by the MSI in so 
far as it embraces the alliance with the USA fully, rather than reluctantly. Thus, while 
Europe is still considered to be a ‘critical friend’ able to raise ‘intelligent critiques’, it is 
committed to the transatlantic partnership and ready to stand by its historical ally, rather 
than questioning its loyalty. 
 
139 
 
COMMUNISTS, AMERICANS, AND MUSLIMS: THE FN’S EXTERNAL THREATS 
Compared with the MSI, the Front National showed a lower level of concern for external 
threats to Europe, although this is largely due to the fact that, since the end of the 1980s, 
they significantly shifted their focus to the ‘diffuse’ threats of globalisation and the EU. 
Nevertheless, the FN still identified a number of external threats to Europe which will 
sound rather familiar.  
Like the MSI, the early Front National considered communist imperialism the 
main external threat affecting Europe, a fear which was further compounded by the 
presence of a strong domestic Communist party. Its importance to the party can be gauged 
by the fact that it was already present in its 1978 programme for the local elections in 
Paris (Le National 1978), and was repeated in almost exactly the same words in the 1981 
programme for the legislative elections (FN 1981). It is notable that this specific point is 
included on very short programmes—one of which being on local elections where this 
issue would be marginal—as it suggests it is a key part of the party’s identity. Both 
documents stressed that the party was committed to ‘ensure peace and national 
independence’ through ‘loyalty to our European and Atlantic alliances’, which were 
defined as ‘our most reliable guarantee against Communist imperialism’ (Le National 
1978, FN 1981).  
In a similar way to the Italian party, the FN viewed the Soviet Union as 
endangering both Europe’s material and spiritual survival, as the following passage from 
Bruno Mégret illustrates: 
11) Consider serenely the USSR as our main enemy 
Soviet hegemony directly threatens our security, and, eventually, 
our identity and our liberty. It is thus necessary to consider it our 
enemy and oppose it not with an open and aggressive fight, but 
with a firm and uncompromising attitude which, while not 
refusing dialogue, does not endorse the unacceptable. This 
implies, in addition, to not abandon the countries of Europe 
subjugated to its imperialism 
12) Cease financing international communism 
It is necessary to stop financing directly or indirectly international 
communism [...] It is also necessary to fight vigorously the 
Soviets’ technological espionage. (Mégret 1987) 
The passage above is extracted from a document entitled ‘Creating a Powerful Europe’, 
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prepared for Le Pen’s 1988 presidential campaign. The original document opens with the 
acknowledgement that ‘Soviet imperialism becomes more and more threatening by the 
day’ and discusses a number of measures to advance to make Europe more powerful 
(including the ‘revival’ of European identity and the introduction of a common currency). 
In points 11 and 12 of the document, Mégret assesses specifically the danger posed by 
the Soviet Union, presenting it as Europe’s ‘main enemy’ because it threatens its security 
and, importantly for this study, the core concepts of Identity and Liberty. As with the 
MSI, this is also accompanied by the insistence on the imperative need to fight it both 
politically and economically, because, as Le Pen put it in his 1984 book, not doing so 
would lead Europe to risk ‘objectively ending up in the Gulag before the end of the 
century’ (1984: 165), thus losing all autonomy.25 
In addition to the USSR, the FN was also concerned about the USA’s influence 
on Europe. Early documents of the FN already acknowledged American influence on 
Europe as a negative feature, defining Europe as ‘subject to the economic and cultural 
pressures of the USA’ (Le National 1979: 8-9); but, the Cold War, along with a certain 
affinity with Reagan, ensured that levels of criticism of the USA were kept to a minimum. 
It was not until the fall of the Berlin Wall and the first Gulf War that the FN shifted to a 
more explicitly anti-American stance in its international relations (Birenbaum 1992: 182-
191, Evans 2007) and that the USA acquired the more definite contours of a threat to 
Europe. In fact, they were accused of pushing for a ‘New World Order’ based on 
economic globalisation, international organisations and American domination by 
imposing ‘diktats’ on European countries by means of the EU and ultimately ‘depriving 
them of their liberty and sovereignty’ (Le Pen 1993; see also Le Pen 1997, 1998). The 
USA, however, were by themselves less dangerous than the Soviet Union; what made the 
USA dangerous was their influence on European culture and on the EU, a body whose 
quality as a threat will be discussed later.  
Along with Soviet Communism and the USA, the Front National identified an 
additional threat that the MSI and AN did not appear to care much about: the Third World 
 
25 The FN’s fear of the USSR did not survive its fall. In fact, following the fall of the USSR, the FN adopted 
a much less critical position towards its successor, seeing it as a source of inspiration and country of interest 
(e.g., FN 2002, 2012a). This mirrors a broader tendency among the European far right to view Russia 
positively, whether this be due to an affinity with Vladimir Putin’s political leadership or, as some have 
claimed, as a result of Russian funding supporting their activity. For a recent discussion of the relationship 
between Russia and the far right in Western Europe, see Shekhovstov 2018. 
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and Islam. In fact, because of the limited presence of immigrants in Italy, the MSI did not 
see the Third World or Islam as a particularly salient issue (if anything, a fraction of the 
MSI even supported further engagement with the Third World), while France’s 
experience of immigration made this external threat more salient and urgent because of 
its domestic implications. Starting from the 1980s, the FN presented Europe as 
endangered by ‘islamo-revolutionary hegemony, in any case the hegemony of the Third 
World, borne out of the demographic explosion of the Third World’ (Le Pen 1984: 164; 
see also Mégret 1987). This concern with the Third World was helpful in linking together 
both external threats and internal ones, because the ‘demographic explosion of the Third 
World’ necessarily lead to immigration, a threat discussed earlier. It also served to critique 
the European Parliament as ‘an assembly responsive to Marxist dialectics and attentive 
to the Third-Worldist ideology’ (Le Pen 1985: 188). Steadily through time, the focus 
shifted from ‘The Third World and Islam’ in general to Islam more specifically. Islam 
was, in particular, presented as a force that threatened Europe’s deeply held Christian 
identities and traditions by seeking to impose ‘Islamist’ ways of life on European 
countries (Lang 2004, Langlois 2014). Islam also moved from being a clearly external 
threat to being one more firmly anchored within European nations because of 
immigration. Thus, Europe became in the party’s words a continent ‘in move towards 
islamisation’ (FN 2009), at the expenses of its own native traditions and local identities.  
 
MANY-HEADED MONSTERS: DIFFUSE SOURCES OF DANGER 
The previous section showed how the MSI and FN’s world was not only populated with 
internal threats, but also with external enemies. As before, on the other hand, AN did not 
present Europe as endangered by threats, and even radically changed its position on 
certain countries previously viewed as dangerous.  
There is a final category of threats worth discussing, especially given their 
dominance in the Front National’s ideology: diffuse threats. Diffuse threats straddle the 
interface between internal and external threats because they are neither situated 
exclusively within the state, not clearly imputable to a single foreign actor or presence. 
This ‘shapelessness’ makes them more pervasive and all-encompassing than the previous 
two. The following sections discuss this type of threat, focusing in particular on 
globalisation, the ‘diffuse’ threat par excellence. While this was only marginally relevant 
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to the MSI and AN, it acquired a central relevance for the FN from the beginning of the 
1990s, especially in relation to the EU. This type of threat is particularly taxing on 
Identity, although, by shifting the loci of power, it also affects Liberty. 
 
AFTER THEIR TIME, AND AFTER THEIR TRANSFORMATION: THE LIMITED 
ROLE OF DIFFUSE THREATS IN THE MSI AND AN 
Diffuse threats were barely present in the MSI and AN’s vision of Europe. In the MSI’s 
view, in fact, Europe was mainly threatened by the USSR, while AN rarely made 
reference to the concept of Threat. For the MSI, the absence of references to the diffuse 
threat of globalisation so keenly discussed by the FN may be explained by the fact that 
the issue was simply irrelevant during the party’s years of existence. The closest thing to 
a ‘diffuse threat’ in the MSI’s ideology is ‘multinational supercapitalism’ (e.g., MSI 
1990b), but this was rarely mentioned in conjunction with Europe.  
AN, unlike the MSI, did speak of globalisation; however, as in the previous cases, 
it did not treat it as a threat but rather, as a process in need of management. The 1999 
Euromanifesto is a helpful document to consult to illustrate how AN approached 
globalisation:  
Even the phenomenon of globalisation – the great change of this 
end of millennium – finds Europe unprepared, in spite of its 
placing itself in favour of liberalisation of world trade. Its 
unpreparedness derives from the incapacity to elaborate a 
homogenous project able to deal with the phenomenon, which, if 
it may not be arrested, could at least be directed as to avoid social 
and economic crises in this or that region, or in this or that sector. 
Free competition, in fact, cannot exist if the starting conditions 
are not the same. […] We do not ask the reinstatement of 
instruments that have already been tried and considered 
inappropriate to solve the issue, such as protectionism. We 
interrogate ourselves on the ways to prevent a false competition 
from creating deep and durable crises […]. We do not request the 
reinstatement of borders, but we interrogate ourselves on the real 
possibilities, and not just hypothetical, to face globalisation with 
the creation of European quality trademarks […] All this 
presupposes a policy aimed at strengthening the small and 
medium businesses, and the artisanal ones, the only ones able to 
employ a professionality linked to traditions and to the history of 
the regions in which they developed. (AN 1999) 
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AN, as the document shows (and as will appear as strikingly different from the FN), 
acknowledged the existence and difficulties of globalisation, without, however, rejecting 
the process. Thus, while describing globalisation as a phenomenon that created tensions 
and which Europe had found itself unprepared for, the party focused more on finding 
ways to ‘direct it’. Once again, AN saw what the MSI and FN interpreted as threats as 
merely policy issues among others.  
Within this context, it is also relevant to underline that in a striking contrast with 
the FN, AN saw the EU as a body that could help manage globalisation. AN, in fact, while 
seeing the EU as a potential danger in this case, maintained a constructive attitude towards 
it. Thus, it typically called for finding a balance between the national interest and the 
shared European interest, and advocated the creation of a ‘more conscious political 
Europe, as the harmonious sum of sovereignties, in which the democratic nature of a 
responsible government prevails’ (AN 2002). A similar point was raised in a more critical 
2008 article in the Secolo d’Italia, which highlighted that the EU Constitutional Treaty 
ended up making the EU ‘an instrument of neoliberal globalisation’ because it was put at 
the service of ‘free and undistorted competition’; but, at the same time, Europe was 
‘something too important to be abandoned to the decisions of a class of, too often 
insufficiently forward-looking, technocrats and eurobureaucrats’. The implication, then, 
was not that national governments should reject the EU, but rather that they should keep 
engaging with it and make it less of an instrument of globalisation and more of an 
instrument to find a balance between national interests (Carrino 2008). Thus, the EU 
appeared as a solution to issues, not as a threat to the survival of Europe and its nations. 
 
THE TROJAN HORSE OF GLOBALISATION: THE FN AND THE EU AS A 
DIFFUSE THREAT 
Diffuse threats occupy a central place in the FN’s definition of Europe, and comprise of 
two deeply interwoven dangers: the process of globalisation on one side, and, most 
importantly, its ‘Trojan horse’ the European Union. Both remove key boundaries, and the 
EU in particular also shifts control away from nations, thus representing a threat to the 
social makeup of Europe. While, strictly speaking, these are almost invariably dangers to 
Europe’s nations, rather than to Europe as a whole (although the fact that the EU 
monopolises the definition of Europe is not entirely unproblematic for the FN), they are 
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still central to the definition of Europe when taken in the narrow meaning of ‘the EU’. 
FN criticism of the EU as a body that threatens identities already started in the 
mid-1980s, following the Single European Act. The EU was presented in documents from 
the time as a ‘levelling’ construction which destroyed local identities and harmed national 
prosperity. In particular, the FN suggested that the EU not only removed internal 
boundaries, but, much more dangerously, removed boundaries between Europeans and 
other non-European peoples. As the Passeport pour la victoire put it: 
Founded exclusively on the objectives of economic liberalism, 
the European Economic Community wants to remove internal 
borders – very well – but it opens at the same time the borders of 
Europe to the external world. Instead of being the instrument of 
the construction of an authentic community, it becomes in this 
way a factor of destruction of identities. It opens Europe to the 
wild winds of all subversive influences. (FN 1989: 95) 
In addition to viewing the EU as a dangerous boundary-removing entity, the FN also 
questioned its motives, arguing that this destruction of borders was aimed at facilitating 
the emergence of a new global order dominated by homogenous countries and faceless 
economic interests. This narrative, already present in the excerpt above, is well developed 
in the following passage from the internal party guide ‘Militer au Front’: 
The debate on Europe is completely distorted, because there are 
in fact two radically different conceptions of Europe.  
One is founded on the idea that the world is destined to 
homogenise and unite, and that Europe in this perspective is 
nothing but a stage. At the same time in which the intra-European 
borders are being brought down, the border between Europe and 
the rest of the world is also being lowered. And the construction 
of Europe is being based on the economy, which is not specific to 
our continent, all the while pushing for total integration. 
The other is founded on the idea that the survival of 
European nations is threatened and they have to unite to preserve 
their identity and retrieve their power. Europe is thus conceived 
as a means to defend the independence of nations or of national 
identities.  
The first conception is that of a cosmopolitan or globalist 
Europe; the second is that of Europe understood as a community 
of civilisation. 
The first one destroys the nations, the second one ensures 
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their survival. The first one is an accelerator of decline, the second 
an instrument of renaissance. The first is the conception of the 
Brussels technocrats and of establishment politicians, the second 
is our conception. (FN 1991: 115) 
Underlying the EU’s effort to remove borders, then, is its ‘globalist’ ideology based 
primarily on economics and, what a later document dubs ‘materialist utopias’ reminiscent 
of the USSR (Le Pen 1994). Within this context, the EU is then presented as a mere stage 
in the creation of a cosmopolitan global order and, therefore, as a danger to the nations 
and identities of Europe. While the term globalisation is not mentioned explicitly, it is 
clear here that this is indeed the unspoken threat that the EU is pushing forwards. 
Interestingly, the passage also problematises the EU’s monopoly over the term ‘Europe’ 
and presents a familiar distinction within the party between Europe and the EU (see for 
example Le Gallou 1989, Gollnisch 2008, Le Pen 2017a), and between a specific view of 
how a political Europe should operate and how the EU actually operates.  
As presented by the FN, then, the EU appears to carry within it the worst of the 
party’s two (former) external enemies. From the USSR, it inherits power-hoarding 
tendencies and the bureaucratic structures of a multi-national empire, in which identities 
are irrelevant. From the USA, it takes on the subjugation to the ideology of free markets 
and mass consumerism, as well as a treacherous ‘melting pot’ aspect.  
Beyond threatening identities, however, the EU is to the FN a very real threat to 
Liberty. The introduction of the Maastricht Treaty in particular caused this development, 
an element that is captured most clearly in the ‘Reims Oath’, a key document worth citing 
in full:   
This powerless and corrupted system asks the people to give up 
their national sovereignty in favour of a supra-national state with 
a federal mission, thus destroying in time our identity, our 
language, our culture. 
In a strictly materialist and mercantile perspective, it gives 
to a plutocratic oligarchy the upper hand on our six century old 
currency and thus allows it to govern our nation. 
It accepts, with little regard for our Constitution, with the 
complicity of the man who is its guardian and the body charged 
of defending it, the subordination of French laws to the European 
law.  
It gives to foreigners the right to vote and opens our 
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borders to foreign immigration. 
All these abandonments are contrary to the principles of 
the State, to the laws of the Republic and even more to the 
unwritten traditions, usages and customs of the Nation. 
It thus initiates a process which it proclaims irreversible, 
regardless of the indissoluble rights of the future generations, a 
process that will ineluctably lead to the loss of our liberties, to the 
dissolution of the State, to the eradication of our language, to the 
disappearance of the French Army and finally to the death of 
France. 
Reunited in Reims, in this sacred spot for the Homeland, 
symbol of its foundation, of its rootedness and of its permanence. 
We solemnly declare that we reject the Maastricht Treaty, 
whose signature and ratification are sullied by nullity.  
We swear to fight with all our strength until 20 September 
and if the totalitarian methods of power did manage to mislead 
the people, to fight against the execution of the Maastricht plot.  
We swear to demand justice for the forfeits and betrayals 
that might lead to abandoning the smallest parcel of national 
sovereignty. 
We swear to defend the liberties, independence, freedom 
of the French people, its culture, its language, its humanist and 
Christian civilisation against the political genocide that is the 
infamous treaty of Maastricht. (Le Pen 1992) 
The Reims Oath, pronounced in 1992, summarises the main reasons why the party 
opposed the Maastricht Treaty and reflects well the view of the EU as a threat to both 
Liberty and Identity. The first paragraphs, in fact, highlight the dangers the EU poses to 
various aspects of Identity and, relatedly, to Liberty, by stifling the nation’s identity and 
reducing its ability to express itself within the confines of the state with internally voted 
laws. The entire oath is also steeped in the language of emergency and immediate threat 
(‘destroying’, ‘subordination’, ‘abandonment’), as well as in references to an oncoming 
battle for survival (‘we swear to fight’, ‘we swear to defend’, ‘protect from political 
genocide’), underscoring once again the threatening character of the EU as well as the 
party’s view of itself as the ‘saviour’ of France.  
Criticism of the EU as a ‘Trojan horse of globalisation’ (FN 2012a) dedicated to 
the destruction of national identities and liberties remains a constant within the party to 
this day. The FN has, in fact, been remarkably consistent in its positions on globalisation, 
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and this has been the case across the party. The following passages from three different 
party sources produced in different decades help illustrate the continuity of its message: 
the first is a speech given in 1998 by Jean-Marie Le Pen at the party’s yearly Joan of Arc 
march; the second, a speech by Bruno Gollnisch at the FN’s summer school in 2008; and 
the third, a press release from 2012: 
We see that we lose here what is essential: sovereignty, 
independence, liberty, security, the right to make our own laws, 
to live according to our laws and traditions, to be able to elect 
those who govern us, to live in our own country, in a framework 
apt for human needs. The one that generations and generations 
have lived in, often in poverty and adversity, but always in liberty, 
in the beauty of our landscapes, in the respect of our ancestors, of 
our martyrs, of our saints, and of our heroes, in the love of our 
own people and of the land where we come from and where we 
will join them. […] 
To entice the mugs, the pro-Europeans told us: “Europe 
will lead to more jobs, more security, less taxes, more wellbeing”. 
But the more we walk towards this illusion, the further away it 
gets. 
Since Maastricht, the contrary has happened. More and 
more unemployed, more and more poor, even destitute people, 
millions of homeless people. More and more immigrants coming 
from all over the world […] More and more insecurity in the 
streets […] Violence grows every day […]. (Le Pen 1998) 
 
The destructive euro-globalism is still there: international free 
trade without protection, leading to unfair competition, closures 
or relocation of companies. A so-called "liberalisation" of 
services, which will pull millions of wages down... A European 
Central Bank that controls our finances, therefore our economy, 
therefore our social policy, from Frankfurt, with no oversight 
[…]. In this Europe without borders and without identity, 
Brussels will decide entry permits throughout the European 
Union, therefore in France. […] The borders of Europe remain 
deliberately undefined, and the conditions for joining, almost 
exclusively ideological and administrative, are so loose that 
tomorrow Uzbekistan or Algeria could become members. The 
preamble of the Treaty refuses to recognise the Christian roots of 
Europe so as to be able to better integrate Turkey, whose 
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membership is still being negotiated, no matter what Sarkozy 
claims. (Gollnisch 2008) 
 
According to the German newspaper Die Welt, the European 
leaders should present a total recasting of the European Union in 
the next European summit […]. 
Bogged down in the crisis of a noxious and unviable 
single currency, the Europeanist caste is ready to sacrifice 
democracy, the nations and our social models to save its mad 
ideology. 
This plan, put in place behind the people’s backs, would 
strip off the nations even more, all in favour of unelected 
supranational authorities, would consecrate the Europe of 
punishment and of fines that only serve a triumphant Germany. 
[…] 
Rather than getting out of the crisis better off, by studying 
the means to reach a concerted end to the calamitous experience 
of the euro, the caste prefers to keep going further towards a 
federal Europe that produces nothing but misery and anger.   
“If Europe does not work, it is because there is not enough 
Europe”; that is its credo, which justifies all the follies that it is 
about to force upon the peoples. Same diehard logic as the Soviet 
Union in its times. (FN 2012b) 
The passages are interesting because they highlight both the remarkable consistency of 
the FN’s opposition to the ‘euro-globalist’ EU as an actor committed to destroying 
nations, and equally show some shifts in themes to support this claim. The first passage 
by Le Pen insists more strongly on the theme of identity and the de-bordering operated 
by the European Union. In addition, he introduces a critique that is also present in 
Gollnisch’s extract, and that is developed much more strongly in the 2012 press release 
and in recent FN documents: its negative effects on the prosperity of nations. Gollnisch’s 
extract focuses more strongly on the prosperity of nations, linking it clearly with 
liberalisation and competition, but also bringing in issues of sovereignty through 
reference to the ECB’s policies. He also, like Le Pen, brings immigration and discussion 
of borders within his frame of attention. The press release, which is less wide-ranging in 
terms of the issues it develops, focuses specifically on the euro and the loss of national 
sovereignty in favour of a global, anti-national construction. It also brings in the theme 
of democracy, absent in the two previous documents but one that Marine Le Pen has 
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introduced more consistently in the party. Overall, then, while there are some shifts in 
themes, the EU is presented across time as a powerful threat to the nation and as an agent 
of the even more powerful threat of globalisation. The following chapter will further 
develop some of these points, showing how this translates into overall scepticism about 
European integration and into alternative projects of European integration. 
 
 
CONSTRUCTING CRISIS: EMERGENCY POLITICS AND 
PROVIDENTIAL ACTORS 
The sections so far have sought to illustrate how the studied parties mobilised the concept 
of Threat to further define Europe. In particular, they have shown how the MSI and the 
FN viewed Europe as endangered by a series of internal, external and diffuse threats 
which closely resembled those that endangered its constituent nations. These threats were 
also presented as deeply entwined with the concepts the parties used to define Europe, 
being as they were threats to Identity and Liberty. Perhaps most importantly, the threats 
that endangered Europe in the parties’ view were not hypothetical and distant, but real 
and concrete, and threatening Europe’s (and its nations’) very survival. Thus, they 
acquired an urgent character requiring prompt action.  
Once we know that the MSI and FN view dangers everywhere, the logical question 
to ask is what the consequences of this vision are. In fact, while it is certainly interesting 
to gain a sense of what individual elements they consider threatening, understanding the 
cumulative effect of these threats is perhaps more intriguing because it provides a view 
of the political implications of a worldview steeped in danger. The contention advanced 
here is that by presenting Europe as threatened, the parties create a climate of emergency 
politics in which they can recast their action as that of a ‘providential’ minority. Elements 
of this argument have been already mentioned in the empirical sections but will be 
illustrated here in more detail. 
To understand the way in which the studied far right parties create an emergency 
and then recast themselves as ‘providential’ actors with clear solutions, it is pertinent to 
turn to the framework developed by Benjamin Moffitt (2015, 2017) to explain how 
populist actors perform crises as a method for ‘dividing “the people” against a dangerous 
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other, for presenting themselves as the sovereign voice of “the people” and for radically 
simplifying political procedures and institutions’ (Moffitt 2015: 210). While the argument 
advanced here is somewhat different in the elements it stresses because it concerns far 
right (and in the case of the MSI, non-populist) parties and how they present themselves 
as ‘providential actors’ rather than representatives of ‘the people’, the steps involved in 
the process of ‘performance of crisis’ are broadly similar. 
Following a tradition that sees crisis as a defining feature of populism (e.g., 
Mouffe 2005, Rooduijn 2014, Taggart 2000), in his study of populist parties, Moffitt 
(2017) identifies ‘crisis, breakdown or threat’ as a key element in their style, along with 
the appeal to the people versus the elite and the use of bad manners. In particular, Moffitt 
argues that populists construct and ‘perform’ crisis to sustain their success. The author 
identifies six steps by which they do so: first, populists identify failures in the existing 
system; second, they link these failures to a wider framework and create a sense of 
urgency by adding a temporal dimension, typically insisting that issues need to be dealt 
with immediately; third, they divide between an ‘elite’ responsible for the crisis and ‘the 
people’, pitting them against each other; fourth, they propagate the crisis through the 
media; fifth, they argue that the solution to the crisis is simple and that they are the strong 
leaders needed to address it; finally, they must keep propagating crisis to ensure their 
political survival. With the exception of the third and last steps, which pertain specifically 
to populist actors, the points developed by Moffitt may be seen as broader features of 
‘crisis politics’, and hence applicable even to non-populist actors such as the MSI. It is 
also worth noting that while Moffitt studies populism as a style rather than as an ideology, 
thus making no claim as to whether populists believe in the crises they create, the 
difference between the two is likely to be irrelevant as far as the effects they create are 
concerned: whether deliberate or not, and whether done out of belief or as a stylistic 
feature, the performance of crisis is likely to create the same sense of emergency. 
The MSI and the FN follow a number of these steps in their presentation of 
Europe, and hence create a European crisis. First of all, as the empirical sections have 
demonstrated, they identify a number of issues both in the form of processes and actors: 
‘internal decline’, loss of power and identity, the USA, USSR and EU. They then elevate 
them to the level of threats by claiming they need to be addressed urgently so as to avoid 
catastrophic outcomes such as the disappearance of Europe. In no document was this 
creation of a sense of urgency requiring immediate solutions as clear as in the Reims Oath 
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discussed earlier (Le Pen 1992). In accusing the Maastricht Treaty of being set on 
‘destroying in time our identity, our language, our culture’, giving ‘a plutocratic oligarchy 
the upper hand’ and ‘giv[ing] to foreigners the right to vote and open[ing] our borders to 
foreign immigration’, Le Pen identified through a single framework a series of critical 
issues leading to an ‘irreversible’ process of ‘dissolution of the state’ and the ultimate 
‘political genocide’ of France.   
The identification of issues and their association with an urgent sense of 
temporality creates an overall sense of emergency, or ‘crisis’, where the natural state of 
things is deeply endangered and crucially in need of immediate action for its protection. 
Thus, when the parties claim things such as ‘the defence of the part of Europe free from 
Soviet imperialism […] is today a topic of such burning urgency that it does not allow 
hesitations of sorts’ (Almirante 1978: 10-11) or that ‘the Europeanist caste is ready to 
sacrifice democracy, the nations and our social models to save its mad ideology’ (FN 
2012b), they are not simply relating a state of affairs or ‘constructing’ a crisis, they are 
also arguing for the need of appropriate solutions that are commensurate to the urgency 
and size of the threat being faced. Emergencies, in short, not only create problems: they 
also require solutions and actors that can advance credible solutions in such a situation.  
It is in this context, then, that far right parties can use the notion of an emergency 
to present themselves as the only actors who are aware of the measure of this danger and 
are willing to fight it; in other words, they appear as ‘providential’ actors in the system 
and offer the ‘strong leadership’ that Moffitt appears to refer to. Common to the far right’s 
vision, in fact, is also the notion that other political actors are either not aware of threats, 
or are ignoring them, making them the only truly ‘aware’ actors in the political system. 
This was evident in passages cited earlier, such as the claim by Romualdi that the 
Eurodestra had the job of ‘interpreting much higher, broader and important interests, 
concerning the political health and the guarantee of liberty and development of the entire 
EEC’ (Romualdi 1979: 17), or in the FN’s party guide suggestion that the FN was the 
only actor interested in fighting for the survival and renaissance of the nations of Europe 
(1991: 115). This also leads them to claim a prophetic nature for themselves, stressing 
that they could see what others could not, as this passage from an interview with Jean-
Marie Le Pen, tellingly titled ‘My truth on Europe’, illustrates: 
In all fields, our most pessimist predictions have come true, contra 
the eternal Europeanists’ promises of an Eldorado. We said 
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“Maastricht will bring more taxes, more immigration, more 
insecurity, more unemployment”. We were right. The incorrigible 
“Maastrichiens” [a wordplay on Maastricht and the French word 
for dog] invite us to ignore this, they tell us: “let’s forget the past”. 
That is, they invite us to run towards a cliff, guided not by reason 
but by ideological passion of the interests of Europe’s enemies. 
We fight against this amnesiacs’ blindness not just for France but 
also for the survival of the European homelands and what they 
represent for world civilisation. (Le Pen 1994)  
As a result, the parties appear as both the sole representatives of some higher good 
which other political actors appear to be wilfully ignoring, but also as prophets of things 
to be. While in the case of the FN this higher good was indeed often framed as that of the 
‘national people’ threatened by a dangerous elite, in the MSI the higher good was not 
presented in a populist frame, making it less of a populist performance of crisis and more 
of a ‘simple’ form of ‘crisis politics’.  
Before concluding, it is pertinent to note how different this mode of politics 
appeared from that of AN. A common thread in these three empirical chapters has been 
the observation of AN’s pragmatic approach to politics. In this chapter in particular, this 
manifested itself in an absence of the concept of Threat and an approach to problems that 
involved the identification of issues and the advancement of balanced solutions to 
approach them. In this sense, instead of identifying issues, linking them together and 
reading through a temporal frame aimed at creating a sense of emergency, AN limited 
itself to the identification of issues without claiming the need to address them urgently. 
Furthermore, it did not present itself as the only holder of simple and straightforward 
solutions (or, indeed, as a representative of ‘the people’ against the elite that had created 
the issues), but acknowledged a level of complexity in political decision making. As a 
result, AN’s Europe was not deeply immersed in emergency, and AN did not appear as a 
‘prophetic’ or ‘providential’ force, but rather as a moderate and careful manager. This 
may be seen as the result of a search for legitimation in which the party sought to look 
respectable, but also as a result of ideological change, where the notion of emergency was 
relegated to a marginal position because politics were no longer conceived of as an 
activity where survival was at stake, but as a form of ‘regular’ interest representation and 
pragmatic problem-solving. Thus, the ideological and strategic complemented each other 
in what was eventually a thorough party transformation. 
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CONCLUSION 
Moving away from the conceptual core of the far right, this chapter argued that the studied 
parties (with the exception of AN) drew heavily on the notion of Threat to define Europe. 
The concept of Threat was considered to be an important trait of far right ideology, 
because it anchors its ideational core in the realm of emergency and sustains a vision of 
politics conceived as a struggle for survival, an element that was considered to be 
distinctive of the far right. In the case of Europe, the parties used it to present Europe and, 
through it, the concepts of Identity and Liberty as deeply endangered by a series of 
internal, external and diffuse threats. Its distinctiveness was also highlighted by its 
absence in AN which, while still sharing with the MSI and FN important ideological 
aspects with respects to the core, did not anchor Europe in the field of emergency. The 
threats identified by the parties are briefly summarised in Table 4. 
 
TABLE 4: SUMMATIVE TABLE OF THREAT AND EUROPE 
 
Secondly, the chapter suggested that by constantly referring to threats the political parties 
created the overall sense of a European crisis which allowed them to present themselves 
as ‘prophetic’ actors who are aware of dangers and can offer appropriate solutions.  
 
  
Main concept  Subthemes Present in 
MSI AN FN 
Threat Internal Threats:  
• Europe and nations 
endangered by 
internal decline  
Present, not dominant 
Sources of danger: 
Local communists, 
immigration, 
demographic decline, 
other politicians 
Absent 
 
 
Present throughout 
Sources: 
immigration, 
demographic and 
economic decline, 
other politicians 
External Threats: 
• Europe and nations 
endangered by 
hostile foreign actors 
Dominant 
Sources: USSR, USA 
Absent 
 
 
Present 1980s, 
1990s 
Sources: USSR, 
USA, Third world 
and Islam 
Diffuse Threats: 
• Europe and nations 
endangered by 
threats of 
unidentified or 
multiple origin  
Absent  Absent Present 1980s, 
dominant 1990s 
onwards 
Sources: 
Globalisation and 
EU 
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6. A EUROPEAN UNION THAT PROTECTS 
AND DEFENDS: DEFINING THE 
PROGRAMME FOR ACTION 
 
 
The previous three chapters have been dedicated to answering the first research question 
of this thesis, namely: ‘how have far right parties viewed Europe through ideological 
lenses and how have they incorporated it in their system of beliefs?’ They have shown 
that far right parties redeployed key concepts in their ideology such as Identity, Liberty 
and Threat to define Europe and make it a part of their worldview. This chapter moves 
away from understanding how Europe became a part of far right ideology to tackle the 
second research question of this thesis, namely, how their ideology informed their 
positions on the European Union. 
Shifting the focus from the parties’ ‘worldview’ to their ‘programme for action’ 
by exploring the links between the two, the chapter argues that parties relied on the 
familiar concepts of Identity, Liberty and Threat to define their positions on the concrete 
project of European integration. These concepts were complemented by the concept of 
National Interest, which served to integrate them into a narrative that elaborated the 
relationship between the EU and the nation. It is suggested that the redeployment of these 
concepts not only in the definition of Europe, but crucially in the parties’ (stated) political 
practice helps them stress commitment to the core beliefs of their ideology and present 
themselves as principled actors. 
In order to illustrate this argument, the chapter proceeds as follows. It opens by 
returning to the concept of ideology, and stressing its role as a praxis-oriented worldview 
and the subsequent expectation that there should be a connection between understandings 
and policies in ideology. It then shows how this manifested itself in the positions that the 
MSI/AN and FN expressed on the European Union by focusing on their views on the 
principle, practice and future of European integration. The final section reflects on the 
broader effects of what the parties have said about the EU, showing how expressing 
positions on the EU allowed them to highlight their consistency. In particular, the section 
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argues that by drawing on familiar concepts in their ideology to express positions on the 
European Union, and showing how the same concepts apply across time and across issues, 
the parties renewed their commitment to long-held values and succeeded in presenting 
themselves as principled actors.  
 
THOUGHT INTO ACTION: FROM ‘UNDERSTANDING 
EUROPE’ TO ‘EU POLICIES’ 
In discussing the history and meaning of ideology, Chapter two highlighted that 
ideologies can be thought of as ‘systems of political thinking, loose or rigid, deliberate or 
unintended, through which individuals and groups construct an understanding of the 
political world they, or those who preoccupy their thoughts, inhabit, and then act on that 
understanding’ (Freeden 1998a: 3), and stressed that it is necessary to understand 
ideologies as being both about understanding and, crucially, about acting upon a certain 
understanding. At the heart of ideology, then, is the idea that what one thinks and how 
one views the world will inform how one behaves and, conversely, that how one behaves 
will be justified with reference to what one believes.  
While being practice-oriented is by definition a feature of ideology, it becomes 
most visible in political parties when they present ideas about what they would do once 
in power. These ideas can be presented in a variety of forms (party manifestoes, campaign 
speeches, interviews, etc.) but will all be characterised by the fact that they weave 
together, sometimes implicitly, sometimes openly, a certain view of the world including, 
as Sainsbury defined it, a vision of the ‘Good Society’ (1980: 10) and the proposed 
measures to get closer to it by addressing issues that are considered problematic in the 
parties’ view. 
The observation of a close link between how one understands the world and what 
action one thinks is necessary led, in the earlier stages of this research, to the formulation 
of a second research question, namely: ‘how has the parties’ view of Europe informed 
their positions on the European Union?’ The objective of this question was to capture 
how the parties’ definition of Europe, as well as the concepts that played a role in defining 
it, informed their concrete policy positions on the EU. In other words, it tried to capture 
how what they thought about Europe (and the world in general) informed their concrete 
statements about the European Union.  
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In order to address this question, this chapter examines more closely what the 
studied parties thought about European integration specifically. Unlike the previous 
chapters, which focused on statements that described Europe in its larger meaning and 
the concepts used to define it, this chapter focuses on what the parties thought should be 
done, and how, concerning European integration. To do so, it analyses statements about 
EU policy by looking at three aspects: first, what the parties thought the EU should be for 
(and, whether indeed, it should exist at all); second, whether they thought that the EU 
actually fulfilled these objectives; and third, what ideal form the EU should take. These 
three points broadly cover the principle, practice and future of European integration 
(Kopecky and Mudde 2002, Vasilopoulou 2011), thus offering a comprehensive overview 
of the MSI/AN and FN’s ‘programme for action’ with respect to the EU. 
Consistent with the idea advanced in Chapter two that, given the close connection 
between thought and practice in ideology, one could expect similar concepts to be used 
to both decontest Europe and define positions on the EU, the analysis of party positions 
on the latter shows that the familiar concepts of Identity, Liberty and Threat helped the 
parties determine their views and positions on the European Union.   
In addition to our familiar concepts, there is another concept that appears 
recurrently in the parties’ discussion of the European Union: the concept of National 
Interest. The National Interest is both an appraisive and actionable concept: as the former, 
it serves to describe what is good or beneficial for a given national community; as the 
latter, it guides policy in such a way that what is beneficial is pursued. It also has no fixed 
content: while many different actors may appeal to it, there is no one fixed National 
Interest and what it means will ultimately depend on who is speaking, when they are 
speaking, how they define the boundaries of the ‘national’ and what situation they are 
considering.   
Given that far right parties are particularly committed to the nation, it should not 
come as a surprise that they appeal to this concept in their positions on the EU. Doing 
what is best for the nation may indeed be viewed as a logical implication of nationalism: 
because the national community is the highest form of allegiance, its interests should be 
represented and pursued in political action. As with the previously studied concepts, the 
parties’ use of the National Interest corresponds to a redeployment of a core part of 
nationalism in a new context and, specifically, in the definition of policies on a new issue. 
Thus, it constitutes a ‘linkage’ between the party’s ideological core and their political 
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practice which allows them to claim that their policies are guided primarily by the 
objective of doing what serves the nation. 
While the concept of the National Interest is no less important than the other 
concepts studied so far, and could have credibly had a chapter dedicated to itself, its study 
is best carried out in relation to the other concepts of Identity, Liberty and Threat. Because 
the definition of what constitutes the National Interest is related to what the parties 
consider to be most important in general (for example, considering it to be in the National 
Interest to work collectively against a Threat), it appeared more sensible to discuss 
National Interest in conjunction with the other concepts, rather than as a self-standing 
idea.  
The following sections illustrate empirically how the concepts studied so far, 
along with the notion of National Interest, manifest themselves in the parties’ discussions 
of the principle, practice and future of European integration. The second part of the 
chapter argues that the fact that parties redeploy these concepts in their definition of 
Europe is significant because it allows them to present themselves as consistent and 
principled agents. 
 
UNITY IN THE FACE OF DANGER: REASONS, MEANS AND GOALS OF 
EUROPEAN COLLABORATION 
How do the concepts of Identity, Liberty, Threat and National Interest figure in the 
studied parties’ views on the reasons, means and goals of European collaboration? The 
following sections illustrate how the MSI/AN and FN defined their views on the principle 
of European collaboration. In particular, they show that especially in the 1980s, because 
the parties viewed Europe as endangered by several threats, they also thought of European 
integration as a positive process aimed at overcoming such dangers. This was also 
justified as being ‘in the national interest’, highlighting once again the centrality of the 
nation in far right thinking. Once the most obvious threats disappeared, however, AN and 
the FN reverted to explaining their positions primarily in terms of what served the 
National Interest, with the latter often being defined through reference to the notions of 
Identity and Liberty, but this time as applied to the nation rather than Europe.  
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DEFENDING EUROPE, RESTORING POWER: THE PRINCIPLE OF EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION IN THE MSI 
The MSI was broadly positive about the principle of collaboration at the European level, 
pushing for further EU integration in selected areas and for a united ‘Nation Europe’. 
Viewing Europe as deeply endangered, it saw European unity as the only way to defend 
Europe, restore it from decline and, at the same time, serve the national interest of Italy.  
The MSI’s view of the aims of European integration was constructed entirely 
against the backdrop of danger and decline discussed in the previous chapter, leading the 
party to espouse the idea of European unity as a way to fend off various threats and return 
Europe and its nations to their past majesty. The MSI’s view of European unity’s dual 
objective to protect against threats and restore power was well captured by Romualdi 
(1981), when in an article he argued in favour of the creation of a nation called Europe 
‘not as a challenge […] but as a defence against the false myths and false philosophies, 
the brutality of the force that sustains them and the assault to our liberties and our lives; 
and to integrate, with our proud political return, the great forces of the West that is nothing 
without us’ (Romualdi 1981). The familiar concepts of Liberty and Threat are in this case 
used not to define Europe, but to explain why it needed to be united: to defend itself, and, 
most importantly, to be able to make a proud (and powerful) political return.  
Restoring the power of Europe, in fact, greatly preoccupied the MSI and appeared 
frequently in the party’s view of what European unity should achieve. Thus, in response 
to the decline of European power observed in the previous chapter, the ‘Spazio Nuovo’ 
minority motion in the 1979 Congress highlighted that ‘the concept of Europe must be 
for the whole party […] a “myth” based on the observation that only a united, independent 
and strong Europe […] will be able to, in front of the current superpowers, not only re-
establish order, but also make it possible for the world to exist without the duopolistic 
logic [sic] in which it has been enclosed for years’ (MSI 1979b); while, the 1987 minority 
Congress motion ‘Proposta Italia’ insisted that the party had to be critical of the current 
shape of the EU because, ‘while noting its weaknesses and shortcomings, we must help 
it overcome them. We have to push it to find again the sense of its autonomous 
personality, to awaken its latent force, to reclaim its full independence, to redeem itself 
from the American tutelage it has settled into, to aim for the first place in the world’ (MSI 
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1987c). These quotes highlight the perceived need to restore the ancient power of Europe 
against its decline and subjection to foreign powers.26 
The commitment to restoring European power through unity was not entirely 
guided by marked Europeanism, but also by the view that this was somewhat necessary 
to preserve the power of the individual nations. As Adriano Romualdi, son of Pino and, 
albeit only briefly,27 party intellectual, put it: ‘de Gaulle’s mistake was to speak in the 
name of France, and not of Europe. It was to think that France could still be great as 
France. But Italians, the French and even Germans will no longer be able to be great as 
Italians, French, Germans; they could be so as Europeans’ (cited in P. Romualdi 1979: 
53). Therefore, the goal of European integration was not only to restore Europe, but also 
to restore its constituent nations. 
In light of this view, the MSI claimed that the goal of European unity was also 
perfectly compatible with the party’s broader commitment to serving the nation. Thus, it 
was also viewed as a way to protect and enhance the National Interest, as the following 
passage from the 1982 Congress motion ‘Destra 80’, brought forward by Romualdi’s 
faction illustrates: 
The guiding line of Italy’s foreign policy must be the defence of 
its interests of all types, of its privilege, of its traditions, of its 
civilisation and its culture in all parts of the world and in every 
circumstance. 
Firstly, promoting with any initiative an ever-growing 
political integration within the European community and its 
integration in an increasingly global political strategy of Western 
countries. The world has been dominated for years by the 
initiative of international communism – in crisis but constantly 
advancing – guided by Soviet Russia […] transforming the free 
world in an encircled fortress […]. In such a world there is no 
other possibility to defend oneself than integrating and fully 
coordinating our interests and our initiatives with those of the 
other free and independent countries that wish to stay so. This 
 
26 While I cite minority motions here, the majority motions expressed rather similar points. For example, 
the 1979 majority motion, echoing the minority one in discussing the uncertain world balance, suggested 
that ‘it is also a crisis that could have positive outcomes as far as Europe is concerned, as long as Europe 
realises that it is a continent, that it does not have to accept to be tied down by the stumps of Yalta, that it 
has in its hands the instruments to establish its autonomy, to have the obligation and, even the interest, to 
look globally to its peoples […] and to be able to carry the weight of the destiny of the world […] (MSI 
1979a) 
27 Adriano Romualdi died in a car accident in 1973, aged 32. 
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cannot mean trying to protect fraudulently – often operating 
outside the Community’s rules, as many governments, including 
ours, do – our particular interests and our rights of initiative. But, 
on the contrary, defending them better, with intelligence and 
tenacity, in an open debate – even harsh if necessary – with the 
initiatives and interests of others […] (1982c) 
The passage above demonstrates very well how European integration was considered a 
primary factor in serving the national interest of Italy. First of all, it identifies ‘the pursuit 
of the national interest’ as the guiding principle in foreign policy. Secondly, it 
immediately identifies the project of European integration as the first initiative to promote 
in the name of this principle. Thirdly, and in line with what was mentioned before, this is 
justified on the grounds of a Threat facing Europe and its nations, showing how Threat 
represents the nexus between the ‘worldview’ and the ‘programme for action’. A final 
point of interest worth noting, however, is that integration requires reciprocity and 
loyalty, to ensure that all national interests are respected and pursued in concert with 
others, rather than at their expense. 
The MSI also discussed how Europe should be reformed in order to achieve these 
goals. Thus, they stressed a series of measures of both a political and a structural nature 
to promote a form of integration that would ensure the Community fulfilled its purpose. 
For example, while remaining sceptical of Parliamentarism (e.g., Almirante 1978: 46), 
they suggested at various points to strengthen the European Parliament (MSI 1979a, MSI 
1982a), create a European executive (MSI 1979d, MSI 1990d), establish an independent 
foreign and defence policy (see amongst others MSI 1979d, MSI 1987d, Gasparri 1988, 
MSI 1990d) and promote social measures to protect European workers living in countries 
different from their own (Almirante 1978: 49-50). While it is obvious that many of these 
measures would have served their own political interests or were guided by their national 
battles,28 they also demonstrate a will to engage with the existing structures of the EU to 
pursue the national interest.  
Above all, the MSI harboured a belief that the project of European integration 
should lead towards a political Europe, a free ‘Nation Europe’ that would stand as a third 
way between the USSR and the USA, and defend the identities and liberty of its 
 
28 For example, the focus on the protection of workers in the community can be seen as part of the MSI’s 
long-standing commitment to protecting Italian nationals abroad, while the focus on a stronger Parliament 
can be seen as guided by their will to have an impact on the decisions of the community through their 
MEPs.  
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constituent nations. This ‘end point’ of European integration will be discussed in the 
concluding section on normative views of the European project. 
 
SERVING THE NATION THROUGH EUROPEAN ACTION: AN’S SUPPORT FOR 
THE PRINCIPLE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
Because AN did not view Europe as deeply endangered, its view of the principle of 
European integration focused less on the notion of Threat and more on what positive goals 
European unity could achieve. In particular, like the MSI, AN viewed European 
integration as a way to solve issues that nations alone could not solve, although it did not 
view these issues as threats. Note, however, that AN also dedicated little time to 
discussing the principle of European integration, preferring to focus on the direction of 
integration instead. Thus, while suggesting that European integration was indeed 
desirable in principle, AN did not explain why in much detail.  
The limited evidence about AN’s view of the principle of European integration 
suggests that underlying the party’s support for it was a strong sense of the 
interdependence of European states and the realisation that further integration made it 
possible to solve issues that nations alone could not tackle. This was well illustrated in a 
1996 document by Mirko Tremaglia, an historical MSI and important AN figure, called 
‘Right means Europe’. The article stressed the Italian Right’s long-standing commitment 
to European integration and said that 
we consider it important to maintain the patrimony acquired up 
until now on the path to integration and we believe that, now more 
than ever, the events in our Continent pass through the respect 
and valorisation of History, of traditions, of the peculiarity of 
nations, as through the coordination of the economic, social, 
financial interest of the individual European countries. 
Thus we respond to the needs of unity and collaboration 
of the European states in an ample world scene, rocked by 
continuous disaggregating impulses, to reach a Union based on 
justice, on solidarity, recognising the principle of subsidiarity in 
the relationship between the Union and the national States. 
(Tremaglia 1996) 
Tremaglia here shows how European integration was, in the eyes of the party, a key 
supporting mechanism for member states, allowing them to tackle issues such as 
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globalisation (AN 1999, Carrino 2008), complex foreign policy issues (AN 1994b, AN 
2002) and even long-standing national issues (such as the gap between the North and 
South of Italy: e.g., AN 2001) where national action would be insufficient. In this sense, 
it served the national interest by performing a crucial problem-solving role for the nation.  
While less concerned with threats, even for AN the EU was meant to act as a 
protective force. In this sense, its action was to be partially guided by the need to defend 
Europe from external pressures, as the following passage from the Secolo d’Italia 
highlights:  
Yet, the leading role of the Indian and Chinese subcontinents, and 
the end of the bipolar opposition between East and West, should 
push the European Nations towards the constitution of a strong 
and united political subject that can start to rediscover European 
identity as a founding element of political institutions. […] 
Given these experiences and in the presence of such 
changes of perspectives, it is necessary to start a new season of 
institutional reforms to relaunch the debate on the idea of 
European unity, aware that it will be necessary to safeguard the 
identity, exalting their roots, of the single peoples and of all the 
nations. Starting from the belief that only a cohesive and united 
continent will be able to play a leading part in the coming future 
scenarios. (Pedrizzi 2006) 
Pedrizzi’s passage, beyond showing the EU as force whose principle should be to protect, 
is also interesting because it gives a sense of what needed to be protected. In line with the 
previous chapters, what the party seems to value above all is a sense of power supported 
by a strong identity, showing how the concepts that play out in the definition of Europe 
also serve to guide action in the EU. While these concepts are not defined here as gravely 
endangered, they do appear in need of being rediscovered in European integration. 
As with the MSI, the principle of European integration did not appear to contradict 
the National Interest, but rather to complement it. This assessment was further stressed 
by the understanding that Europe was indeed an arena where the National Interest should 
be pursued, as the 2004 programme highlighted when it suggested that previous Italian 
governments wrongly thought that ‘fidelity to this [European] ideal meant renouncing the 
protection of legitimate political, social and economic interests of the Italian nation’, 
while both could be pursued together at the European level, as the successful experience 
of countries such as France, Great Britain and Germany demonstrated (AN 2004).   
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With this in mind, the party proposed a variety of measures for the future of 
Europe, pointing towards the need for further integration in key areas such as defence, 
foreign policy and fiscal policy. Importantly, for AN, as for the MSI, this should lead 
towards a more ‘political’ form of Europe, an idea which will be discussed along with the 
MSI’s view of the future of Europe in the closing section of this chapter.  
 
EUROPEAN INTERESTS TO NATIONAL INTEREST: THE FN’S CHANGING 
VIEWS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
The FN’s position on the desirability of European integration, and especially on its form, 
shifted visibly over time. If in the 1980s the party was supportive of further European 
integration in the name of unity before a common danger and as a means to restore 
European power, from the 1990s onwards it reverted to judging the utility of the European 
project exclusively on its ability to serve the National Interest, partially explaining why 
the FN turned against the European Union.  
In the 1980s, like the MSI, the FN constructed its positions on the principle of 
European integration against the backdrop of a threat to the continent, viewing European 
unity as a form of protection from the outside world. In fact, the previous chapter showed 
that the FN considered Europe to be encircled by enemy forces, which in turn led it to 
speak in favour of the political integration of Europe. This is well illustrated by the 
following passage from Jean-Marie Le Pen’s book ‘Les Français d’abord’: 
No country has managed to establish its hegemony on Europe. 
Many have tried. All have written pages of glory. […] The 
groundwork has been done and one can now accept the creation 
of a united Europe in front of external threats. One never 
associates by natural reflex. When one creates a society, it is 
because one does not have the means to act alone. It is certain that 
the threat of Soviet Communism (and the dangers of 
disintegration by subversion it entails) is also Europe’s great 
chance. It can allow it to define itself precisely against a certain 
form of danger. One can obtain a huge consensus, reinforced by 
the fact that Europeans are aware of the fact that they are partially 
occupied by the Soviet Union, while the French, Spanish or 
others, by themselves, do not feel this. […] (Le Pen 1984: 155-
156) 
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Far from being an isolated case of support for European integration, this vision was 
pervasive in party documents at the time. Thus, Le Pen repeated the same point in a more 
succinct fashion elsewhere, for example later in the book, when he claimed that ‘there 
will be no Europe unless it is destined to become a Nation. Now this nation cannot be 
created if not to defend itself (and God knows that Europe is threatened) against external 
dangers’ (1984: 164), and again in other documents, such as the 1989 La Lettre editorial 
‘For a Europe of the Peoples’ in which he insisted that ‘the unity of Europe is necessary 
because what is at stake is our survival, our independence, our identity and our culture, 
our economic and social capacity. Europe is faced with dangers: diplomatic and military 
from the USSR; demographic from the third world and Islamic expansionism; in its 
vitality by decreasing birth rates, criminality, drugs, AIDS’ (Le Pen 1989). So, underlying 
the FN’s view of European unity was firstly, the recognition of a shared heritage among 
European nations, and secondly, the feeling that there was a Threat being posed to the 
nations of Europe which forced them to unite because they lacked ‘the means to act 
alone’. European unity, then, appeared as a form of protection for the individual nations 
of Europe and for the continent as a whole.  
Because the FN also saw Europe as in decline, it followed the MSI in its 
assessment of European integration as a means to restore European power. Combining 
the concepts of Liberty and Threat by presenting the former as endangered by the latter, 
this view was brought forward particularly by Mégret, who insisted on the need for 
Europeans to unite in the name of the ‘common benefit’ of ‘power’ (Mégret 1992). 
European unity, then, was considered desirable as a way to create a European ‘pôle de 
puissance’, which would be able to stand up to the USA and the USSR and ensure that 
Europe and its nations ‘find anew the power they have lost in the fratricidal wars they 
fought against one another and that they left the USA and the USSR to arbitrate’ (FN 
1991: 118).  
If the early documents of the FN appear to be committed to some form of 
European unity guided by the need to defend Europe’s survival and enhance its power, 
the FN’s commitment was conditional upon this being positive for France. As the 
previous paragraph showed, in fact, the FN viewed unity as a necessity for the protection 
of the individual nations, suggesting that its support for European unity was strictly 
delimited. Thus, while its declared policy was one of defending the European interest, the 
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underlying assumption was that this would allow for (and should indeed be dependent 
on) the defence of the National Interest. 
The importance of this notion of National Interest became particularly visible and 
explicit in the years following the end of the Cold War, when the logic of unity in the face 
of danger disappeared, leaving the National Interest as the principal objective of the FN’s 
European policy. This was evident in Le Pen’s view that European unity should be 
pursued only ‘to the extent that it is indispensable to the nations that have constituted it’ 
(Le Pen 1994). This, in turn, led the FN to propose increasingly less ambitious measures 
to adopt at the European level and to focus exclusively on European integration as a 
means to pursue ‘mutually beneficial’ projects. While this could occasionally lead to 
proposing measures such as a common currency (but not a shared one; e.g., Le Pen 1998, 
FN 1999), European integration only made sense, in the words of the 2009 programme 
(which is almost the same as the wording of Lang 2004), ‘if it creates jobs, riches; if it 
creates the conditions for more security and for peace for the peoples of Europe first’ (FN 
2009).   
In conclusion, the talk of creating Europe as a ‘puissance’ or as a ‘nation’ united 
against the common enemy disappeared and relegated Europe to a mere, loose project of 
integration aimed at facilitating bilateral and multilateral collaborations serving the 
individual nations’ interests. The form that this Europe should take will be discussed later 
on. The next section, for now, turns to a discussion of the assessment of the EU, on the 
grounds of this view of what aims European integration should pursue. 
 
PERFECTIBLE UNION OR FAILED EXPERIMENT? ASSESSING 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
The previous section showed how different concepts played into the parties’ positive 
assessment of the idea of uniting Europe. In the 1980s, the parties adopted a positive view 
of European integration, viewing it as a way to unite in the face of a common threat, return 
Europe to its past splendour and, as a result, serve the National Interest by acting at a 
higher level. From the 1990s, the rationale of European unity as a means to serve the 
National Interest became more visible and indeed dominant in the parties’ positions, with 
AN viewing the EU as a way to solve issues and pursue both the National and European 
166 
 
interest, and the FN focusing exclusively on the National Interest and viewing European 
integration primarily as a ‘zero-sum game’.  
Having established why, and under what conditions, the studied parties considered 
European integration desirable, the aim of this section is to see how the MSI/AN and FN 
assessed European integration. It focuses on whether they considered the EU to be fit for 
purpose, and on which grounds they justified their positions. Once again, our parties took 
divergent stances. While they all broadly agreed that the EU was not perfectly designed 
to fulfil the goals mentioned in the previous section, the MSI/AN still saw it as a 
perfectible structure, as opposed to the FN who especially from the 1990s onwards 
presented it as completely unsalvageable in its current form, and indeed, actively 
threatening.  
 
NEITHER UNITED, NOR POWERFUL: THE ROOTS OF THE MSI’S NEGATIVE 
ASSESSMENT OF THE FORM AND DIRECTION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
The MSI built its assessment of the European Union as a concrete project by referring to 
the ideas expressed earlier that European unity should be aimed at the three interlinked 
objectives of defending Europe, restoring its power and serving Italy. While the party 
considered the EU a first step towards the political integration of the continent, it also 
considered that the EU did not achieve the party’s goals and presented some important 
shortcomings in both institutional and policy terms. Thus, it assessed its current form in 
a mostly negative way, without, however, rejecting it completely. 
Starting with the view that the EU should allow for the common defence of Europe 
and the pursuit of power, the EU’s form was considered by the party as largely inadequate. 
This was imputed to a variety of factors, ranging from the EU’s inability to identify shared 
interests to its imperfect institutional structure. The first point is well captured by 
Romualdi in his 1979 Intervista sull’Europa, when he stressed that the EU was far from 
being a ‘Nation Europe’ because petty localised interests still prevailed: 
The European Parliament directly elected by the European people 
is born, but political unity is still far away, and so is the Nation 
Europe. Not because nationalisms are still alive. But exactly for 
the opposite reason. Because nationalisms have been replaced by 
the low and petty particular interests. The interests of individuals, 
of economic groups or multinational companies, and especially 
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of parties and their internationals. To De Gaulle’s [sic] Europe of 
the Homelands – still charged with chauvinism, but at least 
animated by a sentiment of grandeur and pride (however 
anachronistic and contradictory) – the bad European leading 
classes have only been able to oppose a Europe of the parties, of 
their interests and their bureaucracy, on the one hand; and on the 
other, the Europe of technocracy, experts and employees 
answerable only to themselves. That is, the Europe of nothing and 
no one. (Romualdi 1979: 54) 
The prevalence of such localised interests most clearly limited the EU’s ability to unite 
in front of a common threat because it limited Europe’s ability to present itself as a unified 
bloc in front of the East (MSI 1982a), leaving it, in addition, largely ‘inexistent’ in world 
politics (1987d). In this sense, it clearly failed to defend Europe from external enemies or 
restore its power, the two main goals of integration in the MSI’s view. 
The inability to overcome localised interests was partially blamed on the EU’s 
institutional structure, which the MSI considered inadequate to pursue a true European 
unity. The main lines of this opposition were well expressed by Rallo in the introduction 
to Almirante’s ‘Intervista sull’Eurodestra’, when he said that  
on the institutional plane, while admitting that the current 
structures of the community may constitute the instrument for 
further steps forward on the path of European integration, the 
Eurodestra does not identify itself with them, because it considers 
that Europe is something rather different than a mere super-
parliament destined to be the mouthpiece for the internal 
contradictions of Member States; because it believes that Europe 
is something more than a common market that at times disregards 
the economic interests of the associated peoples, creating in 
addition dangerous anti-European moods in certain Countries in 
our Continent. Equally, the Eurodestra does not identify with old 
federalism, as Europe cannot be a jumble of semi-powerful states, 
deprived of a true unifying glue, open to the political and financial 
speculations of foreign powers. (Almirante 1978: 11)  
The passage summarises several of the critiques the party raised against the EU’s form 
throughout the years. While acknowledging that the EU could be thought of as a first step 
on the path towards integration, Rallo here suggests that it is unable to create a unified 
front of Europeans because of the weakness of the institutions and the primarily economic 
form of integration. The 1987 Congress motion ‘Proposta Italia’ struck a familiar chord 
when it said that  
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we cannot share the utilitarian and mercantile level on which the 
life of the European organisms is developed, and we do not 
approve its political structures, inspired by a type of 
parliamentarism in which inconclusiveness and partisan offshoots 
and subjections coming from different countries end up 
dominating. Neither can we accept the passivity with which the 
EEC adapts itself to a secondary role in the world […] (MSI 
1987c; see also MSI 1990d for a similar view).  
The 1987 MSI programme is particularly interesting here because it highlights all the 
shortcomings of EU integration: its non-unitary political structures, its resignation to a 
secondary role in world politics and, most importantly, its primarily economic character 
which exacerbated its loss of power. 
The MSI’s main area of critique of the EU, in fact, concerned its dominant 
economic character which, in the MSI’s view, limited its ability to address the real threats 
that faced Europe. In particular, a purely economic form of integration did not make 
Europe free in any meaningful way, and failed to provide the necessary tools to defend it 
from external enemies. It also led to the creation of a ‘Europe of the merchants’ rather 
than a ‘political Europe’ based on local identities. Criticism of the EU as a purely 
economic construction which limited the pursuit of more important, political goals 
appeared in the course of various debates, including that on the EU’s incorporation of 
Spain and Portugal (Mantovani 1985) and the debate on Maastricht. Its main points are 
well outlined in the following passage by Maurizio Gasparri, who claimed that ‘we, who 
have always believed in Europe, will certainly not oppose integration processes. But we 
do not want a Europe of free trade – we do not want a Europe of monetary systems and 
finance. We look at what must precede currencies and trades. We look at political 
integration, at the military defence of our Europe, to the cultural identity of our land’ 
(Gasparri 1988). Gasparri, here discussing the advent of a European economic and 
monetary union, raises a number of points that clarify the MSI’s critique of the EU as an 
excessively economic construction, focused on ‘monetary systems and finance’ rather 
than on what precedes them. In particular, he pits this type of economic integration, that 
as a later document puts it, ‘betrays the duties that geography, politics and destiny have 
given to the continent’ (Gasparri 1993), against a more desirable form of political 
integration based on the defence of Europe and its heritage, and its return to power.  
Even though the MSI criticised the EU as a victim of petty interests, it should be 
noted that they were not unfamiliar with critiques based on Italy’s national interest. For 
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example, a 1982 minority motion criticised the Common Agricultural Policy because it 
forced Italy’s south to compete with a more productive northern Europe (MSI 1982b). 
This point was included in the 1983 programme, although, rather than blaming the EU 
itself, the programme blamed the Italian political class for being unable to protect Italian 
goods (MSI 1983). Further along the line, Maastricht was also heavily criticised by the 
party as having negative implications for Italy because it created an unequal relationship 
with European partners and had negative effects on the Italian economy, all the while not 
presenting a sufficiently ‘political’ form of integration (Gasparri 1993, Toppi 1994, MSI 
1994). In this sense, the MSI was also clearly concerned with ensuring that European 
integration did not harm Italy.  
Overall, it should be noted that, while the MSI did adopt a critical stance on the 
shape of the EU, it never fully rejected the idea of uniting Europe, and seemed to be 
mostly interested in developing the EU in a different direction. What direction it should 
have taken will be discussed in the final part of this empirical section. 
 
A PERFECTIBLE UNION: THE AN’S CRITICAL STANCE ON THE SHAPE OF THE 
EU 
AN, the previous section argued, held a positive view of the principle of EU integration, 
seeing it primarily as a means to solve issues that the nations alone could not address. 
This also guided its view of the European Union: while recognising its utility, AN also 
adopted a critical stance when the EU failed to ensure an acceptable level of protection, 
although, importantly, this never led the party to reject it completely.  
First of all, it is important to stress that AN viewed the EU as an important 
achievement which should be preserved. The previously cited Tremaglia for example, 
highlighted the need to ‘maintain what has been achieved up until now’ (1996), while in 
2002 Fini argued that European citizens did not oppose a growing Europe but that they 
were ‘in favour of further European integration in those sectors in which only the Union’s 
action, and not that of the individual states, can achieve satisfactory results’ (Parlato 
2002). The 2004 programme even stressed how the introduction of the Euro ended the 
first phase of the European construction, achieving the ‘perhaps most extraordinary result 
of the 20th century’ of ‘removing the bloody borders which for centuries had separated 
the peoples and economies of Western Europe’ (AN 2004). Thus, the EU, however 
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imperfect, was seen as a desirable element of European politics.  
While positive about the overall project, AN was also more critical in terms of its 
assessment of the nature of European integration, considering that, in many cases, it did 
not fulfil its role of problem solver and even violated key values. It is here that it is 
possible to observe the reappearance of the concepts of Identity and Liberty studied in the 
previous chapters, as well as their juxtaposition with the concept of National Interest. 
Like the MSI, AN criticised the EU’s ‘neo-Enlightenment’ and ‘dirigiste’ form which 
focused on economics while ignoring key political principles such as democracy and 
national cultures (AN 1994b, AN 2004). More importantly, it questioned the extent to 
which the EU served Italy’s (or even Europe’s) interests in a balanced manner. In fact, 
although AN accepted the need for compromise, it suggested that Italy was compromising 
much more than other countries, leading to negative consequences for the country’s social 
and economic development (Tremaglia 1996, Alemanno 2000, AN 2002, AN 2004).  
The form that AN’s criticism of the EU took is described in the following editorial 
by Selva, published in the Secolo d’Italia and tellingly called ‘If the European dream 
becomes a nightmare’: 
I confess to feeling by now as a “defrocked priest”, due to the loss 
of faith in “this Europe”. I still celebrate “European Masses” […] 
but the dream of a Community seeking to become the United 
States of Europe, […] must be reviewed: in fact, the only great 
human and political victory of our community has been that of 
making war amongst us impossible and making us enjoy peace 
for half a century […].  
But let us return to the dream that should have become a 
reality and that, on the contrary, almost transforms into a 
nightmare: the conflict that is ever more evident between the 
European institutions and the political will of European peoples. 
When the citizens in France and the Netherlands […] do not see 
in the institutions the power to solve the issues of globalisation 
and not even of national economy, they vote with anger against 
the European positions of the governments they have elected. 
The bureaucratisation of the institutions has become not a 
simplification of the relationship between the community and 
individual citizens, but an obstacle. […] 
Following the rhetoric of a “Political Europe of the future” 
[…] we Italians did the opposite of the French and Germans, and 
especially of the English: we privileged European politics over 
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the defence of the national interest. I do not mean to say that this 
has not given us some advantages […], but I do say that we must 
no longer talk about European “unity” without first defending the 
“diversity” of interests and of the national “values”. (Selva 2005) 
Written at a difficult time for the EU, following the French and Dutch ‘No’ votes on the 
Constitutional Treaty, this passage helps highlight the tension between what AN saw as 
the goal of European integration and the EU’s ability to fulfil it. It was mentioned before 
that AN viewed European integration as necessary to protect the national interest through 
action at the European level. This would be done by protecting the cultures and nations 
of Europe (or, in the language used in the previous chapters, its Identity), something 
which the passage above suggests the EU was no longer able to do. Thus, the EU was 
unable to tackle globalisation and could also no longer ensure prosperity and security. 
This also leads, in Selva’s view, to a break between the EU and its constituent nations, 
raising issues of democracy. What is perhaps most interesting about the article, however, 
is the perspective from which it is delivered. Selva criticises the EU on a wide range of 
grounds, essentially suggesting that it has failed to deliver on its own promises. The 
overwhelming sense, however, is one of disappointment rather than anger, the regret of a 
former convert in seeing that the project one had been pursuing has fallen short. This 
suggests that the AN, even when being critical, remained committed to European 
integration as a project, considering it necessary to reform it, even radically if necessary, 
but not abandon it in toto as the FN did.  
 
THE EU AS A FAILED PROJECT: THE FN’S NEGATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE 
FORM AND PRACTICE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
The FN’s assessment of the EU as a concrete project of European collaboration is, and 
has been since the mid-1980s, overwhelmingly negative. While the party adopted a more 
nuanced stance in the early 1980s (e.g., FN 1981; Le Pen 1984, 1985), and occasionally 
welcomed the general principle of integration as well as specific EU initiatives (e.g, 
Mégret 1992 on the single market), overall it has tended to see the EU as a deeply flawed 
project which does not conform with its view of what European unity should achieve, and 
particularly with the imperative to act as a protective force.  
The FN’s assessment of the European Union was initially positive, with the party 
seeing it as a first step towards further European unification in the face of danger. For 
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example, the 1979 programme of the Union Française pour l’Europe defined the EU as 
‘a decisive step’ towards the European confederation they saw as desirable. Similarly, the 
1985 programme presented by Le Pen expressed the importance of ‘reaffirming the reality 
of the Europe founded on the homelands of the EEC’ (Le Pen 1985: 189).  
While generally supportive of the overall project, already in its early years the FN 
had its reservations about the functioning of the EU, considering (like the MSI) that it 
was insufficiently ambitious in its political scope. In the same passage that speaks of the 
importance of ‘reaffirming the reality of the Europe founded on the homelands of the 
EEC’, Le Pen also advanced a critical view of European integration stating the following: 
Return Europe to its true dimension 
For as long as France and Europe accept to be shamed by certain 
Third World countries, instruments of Soviet hegemony, they will 
not be able to forge a political will and the projects of European 
unity will remain vague hopes. 
A hope was born with the Coal and Steel treaty of 1950, 
the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and the Euratom in 1958. Today, this 
hope has been let down, called into question. 
From one European summit to another, the Community 
sinks, it no longer solves issues […]. 
Nor has it given itself the financial and regulatory means 
for the enlargement. 
The European Parliament too often looks like an assembly 
responsive to Marxist dialectics and to the Third-Worldist 
ideology.  
The European Commission is an organism influenced by 
bureaucratic socialism. 
No, this is not what Europe is, it is not only the Europe of 
merchants, of trade unions, of theoreticians and of technocrats.  
It is an extra-millenary community of destiny, whose 
construction, the last great design of the 20th century, can give our 
youth a future commensurate to its legitimate ambitions. (Le Pen 
1985: 188-189)  
Like the MSI, Le Pen presents a critique of the EU as a ‘Europe of merchants’ that has 
abandoned all political will. While acknowledging that the EU had started on the right 
footing, the passage then proceeds to explain where it all went wrong, attacking in turn 
the Parliament, the Commission and the overall form of the project, considered to be a 
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‘betrayal’ of the real Europe. The domination of these institutions clearly carries negative 
implications, as they are unlikely to be committed to restoring Europe’s power by making 
it into a body ‘commensurate’ to the ‘legitimate ambitions’ of the European youth. 
Following an early phase of moderate criticism, the Single European Act, the 
concrete experience of FN members as MEPs, the decline of Communism and the 
adoption of the Maastricht Treaty led the FN to adopt an increasingly oppositional stance 
to the EU, making it, as the previous chapter has demonstrated, a Threat in itself (on this 
evolution, see Reungoat 2012: 102-104). As such, the FN began to oppose it principally 
on three (often mixed) grounds which recall the concepts studied in the previous chapters, 
as well as their reasons to support the general principle of integration mentioned earlier.   
First of all, the EU was assessed negatively as a body that harmed identities by 
removing (or shifting) established physical and symbolic boundaries between ‘Us’ and 
‘Them’, thus violating what should have been its key role of acting as a protective force. 
Under this heading, the EU was presented, for example, as a force that facilitated 
immigration (both intra-EU and extra-EU: e.g, FN 2002, FN 2012a, Gollnisch 2006, Le 
Chevallier 1988, Le Pen 2016), empowered regions (e.g., FN 2002, Le Pen 2003) and 
destroyed national diversity through harmonisation (e.g., FN 1991: 116, FN 2007, Mégret 
1989b).  
Secondly, the FN opposed the current form of European integration by claiming 
that the EU violated the fundamental principle of Liberty by removing power from its 
rightful holders. Drawing on the notions of autonomy and self-rule, this form of 
opposition encompassed attacks on the primacy of EU law, on the ‘unelected Brussels 
bureaucrats’ and on the EU more generally as diminishing the sovereignty of its 
constituent members (e.g., FN 1999, FN 2012a, Le Pen 2017b; see also Chapter five).  
Finally, the FN also developed an economic line of critique which suggested that 
the EU created poverty in its members, thus violating their national interest and harming 
their long-term chances of survival. This was built by criticising both generic and specific 
aspects of EU policy such as its flair for liberalisation, the Common Agricultural Policy 
and especially the Euro, defined in a speech as an ‘occupation currency’ (Le Pen 1998; 
on this third line of critique, see also for example FN 1999, FN 2012a, Le Pen 2007).  
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The reasons for the FN’s negative assessment of the EU are well illustrated in a 
six-page-long Q&A published on Français d’abord in 1999, whose main axes of 
reasoning are presented below (all stresses in original): 
Q: We must construct a federal Europe because there is a 
European civilisation. 
Answer: The existence of a community of civilisation that brings 
European peoples together is not contested […] 
1) But a civilisation is not a nation: […] 
2) The EU in any case forgets the founding values of our 
civilisation: 
• European civilisation is precisely that of the free 
and equal peoples. That is the civilisation of the 
diversity of national cultures. A federal Europe 
would negate this diversity. […] 
 
Q: It is necessary to create a federal Europe to avoid 
war in Europe. Europe is peace. 
A:  
1) But it is not the European construction that has granted 
peace in Europe. […] 
2) This Europe might, alas, lead us to war. According to 
the Maastricht Treaty, the passage to the euro is ‘irreversible’ 
[…]. Europe will then have to use force to prevent a people from 
retrieving its freedom.  
3) The best way to avoid aggressive nationalism, is 
precisely to respect the liberty of nations. […] 
 
Q: But we still have the possibility to control what 
happens at the European level. 
A: 
1) But we control nothing! In the past, it was necessary to 
have the unanimous agreement of all states to pass a European 
law […]. Today, if there is a majority, it is possible to impose on 
a people what it does not want […] 
2) In several areas, the power belongs to unelected 
technocrats! The French Parliament becomes a mere registration 
chamber of the laws made in Brussels. Democracy […] 
disappears in favour of the power of ‘experts’. 
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Q: It is necessary to create a federal Europe because 
European economies are more and more interdependent. 
A: 
1) But the economy is not in charge of politics […] In 
democracy and in the Republican setting, the primacy of politics 
is, simply, the possibility for the people to choose the economic, 
foreign, social policy that it prefers […] 
 
Q: The Euro is the sharing of a monetary sovereignty 
we had lost. 
But by definition, sovereignty is ‘unconditional power’, 
which means it is indivisible: it either is, or is not. […] Sharing 
sovereignty means not being sovereign. […] (FN 1999) 
 
Following these first four pages dedicated to identity and sovereignty, the remaining two 
pages of the dossier deal more specifically with the euro as a complex new currency which 
will penalise citizens, endangering their savings and their purchasing power. The Q&A, 
structured as a conversation between a humanised, intelligent-looking flame (the party’s 
logo) and three distinctively dark-skinned mobsters,29 thus highlights all the lines of 
criticism of the EU. In the eyes of the FN, it is a boundary-removing body, an 
economically faulty construction and, the dominant theme here, a body that removes 
control from the nation and its politics, which it replaces with the domination of 
bureaucracy, economics and administration.  
The FN’s message on why it opposed European integration has remained constant 
ever since. Even with the change of leadership, the overall arguments have remained 
rather similar, as a comparison between the preceding 1999 passage and the article below 
from the party magazine Nations Presse Magazine (created in 2010 to support Marine Le 
Pen’s candidacy for the leadership of the party) will illustrate:  
Faced with this situation, while they could have been an anchor 
to safeguard our jobs, our social protection, our public services 
and our cultures, Europe and its Brussels Commission have 
forced upon the people a European model: 
 
29 The men’s profession is not indicated; however, the fact that they are all wearing sunglasses, that one of 
them is wearing a suit, one is smoking a sizeable cigar and the third has a ponytail and a large, hoop shaped 
earring, lead them to bear a strong resemblance to mafioso imagery.  
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• Drifting geographically, first East, up to Asia Minor 
with the desired accession of Turkey 
• Drifting economically towards unfettered free trade 
• Drifting politically through the slow construction of a 
EUSSR (Aliot 2011) 
In short, Louis Aliot, the magazine director, FN politician and partner of Le Pen, criticises 
the EU for failing to fulfil its protective function. In a similar vein, in a 2010 speech, 
Marine Le Pen, not yet president of the party, stressed how 
the French have said no this European constitution, that is, to a 
specific conception of Europe, that which has been dominating 
for decades: a Europe of rapacious banks, where cash is king; of 
generalised deregulation; of the destruction of public services and 
of States; a Europe open without protection to all the winds of 
globalisation, to all migrations, a Europe of the standardisation of 
languages and cultures, of their alignment to the Anglo-
American; a Europe without nations, without peoples, without 
democracy, entrusted to a small arrogant and omnipotent caste. 
(Le Pen 2010)  
The essentials, then, as the passages show, remain largely the same. Since the end of the 
1980s and early 1990s in particular, the EU is assessed negatively as a body with unclear 
boundaries (and which removes the ones that are present), an economically unprosperous 
area and a bureaucratic nightmare removing political powers from its rightful holders.  
One area of change in the FN’s criticism of the EU is how it proposes to deal with 
it, with the party oscillating between leaving the EU and reforming it. The party has in 
fact been rather ambivalent on this, supporting in turn exit from the EU project as a whole 
(FN 2002), a simple renegotiation with no mention of exit (FN 2007 and the post-2017 
presidential campaign) or a renegotiation with a possibility of exit if this does not go in 
the right direction (FN 2012a, FN 2017). As for what an ‘ideal’ renegotiated Europe 
would look like, this is for the last section to discuss. 
 
CONFEDERAL? YES, BUT HOW? CONSIDERING THE FUTURE OF 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
The previous sections have shown that none of the parties here studied displayed unfailing 
support for European integration. All three, in fact, demonstrated a measure of scepticism 
concerning the functioning of the project, although their criticism did not lead to the same 
177 
 
conclusions. Thus, the Italian parties, while critical of the current shape of the EU, viewed 
it as perfectible. The Front National, on the other hand, shifted from viewing it as 
imperfect but valuable to rejecting it completely as a failed and dangerous project in need 
of complete overhaul.  
In light of this critical assessment brought forward by the parties, this section 
explores how they thought an ideal EU would look. It shows that while all parties 
advocated a confederal project of European integration, they took divergent stances on 
the extent to which it should be integrated and what areas it should prioritise. Thus, the 
MSI pushed for a ‘political’ Nation Europe with a strong common foreign and defence 
policy, while AN supported a confederal model guided by the principle of subsidiarity. 
The FN always supported a confederal model of European integration; however, it moved 
from a position similar to that of the MSI to one that supported only loose forms of 
European collaboration. 
 
EUROPA NAZIONE: THE MSI’S UNITED AND POWERFUL (CONFEDERAL) 
EUROPE 
To the MSI, the ideal Europe should be ‘One, free, self-sufficient’ (MSI 1982a), guided 
by the imperative of power in the external world, but respectful of national individualities. 
The MSI’s ideal of European unity mirrored closely what it thought Europe should be for 
and was heavily indebted to the ideas and language of Anfuso, whose idea of Europe was 
discussed in Chapter three. Guided by the view that European integration should be aimed 
at defending Europe and restoring power, when speaking of the endpoint of European 
integration, the MSI argued that Europe should become a ‘political’ and united ‘Nation 
Europe’, able to act decisively on the world stage as a third way between the capitalist 
USA and the communist USSR. In the MSI’s view, only such a form of European unity 
would allow the EU to fulfil its goals. As the party’s 1987 programme most clearly put 
it, the MSI wanted 
a politically, economically and militarily integrated Europe, a 
united Europe as an influencing factor for peace and stability; it 
will compete with the USA in maintaining freedom and 
civilisation; a Europe that cannot and must not be subject to 
limitations, discriminations or privileges and that has its full 
rights in the Western formation, which can be determinant in the 
choices of the alliance, to fulfil its responsibility in the world, 
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especially in the Mediterranean, in the Third World and in Latin 
America. (MSI 1987d) 
The passage ties together what were discussed at the beginning of this chapter as the 
‘aims’ of Europe and the shape that it should take. First of all, it identifies the need for a 
‘politically, economically and militarily integrated Europe’, suggesting that European 
integration should go further than it had at the time. Secondly, it stresses the view of 
Europe as one that is fully free from external control and able to be determinant in world 
politics: in other words, an autonomous and powerful Europe. The MSI’s ‘Nation 
Europe’, then, could be seen primarily as a foreign policy actor, able to project power in 
the external realm and, expected, with time and further political integration, to become 
‘an equal pole of the USA and the USSR’ (MSI 1990d). 
As far as the form that integration should take, while adopting the language of a 
‘Nation Europe’, the MSI viewed the ideal form of integration as a confederal one. MSI 
activist Michele Rallo discussed this most clearly in the opening sections of the Intervista 
sull’Eurodestra, when he highlighted that the party’s ‘Nation Europe’ was neither a 
centralised project of European integration nor a federal ‘levelling’ one, but a confederal 
project in which Europe would be ‘united and integrated’ while ‘maintaining intact the 
national individualities that make it up’ (in Almirante 1978: 9-10). In other words, the 
ideal Europe would be guided by the imperatives of Liberty and Identity, restoring the 
power of European nations all the while respecting their individualities by adopting a 
confederal form. 
 
EUROPA DELLE PATRIE: AN’S CONFEDERAL BUT INTEGRATED UNION 
AN’s vision for the future of Europe was marked by both breaks and continuities with the 
MSI’s. In fact, while it maintained the MSI’s commitment to a confederal and more 
‘political’ Europe, in which the sovereignty and national interests of individual nations 
would be respected, it also broke with tradition by distancing itself from the idea that 
European integration should be guided by action against external enemies, and by shifting 
the intellectual references for its ideal of Europe.  
The presence of both breaks and continuities could already be observed in the 
party’s first manifestoes, in which ideas of the MSI remained present, but were 
repackaged to fit in with the conservative political lineage of de Gaulle. As far as 
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continuity was concerned, the programmes stressed the need for the EU to become a more 
political confederation of states. At the same time, the party abandoned the language of 
‘Nation Europe’ that it had inherited from fascist diplomat Anfuso and adopted the 
Gaullist formula of ‘Europe of the Homelands’.30 Thus, the 1994 EU manifesto stressed 
that the party drew its inspiration from de Gaulle’s project, while the national programme 
presented the AN’s view of an ideal Europe as a  
Europe that is not merely a space of free trade, an area tied 
together by mere economic interests, but a Confederation of 
diverse and sovereign states, that can find together the strength 
and will to give themselves a foreign or security policy, a unity of 
aims, of directives and laws that guarantee the primary efficacy 
of “politics”, not subordinated to economics as a system that is an 
end in itself. (AN 1994a)  
While bearing several similarities with the MSI’s vision in that it stresses the confederal 
and political nature of an ideal Europe, it is also notable that the passage highlights the 
need for the states to remain ‘sovereign’, a term rarely used by the MSI in this context 
but key to de Gaulle’s vision. Thus, the party successfully maintained a continuity of 
ideas with the past by stressing the need for a powerful and confederal Europe, as well as 
inserting itself into a different ideological realm by appealing to a different intellectual 
tradition.  
AN remained attached to this confederal and political project even in following 
years, although, unlike the MSI, it did not consider this political Europe as necessary to 
defend Europeans from the outside world, but as an instrument of collaboration when 
action by single nations would be insufficient to guarantee the National Interest (Parlato 
2002). Thus, the 2002 Congress expressed its view of the ideal EU as  
an institution that, preserving the specificities of individual States 
as an element of richness in the Union, can synergistically unite 
their contributions, not annulling the national States but 
constituting a confederation of nation-States; in this sense the 
States and national interests contribute and are not an obstacle to 
the formation of the European interest and priorities. (AN 2002) 
As for the MSI, the confederal form of an ideal EU was thus confirmed as the most 
 
30 As mentioned in the above quotation of Intervista sull’Europa, it is worth noting that, at least in the 
1970s, the MSI was not overly enthused by de Gaulle’s vision, which Romualdi defined as positively grand 
but chauvinistic (1979: 52). 
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appropriate one, as it would allow the states to form of a European interest respectful of 
national traditions and interests. Other documents stressed that it should also seek to be 
closer to the citizens and to the peoples of Europe (Parlato 2002, AN 2004), an innovation 
which brought the party more in line with the EU itself. Importantly, and, as we shall see 
in stark opposition to the FN, this confederal Europe remained a variation of the EU that 
kept intact its key structures, rather than an entirely new project based on radically 
different forms of collaboration. 
 
EUROPE DES PATRIES, EUROPE DES NATIONS, EUROPE A LA CARTE…: THE 
FN’S PROJECT OF LOOSE CONFEDERAL COLLABORATION  
The concepts of Identity, Liberty, Threat and National Interest all feature prominently in 
the FN’s view of what an ideal Europe would look like. The party, in fact, viewed 
European unity as guided by the principle of identity among Europeans, in a form that 
would respect their individual sovereignty, and aimed at their collective defence and the 
pursuit of mutually beneficial projects where nations alone would not be able to act. The 
formula the party used to define this form of collaboration was the Gaullist ‘Europe of 
the Homelands’; however, what they meant by it shifted over time, going from a 
confederal model of integration with a shared defence to an ever looser association of 
European states. Thus, while using the same formula as AN, the FN pushed for a much 
weaker form of integration which also placed itself outside the regular frameworks of the 
EU.  
To illustrate how the concepts studied so far figured in the FN’s definition of their 
ideal of European integration and how its positions evolved, it is pertinent to compare 
three documents spanning a 20 year period. The first one is an excerpt from the 1991 
party guide ‘Militer au Front’. The second is an article by Carl Lang in Français d’Abord. 
The third is an excerpt from the party’s 2012 electoral programme.  
The Europe of Homelands  
Our conception of Europe is that of a Europe of the nations; that 
is, the organisation of a community of civilisation founded on the 
renewal of European nations, each preserving its identity and 
integrity within a confederal entity. 
Europe will be based on a political, and not economic, 
project. […] The common denominator must be specific to 
181 
 
European countries; therefore, it must be founded on European 
identity and civilisation. […]  
A confederal Europe 
Europe must organise itself, with due respect to proportions, 
according to the Swiss model, a confederal state, eminently 
respectful of each particularity [….] From this point of view, 
Europe or the European Union should adopt the principle of 
subsidiarity […]  
Europe must do what states cannot do themselves: find the 
means for a shared defence, develop great projects such as Ariane, 
Hermes or Airbus.  
A European Europe 
Europe will be made with Europeans and not with Africans or 
Asians. Everything must be put in place to preserve the 
endangered European peoples’ identity from the Third World 
immigration. […] (FN 1991: 118-119) 
 
The only Europe worth building is that in which free 
cooperation between fully independent and totally sovereign 
nations reinforces each one of them. This cooperation can only 
be carried out at the intergovernmental level […]. 
In our Europe, the States would be able to pick freely the 
domains in which they wish to act together. […] 
Our Europe has a vocation to welcome all European 
countries, but only European countries. […] 
The freedoms, independence, sovereignty and 
permanence of our different nations and their millenary culture 
depend on our ability to refuse the Europe that is being built in 
deception and secrets in Brussels, to put in place a true Europe, 
that of the Nations, of the Homelands and of the Peoples. (Lang 
2000)  
 
In the framework of Article 50 of the Treaty of the European 
Union, it is appropriate to start a renegotiation of the treaties to 
break with a failing European construction. […]  
At the end of this process, it will be necessary 
• For France to regain control of its borders, 
preferably in the context of a free association of 
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European States sharing the same vision and the 
same interests on subjects such as immigration or 
the rules regulating foreign exchanges and the 
movement of capital 
• For France to re-establish the primacy of national 
law over European law 
• For France to regain the control of its currency and 
economic policy 
• For the period of great innovative European 
projects to come, at the service of the peoples, built 
by starting from voluntary partnerships […] 
We will thus return to its rightful place the useful 
European cooperation: in projects, cooperation, but removing the 
tutelage of a Eurocratic Super-State […]. (FN 2012a) 
The passages present three variations on the theme of a ‘Europe of the Homelands’, going 
from a slightly more ambitious confederal and political project to a looser form of 
multilateral cooperation at best.  
The first passage from ‘Militer au Front’ is, compared with the others, a relatively 
ambitious one. The model proposed for Europe is a confederal one similar to that of the 
Swiss and built around the idea of a shared and exclusionary identity. The ‘Europe of the 
Homelands’ thus constituted would be a ‘political Europe’ based on a common 
civilisation rather than a mere economic project and aimed primarily at protecting Europe 
from threats such as decline. While the powers of this Europe should not be overstated, 
as the use of the concept of subsidiarity implies that they would only apply in cases when 
the member states cannot act alone, it still points towards a rather structured form of 
collaboration.  
The second and third passage, on the other hand, appear to support more ad hoc 
forms of collaboration, and focus more on Liberty and the National Interest than they do 
on Identity and Threats (although these still appear). They do so by emphasising the 
notion of sovereignty and strictly delimiting EU action to areas where individual nations 
cannot act alone. They also contrast more clearly their view of the ideal form of Europe 
as one of ‘voluntary partnerships’ with that of the EU as a forced form of collaboration, 
and the third passage goes as far as claiming the need to leave the European Union. In 
this sense, they explicitly reject the EU as a framework for collaboration, pointing towards 
its ultimate unreformability. 
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CONSISTENTLY NATIONALIST: RENEWING 
COMMITMENT THROUGH EUROPE 
The sections so far have shown how the studied parties positioned themselves on the 
principle, practice and future of European integration. In discussing their positions, the 
chapter has sought to tease out how the concepts of far right ideology studied in the 
previous chapters came together in the parties’ positions on the EU, and how they were 
complemented by a fourth concept which could be seen as relevant to nationalism, 
namely, the National Interest. It thus confirmed the proposition advanced in Chapter two 
and developed in Chapters three to five that far right parties will draw on key concepts in 
their ideology not only to define Europe, but also to determine their positions on the 
European Union. 
Why does it matter that the MSI/AN and FN redeployed core concepts in their 
ideology such as Identity, Liberty and Threat, or that they brought their positions on the 
EU back to the nation via the concept of the National Interest? The argument advanced 
here is that drawing on key concepts in their ideology to define Europe and their positions 
on the EU serves to renew the parties’ commitment to long-held principles. To develop 
this argument, it is important to understand what else parties are doing when they say 
something about Europe. 
First of all, it may be noted that when far right parties draw on familiar concepts 
in their ideology to integrate new (peripheral) issues, they are not only saying something 
about the new issue, but they are also restating the importance of the ‘old’ principles. 
When the MSI/AN or the FN speak about Europe, they are not simply making claims 
about Europe: they are saying something about themselves as well. When drawing on 
Identity, Liberty, the National Interest, or when presenting something as endangered by 
a Threat, the parties stress what matters to them, the principles that guide them in the 
political world. As a result, they commit themselves anew to their ideological core, 
creating an allure of consistency. 
The existence of a link between the core and the periphery and the maintenance 
of that link over time further reinforces the sense of consistency by showing that the same 
principles keep applying over time and across issues. When the studied parties make 
Europe a part of their ideology and justify their positions by referring to key concepts, 
they do not simply stress their commitment to certain principles, they also show more 
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clearly how they play out in different contexts. They create a narrative about how what 
matters to them matters everywhere, and not simply in selected areas. In short, they 
highlight a sense of continuity in their ideology. 
Importantly, being able to discuss issues by referring to core principles may help 
facilitate changes in position by the parties because it can stress continuity even when 
there appears to be a break. In fact, it may help them highlight consistency even in the 
face of radical change because it makes it possible to stress that while the position on an 
issue may have changed, the party remains faithful to certain broader commitments. The 
FN’s U-turn on European integration, represented in the two quotes below, can provide a 
good illustration of this argument: 
I believe that we have a shared heritage in Europe which goes 
beyond agricultural, coal, steel or atom exchanges. I believe that 
Europe has a much greater future and a much greater content than 
this […] 
Finally, Europe can only be built in the fight for its liberty, 
even more than that, for its liberation. We will never accept the 
amputation and slavery of the sister nations captured by 
communism […] 
For there to be a Europe, there needs to be a European 
sentiment, and that is why we have wanted to transcend 
patriotism, our national patriotisms, in a European patriotism. 
That means that there will be no Europe unless it is likely to 
become a Nation. Now, this nation cannot be created if not to 
defend itself (and God knows that Europe is menaced) from 
foreign dangers. […] 
My European programme is in fact the exact extrapolation 
of the national programme of the FN, since the same dangers that 
menace France, menace Europe. […]  
The fight for Europe is a fight for France, and the fight for 
France is a fight for Europe. Build Europe, yes! But by 
reconstructing France first. Help Europeans, yes! But by helping 
the French first! (Le Pen 1984: 162-165) 
 
The European Union, created at the beginning between countries 
sharing similar civilisations, with comparable levels of economic 
and social development, founded on the principle of ‘Community 
preference’, is today diverted from its aims. The results are well 
known: opening of borders leading to offshoring, unemployment, 
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the dictatorship of the markets, destruction of public services, 
precariousness, poverty, massive immigration. Installation of a 
Super-State, with its Constitution, its indefinite borders where 
one would like to allow Turkey to become a member, its ultra-
liberal and globalist ideology, its ecstasy of new competences. 
(FN 2012a) 
The two passages reproduced here illustrate the positions held by the same party at a 
distance of roughly thirty years. In the first one, extracted from a chapter of Jean-Marie 
Le Pen’s 1984 programmatic book, tellingly titled ‘A strong homeland in a strong 
Europe’, Le Pen discusses his (mostly) favourable view of European integration. The 
second passage tops the Europe sections of the FN’s 2012 electoral programme, where, 
in its original form, it is duly followed by a discussion of the EU’s democratic deficit, its 
role as a body that was built ‘without the people’ and working ‘against the people’ and 
the ways in which it harms France; it also ends with the call to leave the EU and ‘lay the 
foundations for a Europe that will respect popular sovereignties, national identities, 
languages and cultures, and that will truly be at the service of the peoples through concrete 
actions’.   
What is interesting about these passages is that while the party changed position 
on the EU, the core concepts it relied upon remained the same, albeit interpreted 
differently at times. In the first passage, Identity appears through ideas of a shared 
heritage and European patriotism; in the second, it is something that the EU has ceased 
to respect in abandoning the idea of ‘Community preference’ and clear borders. In the 
first passage, there is a call for the Liberty of Europe; in the second, it is claimed that the 
EU is some ‘Super-State’ which always seeks new powers and violates sovereignty. In 
both cases there is a Threat lurking in the background: in the first passage, it is not named; 
in the second, it is the EU itself. Finally, the first passage advances the idea that what is 
good for Europe is good for France, and hence may be viewed as serving the National 
Interest; while, in parts of the second passage not reproduced here, the EU is presented as 
something that actively harms it. Overall, then, while the policy changed, the presence of 
similar guiding principles ensured continuity between past and present, reinforcing the 
notion of the party as a ‘community of principle’ (White and Ypi 2016: 14). 
In the case of AN, maintaining the use of similar concepts in its positions on 
Europe may also have fostered a sense of continuity with the past in times of change for 
the party. Defining Europe in broadly similar terms to those adopted by the MSI may, in 
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particular, may have provided a sense that even in times of change certain principles 
remained unaltered. Thus, its continued references to a ‘powerful’ Europe, and its 
attachment to a European civilisation and to an EU dedicated to defending the National 
Interest ensured conceptual continuity between the MSI and its successor party, even as 
other concepts such as Threat disappeared. 
In summary, the parties’ use of core concepts in their ideology to integrate a new 
issue such as Europe allows them to stress consistency and attachment to certain fixed 
principles because it restates the concepts’ value and shows how they apply over time and 
across issues. Appealing to them also makes policy change easier to justify, in so far as 
change can be still presented as part of a coherent story.  
While the fact that the parties draw on concepts in their ideology to integrate new 
issues may be viewed, as is the case in this thesis, as a reflection of the importance of 
ideas in informing action (see, among others, Bevir 2006: 284, Kitschelt 1994: 256, Hay 
2002: 213, Yanow and Schwartz Shea 2006: 109) or, in a less demanding fashion, as a 
manifestation of ‘bounded rationality’ where ideology works as a constraint on the 
positions that are available to parties (Kitschelt et al. 1999: 440, Marks and Wilson 2000), 
the argument of continuity carries some interest even for scholars who prefer to view 
parties as strategic actors. In particular, it may encourage a reflection on consistency as a 
political strategy which could help parties in elections because it projects the image of 
them as actors that stand by their word (whether they believe in what they say or not is 
beside the point here).  
A final point of reflection concerning the specific concept of the National Interest 
is required before closing this chapter. While this section has discussed why the National 
Interest, along with the other concepts, serves to create an image of consistency in the 
studied parties, its value in itself has not been discussed. Two brief points may be noted: 
first of all, as claimed earlier, it underlines the importance of the nation in far right 
thinking which, along with the other concepts, allows them to stress commitment to a 
core principle; second, it may be argued that, very much like Liberty, it allows the parties 
to draw on a discourse that, while consistent with what they believe, is also prevalent in 
other political actors.  
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CONCLUSION 
Following three chapters dedicated to the parties’ understanding of Europe, this chapter 
explored how the way in which they defined Europe informed their positions on the 
European Union. In particular, it showed how the concepts studied so far, along with the 
additional concept of National Interest, helped define the parties’ positions on the 
principle, practice and future of European integration. This, the chapter argued, was 
consistent with the idea that parties would draw on core concepts in their ideology not 
only to define Europe, but also to present their ‘programme for action’. The parties’ 
positions are summarised in the table below.  
 
TABLE 5: SUMMATIVE TABLE OF THE PROGRAMME FOR ACTION 
 
The concluding part of the chapter focused on why it matters that the parties drew 
on core concepts to integrate new issues in their ideology. In particular, it was suggested 
that this allowed them to present themselves as consistent actors committed to certain 
principles. It was also briefly suggested that the reliance on the concept of National 
Interest performed a similar role to the reliance on the notion of Liberty: that is, presenting 
parties as aligned with other actors in the political system. The next chapter concludes the 
thesis by bringing together the insights advanced so far on the far right’s ideology of 
Europe and discussing how they contribute to existing literature.  
Main theme  Subthemes Present in 
MSI AN FN 
The 
programme 
for action 
Principle of European 
Collaboration  
• Shared favourable 
view of European 
collaboration 
• Different aims 
identified 
Aims of European 
unity: protect 
from threats, 
restore European 
power 
Aims of 
European unity: 
collective action 
and pursuit of 
national interest 
Aims of European 
unity: defence from 
outside world, restore 
power (1980s), 
collective action and 
pursuit of national 
interest (1990 on) 
Practice of EU 
integration 
• Shared critical 
assessment of the EU 
• Reasons and level of 
opposition vary  
Moderately 
negative 
assessment of EU 
as excessively  
focused on 
economics  
Mixed 
assessment of 
the EU as 
unable to fulfil 
expectations 
Highly negative 
assessment of the EU 
as a threat 
 
 
Future of Europe 
• Agreement on a 
confederal form 
• Different types of 
integration sought 
‘Nation Europe’: 
integrated 
economically, 
politically and 
militarily 
‘Europe of the 
Homelands’: 
acting where 
nation-states 
cannot act alone 
‘Europe of the 
Homelands’: 
politically and 
militarily integrated 
(1980s), loose ad hoc 
collaborations (1990s 
onwards) 
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTION 
This thesis opened with a series of statements that illustrated the complexity of the far 
right’s thinking on Europe. Its main objective has been to delve deeper into this 
complexity, revealing how far right parties viewed Europe through ideological lenses. 
Employing a combination of morphological and discourse analysis, and focusing on the 
Movimento Sociale Italiano/Alleanza Nazionale in Italy and the Front National in France, 
the thesis addressed two research questions. First, how have far right parties viewed 
Europe through ideological lenses and how have they incorporated the concept of Europe 
into their system of beliefs? Second, how has their ideology informed their positions on 
the European Union? It advanced the expectation that far right parties would draw on 
existing concepts within their ideology to make sense of Europe and develop positions on 
the European Union.  
The key contention advanced in the thesis is that the MSI/AN and FN repurposed 
key concepts in their ideology in order to integrate ‘Europe’ into it, thereby creating a 
distinctively far right conception of Europe. Drawing on the analysis of party documents 
produced by the MSI/AN and FN between 1978 and 2017, the empirical sections of this 
work showed how the parties redeployed key concepts in their ideology to make Europe 
and the EU a part of their worldview. They demonstrated how the studied parties built a 
far right conception of Europe and developed their positions on European integration by 
drawing on the concepts of Identity, Liberty, Threat and National Interest. Identity served 
to define Europe as a clearly bound civilizational space that the parties professed an 
attachment to. Liberty was used to define Europe as a territory that needed to reclaim its 
autonomy and power, but also, in the case of the Front National, to oppose the constraints 
that the European Union placed on self-rule. The concept of Threat further characterised 
Europe as an endangered space. These concepts, in conjunction with the notion of 
National Interest, also came into play in defining how the MSI/AN and FN determined 
their positions on European integration. Through the use of a diachronic approach, the 
analysis also highlighted that the parties remained consistent in their use of these 
concepts, drawing on a similar set of ideas throughout the period of study.  
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Before illustrating how this thesis contributes to existing research, it is important 
to dispel one last doubt that may have arisen concerning how distinctively far right this 
conception of Europe is. A sceptical reader might suggest, for example, that there are too 
many similarities between the far right and the mainstream for this to be a ‘distinctively’ 
far right conception of Europe. They could cite the similarities between the studied 
parties’ views on Europe and those of more reputable characters such as Charles de 
Gaulle. They could also argue that the ‘politics of emergency’ are now part of the 
mainstream, evidenced by leaders’ responses to the migration crisis or to the Eurozone 
crisis. Finally, they might suggest that certain topics that usually occupy a central place 
in the definition of the far right barely make an appearance. For example, they might ask 
why Islam or immigration has not been given a more prominent place in the analysis.  
On the limited space given to certain topics, it should be remembered that the 
primary aim of this thesis was to understand what the parties mentioned in conjunction 
with Europe. In this sense, issues that occupy a more central place in their ideology may 
have been given less prominence because they were less relevant to the parties’ definition 
of Europe or discussions of the EU. This does not mean that they are irrelevant to them, 
but simply that in their discussions of Europe they have tended to focus on a different set 
of issues. On the question of distinctiveness, it is pertinent to reiterate the point raised in 
Chapter five that, while the concepts themselves may not be ‘distinctively’ far right, the 
way in which they are defined and their overall combination is. In this, sense, the parties’ 
conception of Europe is not distinctively far right because it revolves around the concept 
of Identity or Liberty, but because it revolves around both of those, plus the concept of 
National Interest and that of Threat. To this point, one might also want to add that there 
is a question of systematicity to be considered. In particular, what makes these concepts 
more distinctive of the far right than of other party families is the systematic and 
continuous way in which they are employed: while others may occasionally appeal to 
emergency politics, they will rarely do it over an extended period of time and apply that 
frame to every issue they discuss. In this sense, while there is overlap between what the 
studied parties have had to say and the mainstream, this should not lead to a rejection of 
the idea that this conception of Europe as a whole is distinctive of the far right.  
 The thesis’s key findings offer some helpful additions to existing works on the 
far right in Europe. In particular, they provide an account on how ideology mattered in 
the far right’s definition of Europe and nuance (mainly vernacular) views of far right 
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parties as somewhat inconsistent populists, at least as far as their positions on Europe 
are concerned.  
 The argument that the MSI/AN and FN drew on existing elements in their 
ideology to define Europe and their positions on the EU contributes to existing literature 
on far right Euroscepticism and expands its scope by examining the parties’ respective 
conceptions of Europe more broadly rather than focusing only on their perspectives on 
the EU and its policies. In particular, by showing how the MSI/AN and FN redeployed 
core concepts of far right ideology to define both Europe and their positions on European 
integration, the thesis lends credence to the claim that ideology shapes party positions on 
Europe (e.g. Gómez-Reino 2018, Hooghe et al. 2002, Halikiopoulou et al. 2012). What 
this thesis adds is an account of how ideology mattered. Unlike previous works, which 
often provided limited cues concerning the path from a certain set of beliefs to a certain 
position on Europe, this thesis adopted a conceptual approach, advancing a series of 
expectations concerning how a new issue such as Europe could become part of far right 
ideology. It then developed this account with empirical evidence by illustrating which 
elements of far right ideology came into play in the MSI/AN and FN’s definition of 
Europe and their respective positioning on European integration.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the thesis highlighted that the MSI/AN and FN’s 
nationalism was the key element in explaining their understanding of Europe and their 
positions on European integration; however, it also showed that its relationship with 
opposition to European integration was less linear than often assumed. Nationalism, 
which was here understood to be both about constructing identities and about expressing 
them in the political realm, clearly had a central place in providing the conceptual 
background against which the parties defined Europe and their positions on European 
integration. The fact that it came into play both in positive and negative evaluations of 
Europe nevertheless suggests the need to be wary of equating far right nationalism with 
opposition to Europe writ large. Opposition to European integration was not a necessary 
consequence of the MSI/AN and FN’s ideology, but merely a plausible one which in the 
case of the FN materialised as the result of the interactions between ideological 
predispositions and contextual factors, such as the historical context during the period in 
which the party was developing its stance on Europe and the evolutions in the European 
Union itself. Thus, while ideology mattered, it bears repeating that ideologies do not 
operate in a vacuum, but are partially shaped by their surroundings. 
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This observation of ideological flexibility makes another point in the MSI/AN and 
FN’s ideology perhaps even more striking: namely, their strong consistency at the level 
of concepts. While the parties showed some flexibility in terms of their understanding of 
and positioning on Europe, a remarkable observation provided by the combination of a 
longue durée approach and morphological analysis is that they did this within clearly 
delimited conceptual boundaries. Their understanding of Europe drew consistently on 
similar ideas, and even when they shifted positions on European integration, they relied 
on the same concepts to discuss their positions. Thus, while the concepts’ relationship 
with Europe changed, they remained consistent at the level of principles, suggesting that 
ideological flexibility is not absolute, but instead confined within a certain set of 
boundaries. While it is not impossible for parties to abandon such boundaries, doing so 
might come at a high cost in terms of credibility.  
In the context of parties often considered to be ‘populists’—with populism taken 
to mean, especially in casual usage, that these actors will stand for anything that gets them 
into office (Bale et al. 2011, Stanley 2008: 101, Urbinati 2019: 112)—the observation of 
ideological consistency implies the need to adjust such perceptions. At the very least, the 
finding suggests that one should accept that even if ‘populists’ might be able to stand for 
anything, they could still find it helpful to present their most audacious positions as 
consistent with what they claim to believe in the first place. This observation may also be 
relevant to scholars sceptical of the idea that parties are motivated by ideology because it 
suggests that even entirely strategic actors may find it advantageous to present their 
positions in the context of a certain tradition, so as to convey an image of themselves as 
principled actors. 
Another implication of the centrality of nationalism to the MSI/AN and FN’s 
definition of Europe is that other elements that are sometimes cited as explaining far right 
views of European integration were likely less important to them. This is the case of 
populism in particular, a frequently cited core ideological trait of parties such as the FN 
(albeit not of the MSI/AN), and usually considered as explaining part of their opposition 
to European integration (Pirro and Van Kessel 2017: 407). The findings of this thesis, 
however, suggest that populism is a secondary driver of far right Euroscepticism in 
comparison to nationalism. First, core aspects of populism such as the vertical distinction 
between ‘the people’ and the ‘elite’ (de Cleen 2017: 346) did not serve to define Europe; 
rather, it was the nationalist concept of Identity as a horizontal separation between the 
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‘in-group’ and the ‘out-group’ (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2019) that the parties 
employed to do this. Second, once it is acknowledged that nationalism is not only about 
constructing national identities but also about expressing them in the political realm (and 
hence, fundamentally about Liberty), populism becomes a largely redundant concept. 
This is because some of the discursive elements that are often labelled ‘populist’ in the 
case of the far right could be credibly viewed as an expression of this political aspect of 
nationalism. In the case of the FN in particular, ‘the people’ who needed to be defended 
against and evil (and inherently cosmopolitan) elite were always the national ‘in-group’, 
and it was the national people’s sovereignty and their General Will that needed to be 
expressed. Thus, the concept of populism has little analytical purchase in explaining their 
positions on European integration (for a similar point, but applied to far right ideology 
more generally, see also Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2019, Eatwell 2000: 412-413). The 
far right’s concept of popular sovereignty is always synonymous with national 
sovereignty, making nationalism, not populism, the core of their understanding and 
positioning on Europe. 
Taken together, these findings challenge the typical equation ‘far right = 
Eurosceptic’. First, ‘Eurosceptic’ as a term only applies to the extent that ‘euro’ stands 
for ‘EU’. In consonance with Vasilopoulou’s argument (2018a: 20-24) that far right 
parties are broadly in favour of a cultural definition of Europe even if many of them 
oppose the EU, the thesis has shown that the MSI/AN and FN displayed a certain 
attachment to Europe; however, especially in the case of the FN, they deeply disliked the 
EU as a political embodiment of it. Second, the observation of the parties’ changes over 
time suggest that far right parties are not natural-born Eurosceptics because of their 
nationalism. As Flood (2002: 7-11; see also Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b: 257) 
pertinently noted, ideology is flexible and Europe is complex, and there is no party family 
that is naturally bound to oppose European integration. Far right parties are no exception. 
As this thesis has shown, the MSI did not reject the process of European integration while 
the FN only came to oppose it in the latter years of its history. While there were certainly 
good reasons to expect that the parties’ ideology could lead them to oppose European 
integration, this was not inevitable, but instead the result of a combination of factors 
shifting their positions in that direction.  This observation serves as a reminder of why it 
is important to ‘take ideology seriously’ in studies of Euroscepticism (Flood and Soborski 
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2018: 38). The links between positions on the EU and ideology are complex and need to 
be studied in depth to be fully understood. 
The observation that the conflation of far right with Eurosceptic is misguided is 
not only a point of scholarly interest, but is also relevant to making sense of some recent 
political phenomena that have been viewed by many with bewilderment, such as the 
growth of transnational alliances between far right parties. While the presence of 
transnational links between far right parties is nothing new (e.g. Albanese and Del Hierro 
2016, Mammone 2015, Zúquete 2015), these were widely publicised in the news media 
prior to the 2019 European Parliament elections and have often been regarded as 
somewhat paradoxical attempts to construct a nationalist international (e.g., Charlemagne 
2019). Noting that far right parties can oppose the EU but still claim an attachment to 
Europe helps explain why, in spite of their nationalism, they have been able to collaborate 
across borders. Not unlike the FN and MSI in the 1980s (but now replacing the USSR 
with the new threat of ‘Brussels’), these parties have been able to justify their 
transnational activities as part of a project to defend Europe from the EU. They have also 
been able to collaborate because they found cooperation beneficial: namely, it served to 
portray them as a unified and growing movement, carrying ever greater political weight 
and forming the main axis of opposition to the cosmopolitan elites.  
Crucially, however, one should not assume that a far-right takeover or destruction 
of the EU institutions is in the making or ever likely to happen. As the thesis has noted, 
while far right parties do benefit from some ideological flexibility, the nation and the 
national interest remain their guiding principles. Although they may be invoked in the 
service of a higher European interest, this strategy will only be effective so long as there 
is some convergence between the European and the national interest, and where no 
fundamental trade-offs are required between the two. Thus, while the far right may be 
able to argue that they are both nationalists and Europeans in the current political context, 
in case of conflict, it is unlikely that their commitment to Europe will ever trump the 
nation. In the improbable event that far right parties did engineer a takeover of the 
institutions, it is also doubtful that they would actively seek to dismantle them. Europe, 
after all, has its uses, and it is likely that they will be willing to take advantage of some 
of them. More likely, the far right would try to transform the EU into something more 
compatible with their own worldview; however, what this ‘Europe of the Nations’ would 
look like, or how it would function, remains mostly unclear.  
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What is more problematic for the EU in the short term is that much of the far 
right’s criticism contests core assumptions about the EU institutions, and runs counter 
some of the solutions brought forward to tackle its own legitimacy deficit. For example, 
the centrality of the concept of Identity to the parties’ definition of Europe raises questions 
about the feasibility of promoting a ‘European identity’ as a solution to the EU’s 
legitimacy issues. In fact, while both the MSI and the FN defined themselves as belonging 
to Europe, for the FN this did not seem to involve supporting the EU, but rather, became 
a reason to oppose it in the name of a different, truer Europe. In this sense, European 
identity may not be a solution to the EU’s woes, but rather, an additional challenge. This 
points towards another factor worth noting: namely, the contestedness of the concept of 
Europe. What this thesis has shown, especially through its analysis of the Front National, 
is that for all of the EU’s attempts to monopolise the meaning of Europe (Glencross 2019: 
2), Europe and the EU remain separate concepts, making it possible for parties to pit one 
against the other. This creates a counter-narrative of Europe which questions the very 
premise that the EU is the embodiment of Europe. Reopening that equation to contestation 
removes one of its legitimising narratives, suggesting that the way ahead for the EU will 
remain paved with opposition. Thus, even if far right parties may not be able to coalesce 
to dismantle the EU or orchestrate a takeover of its institutions from the inside, they can 
still lead public opinion against it and hinder further institution-building.  
While this thesis’ main contribution is to the literature focusing on the far right’s 
understanding of Europe and their position on the EU, some of its observations can also 
contribute to the literature on the Europeanisation of the far right, far right ideology, and 
the relationship between the far right and the political mainstream. 
On the first point, in addition to examining how Europe became a part of the 
MSI/AN and FN’s ideology, the empirical chapters also showed how the integration of 
Europe modified the parties’ ideology. They demonstrated how defining Europe or 
‘European’ as a form of Identity opened up their ideology, and how employing the 
concept of Liberty shifted attention away from the more contentious aspects of their 
ideology to the less controversial ones. They also illustrated how presenting Europe as an 
endangered realm helped the parties portray themselves as ‘prophetic’ actors, and how 
the fact that they relied on existing concepts in their ideology to define their positions on 
the EU conveyed an image of them as committed actors. Thus, they showed how taking 
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part in the process of European integration shaped and altered the parties’ ideology as a 
whole, and how it allowed them to convey certain messages about themselves. 
An element which this thesis has not considered, but which may be relevant for 
future research, is how the integration of Europe into the parties’ ideology may have 
benefitted them. In fact, while literature on the ‘Europeanisation’ of the far right has done 
the important job of understanding how participation in European institutions has given 
far right parties practical and symbolic resources for their legitimation, it has not extended 
this line of reasoning to what the parties have said about Europe. This point has not been 
addressed by the existing literature which, in focusing on the legitimising effects of party 
practices in Europe, has neglected the potential effects of party beliefs about Europe (for 
an exception, see Adamson and Johns 2008). As a result, we do not know if the parties’ 
position on Europe, and how they have presented them, has also been an advantage for 
them, or if it has been a hindrance.  
While this question cannot be answered here, it is possible to tentatively suggest 
that Europe may have functioned as an ideological resource, allowing the parties to 
project a more respectable image. There are several ways it may have done so. The 
MSI/AN and FN’s appeal to a European civilisation may have moderated their image of 
being dangerous ‘closed’ nationalists, by suggesting that they are open to other 
(European) peoples and cultures. In a similar fashion, the FN’s appeal to Europe in 
opposition to the EU may have helped them claim legitimacy by suggesting that they 
represent a ‘true Europe’ as opposed to a distorted version of it. Their increased focus on 
concepts and ideas shared by the mainstream, such as Liberty and National Interest, may 
have helped the parties present themselves as actors holding ‘normal’ positions, rather 
than as actors belonging outside the mainstream of politics. Alternately, relying on the 
‘politics of emergency’ (e.g., White 2015, 2019) and presenting Europe as endangered 
may have helped the MSI/AN and FN construct legitimacy by promoting the idea that, in 
desperate situations, positions normally judged as extreme can become a serious 
possibility. Finally, the MSI/AN and FN’s tendency to draw on old concepts in their 
ideology to define their positions on the EU, thereby renewing their commitment to long-
held principles, may have helped them present themselves as credible and trustworthy 
actors who would keep their word if entrusted with power. In sum, integrating Europe 
into their ideology may have provided them with the resources to draw attention to the 
less divisive aspects of their ideology, thus contributing to their legitimation as political 
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actors. Future research may explore these mechanisms further and understand to what 
extent Europe has been an ideological resource for the far right. 
Suggesting that Europe may have acted as an ideological resource for the 
legitimation of the MSI/AN and FN does raise a further question concerning whether 
parties intentionally used it as such, or whether this was an unintended side effect of its 
integration. More broadly, it asks us to consider whether the parties used Europe to 
deliberately reorient their ideology (for example, to stress their ‘openness’ or similarity 
with other actors), or if integrating Europe happened to change it in unexpected ways. 
The answer to this question is likely to be a bit of both. Ideologies may experience both 
deliberate and unintended changes, and have both deliberate and unintended 
consequences, meaning that the parties may have sought out some of them and stumbled 
upon others. At least for the Front National, however, there are good reasons to think that 
their position on Europe was meant to serve the broader goal of legitimation. In fact, the 
FN’s political strategy has been heavily influenced by intellectuals of the Nouvelle Droite 
who insisted on the importance of using language to shape perceptions of what is 
acceptable (Camus 2015: 108-110). In this sense, they are more likely to have deliberately 
presented their positions in a way that fostered legitimacy and the creation of a more 
positive political image. Overall, however, both the intended and unintended 
consequences of ideology are worthy of study because they both shape how parties are 
viewed.  
 Concerning far right ideology more generally, by showing which of their core 
concepts the MSI/AN and FN redeployed in their definition of Europe, the thesis has 
given an idea, however partial, of what elements recur in the parties’ ideology. In this 
case, what appeared absolutely central to the parties’ identity was their nationalism, much 
more than their authoritarianism, or in the case of the FN, their populism. This further 
confirms the pivotal role of the nation in far right ideology, suggesting that it is indeed 
the central concept around which the rest of the ideology revolves.  
Chapter six also highlighted an important difference between the far right MSI 
and FN and the ‘post-fascist’ Alleanza Nazionale: namely, the absence of a sense of 
urgency in the ideology of the latter. While this would certainly require further research, 
it can be tentatively suggested that one important difference between the far right and the 
mainstream right consists precisely in their recourse to a politics of emergency, or, at 
least, in its centrality in their ideology. In particular, while both the mainstream right and 
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the far right may refer to notions of urgency and emergency, the latter will tend to do it 
systematically and continuously, while the former may delimit its usage to certain periods 
of time.  
One final point that the thesis highlighted in terms of far right ideology is the 
similarity between some of the things that far right parties wrote in their documents and 
existing mainstream political ideas at the time. Reflecting on the implications of this 
observation, two things may be said. The first one, consistent with Mudde (2010), is that 
this observation encourages scholars to think about far right parties as ‘pathological 
normalcies’ rather than normal pathologies, and not only in terms of the positions that 
they express on issues such as immigration. This is perhaps an unpleasant observation, 
but one that critics of the far right will need to be aware of if they are to construct effective 
counterstrategies. It is not enough to call out parties as extreme, or radical; one also needs 
to understand why certain ideas resonate. This may have little or nothing to do with the 
parties themselves and require engagement with what else about society at large makes it 
possible for them to be successful. 
The second observation about the similarities between far right discourse and 
many mainstream political ideas is that it problematises the definition of ‘mainstreaming’ 
as a process whereby far right parties converge towards the centre and adopt positions 
closer to those of mainstream political parties (Akkerman et al. 2016: 7). On the one hand, 
one may wish to question the extent to which far right parties are in need of 
‘mainstreaming’, or if, indeed, their ideas are already largely present in the mainstream. 
On the other, it may be argued that their focus on shared ideas noted in Chapter four and 
Chapter seven suggests that they are indeed attempting to ‘mainstream’, but with the term 
taken to mean something beyond ‘looking like other political parties’. What might be 
suggested is that there are other ways for parties to ‘mainstream’ that do not entail 
adopting positions similar to those of less radical parties but simply entail stressing ideas 
they hold that are broadly acceptable, natural or at least understandable in democratic 
societies. This is what the parties do when they focus on the ideas of Liberty or National 
Interest: they are not necessarily converging towards the centre in their policies, but 
rather, using ideological elements that are broadly acceptable to justify their extreme 
policies. In this sense, mainstreaming may not only refer to a process of converging 
towards the message of mainstream parties, but also, to the exploitation of shared ideas 
and values to justify extreme positions.  
198 
 
AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Where can future research go from here? Three paths appear most interesting: the 
first entails consolidating the findings of this thesis; the second calls for an expansion of 
its scope to other political parties; the final one shifts the focus to the meanings taken by 
‘essentially contested concepts’ in use.  
 A first avenue for future research addresses one of the limitations of this study: 
namely, its small number of cases. While the choice to focus on a small number of case 
studies was justified by the objective of privileging depth over breadth, it does mean that 
they cannot be used to make a case about far right parties in general. One way in which 
this could be addressed in future research is by carrying out a similar study on different 
parties belonging to the far right party family and understanding whether they present 
similar results. There are good reasons to think that this would be the case. As mentioned 
in the analysis, the concepts used by the MSI/AN and FN did appear to fall in line with 
existing literature on what could be expected from far right ideology and with what far 
right parties have been saying in other countries (e.g. Adamson and Johns 2008, Brubaker 
2017, Fieschi et al. 1996), suggesting they may have broader applicability. However, 
whether all European far right parties draw on pre-existing concepts to integrate Europe 
in their ideology would warrant further investigation. This could be done both 
qualitatively, following the procedure adopted in this thesis, or quantitatively, employing 
text analysis software to facilitate the procedure. A helpful addition to this work is also 
the previously mentioned research of how integrating Europe into far right ideology in a 
certain way may have benefitted parties, and whether it was effective. 
 A second way forward for future research is to analyse the ideology of Europe of 
a broader group of parties. While some work has focused on the role of parties in the EU 
(Hix and Lord 1997, Lindberg et al 2010), how left/right poisoning influences positions 
on EU integration (Aspinwall 2002, Hooghe et al. 2002), how Socialist parties positioned 
themselves vis-a-vis European integration (Featherstone 1988) or how Christian 
Democratic parties have sought to shape the European construction (Kaiser 2007), we 
still know little about how specific ideological traditions approach Europe. To this day, 
and to the best of the author’s knowledge, Gaffney’s 1996 edited volume is the only one 
which attempts to bring together accounts of party positions on Europe, although it suffers 
from a focus on national parties and a limited selection of comparative approaches. The 
question, however, is not devoid of interest. The European Union, in fact, is a construction 
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that can be very difficult to handle for parties because there is no straightforward 
‘ideological’ way to define their positions on it (Flood 2002: 7-11, Gaffney 1996: 19). 
This point is evident in the analysis conducted through this thesis, and applies even to 
parties that might have been expected to ‘naturally’ oppose European integration.  
Building on the methodological approach used in this project, future research 
could study key texts on Europe produced by intellectuals, politicians, and groups 
belonging to the main European party families (Conservatives, Christian Democrats, 
Liberals, Social Democrats, Greens, Radical Right parties and Radical Left parties), 
individuating the core concepts they relied upon to define it and analysing their evolving 
positions on the issue of European integration. This would entail understanding the 
tensions that European integration generated for parties, but also, how the European 
Union itself has been thought of as an ‘ideologically charged’ construction, for example 
by those who have viewed it as an inherently open ‘neo-liberal’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ 
institution, or by those who viewed it as a closed and delimited ‘Fortress Europe’. It would 
also entail understanding the effects of the integration of Europe into party ideology and 
its potential as an ideological resource: what changes did it entail, and how did it help (or 
hinder) parties’ ideological and electoral development? Considering the role that political 
parties play in the EU, and most importantly, the ideological divisions that have arisen 
within them concerning European integration, this appears to be rather promising area for 
future research. 
 The final promising avenue for future research springs less from this thesis’s 
limitations than from the phenomenon at its core: the meaning of concepts in use. This 
project has been dedicated to understanding the meaning of the single concept of Europe 
in far right ideology. In doing so, it has introduced other concepts such as Identity, 
Liberty, Threat and National Interest, and focused on their meaning to far right parties. 
What the analysis has shown is that the MSI/AN and the FN interpreted these themes in 
distinctive ways, playing with the ‘essentially contested’ (Gallie 1955) nature of some of 
them. They have appropriated these concepts and made them their own, adopting 
definitions that ‘made sense’ in their worldview. Therefore, it is worth exploring more in 
depth what these parties, and other political actors, mean when they use certain concepts, 
why certain understandings dominate in their ideologies, and the practical implications 
of adopting a particular understanding. Rather than opening a new field of research, this 
project returns to the familiar themes of conceptual history (for a recent overview, see 
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Wimmer 2015), but with a sharper focus on the ideological roots of the interpretation of 
certain concepts by different actors.  
This is not a merely intellectual exercise, but one that has practical relevance too 
because the way in which concepts are interpreted can have real-life consequences. One 
might consider, for instance, the example of sovereignty in the context of the European 
Union. At the heart of the EU project is the idea that sovereignty is pooled between 
countries. Each country gives up a measure of its own legal sovereignty in order to gain 
more ‘real’ sovereignty by leveraging collective power. This entails adopting a certain 
understanding of sovereignty that allows for it to be divisible, and equates it with ideas 
of effective power. Far right parties contest this definition of sovereignty and create a 
counter-narrative about it. In their vision, sovereignty is undivided, absolute and the sole 
source of legitimate power. This makes the EU an aberration because it limits sovereignty 
defined in this manner. By doing so, the far right opens the meaning of sovereignty to 
contestation and can successfully leverage opposition to the EU on such grounds. Neither 
is the far right the only political group who does this, as the UK’s 2016 referendum on 
EU membership demonstrated. The Leave campaign effectively proposed a view of 
sovereignty as a matter of ‘taking back control’ rather than one of political power in a 
globalised world, and it employed this narrative as a key element of its successful 
campaign to leave the EU. Future research, then, might look at how these ‘essentially 
contested concepts’ are employed in the public space: what do they mean to whom, what 
are the implications of certain understandings, what opportunities do they open and close 
off, and how do they do it? The pool of available concepts is vast, and has the potential 
to bridge work in the fields of politics, history, and political theory, making this a fruitful 
area for cross-pollination.  
Given the growing relevance of far right parties, the return of ideological conflict 
after many years of apparent political convergence towards the centre, and the uncertainty 
surrounding the future direction of the EU, these issues warrant serious investigation. 
While this thesis has only scratched the surface of some of these areas of research, it has 
hopefully provided new conceptual tools to explore them in greater depth and expand 
research in the fields of far right politics, political ideologies and European studies.  
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX A: CORPUS BUILDING  
DATA COLLECTION 
The main sources of this thesis consist of archival documents and various types of party 
literature. While archival resources represent the main source for the thesis, the researcher 
also carried out a small number of interviews (n=6) with current and former members of 
the two parties to gain a better knowledge of their inner workings. These included two 
former party leaders (FN and MSI/AN), a current MEP (FN) and three former regional 
councillors (FN). While their contributions are not cited, they provided valuable insights 
and relevant documentation on the parties of which they were (and in two cases still are) 
members. 
 
CREATING THE CORPUS 
The first step in the creation of the empirical corpus of this thesis consisted in identifying 
relevant sources. Data was collected through a mix of online and library research carried 
out in London, and archival research in Paris, Florence and Rome. The aim of data 
collection was to build a corpus of documents in which the selected parties discussed 
‘Europe’. To do so, the researcher first identified a number of general party sources, and 
then explored them thoroughly to build a corpus of documents which either centred 
exclusively on or discussed in some depth European issues. To avoid a common issue of 
‘eurocentrism’ in European studies, more general documents such as party programmes 
and congress motions were also included as to understand the overall place and relevance 
of Europe. Digital copies were made of relevant documents, so that they could be read 
and analysed in depth at a later stage. 
Building a corpus for the Front National was a relatively straightforward process. 
The Front National is a party that has been reasonably successful and which has published 
a large number of documents in its 47 years of continued existence. In addition, it has had 
its own publishing company (Éditions Nationales) which published a number of political 
books in its years of activity. Most Front National programs were available directly online 
and accessible via a simple Google search, and those which were not immediately 
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available could be retrieved from the Comparative Manifesto Project (MARPOR) and the 
Euromanifesto project database. In addition, the library of the London School of 
Economics had a number of primary sources available in book format. In this way, all 
programs published between 1984 and 2017 were found, with the exception of the 
programme from 1993 which was retrieved at a later stage from Sciences Po Paris.  
To complement this mainly electorally-oriented corpus, the researcher identified 
the need to draw upon additional party literature which would allow to capture the non-
electoral and internally directed dynamics of ideology and provide a more comprehensive 
view of ‘Europe’ in the FN’s discourse. The opportunity to achieve this was offered by a 
two and a half month research stay in Sciences Po Paris, in which extensive use was made 
of the university’s resources and of the documents available at the Bibliothèque Nationale 
de France. Thus, the initial corpus was enriched with articles and editorials from Le 
National, an early party magazine, La Lettre de Jean-Marie Le Pen, the official bi-weekly 
magazine of the party between 1985 and 2008 (from 1995 and until it ceased publication 
in 2008 also known as Français d’Abord), Nations Presse Magazine, a monthly 
publication aimed at supporting Marine Le Pen’s campaign for the FN’s presidency and 
her subsequent work as president of the party between 2010 and 2015, and a number of 
speeches retrieved from the BNF’s ‘Archives de l’Internet’, which gave access to cached 
versions of the Front National’s website. Finally, to cover the period in which no other 
grey literature was available (2015-2018), the researcher drew on further internet based 
research, identifying relevant press releases, electoral material and speeches from the 
Front National’s website (https://rassemblementnational.fr/).  
Building a corpus for the MSI/AN required more digging, but was greatly helped 
by the fact that many of the archives of the MSI have been recently digitalized, and that 
for most of its existence, the party had an associated daily newspaper, ‘Il Secolo d’Italia’, 
which made it possible to retrieve a large number of documents.  
The starting point for corpus building were the archives of the Fondazione Ugo 
Spirito - Renzo De Felice.  The Fondazione Ugo Spirito - Renzo de Felice (from here on, 
FUS) was founded in Rome in 1981 following a donation by his wife of documents 
belonging to the late Ugo Spirito. The foundation has a large archival fund bringing 
together various MSI documents, ranging from foundational documents, internal 
communications, congress motions, press reviews etc. The first stage of this thesis’s 
research was thus dedicated to sifting through the fund, identifying relevant documents - 
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in particular, electoral material, speeches, reports and party congress motions. This could 
be easily done online, as the archives of the Fondazione have been digitalized and made 
available on the website of the Italian Senate (www.archivionline.senato.it). In addition, 
the researcher spent two days in the offices of the FUS in Rome, exploring funds which 
had yet to be made available online. From this initial phase, the researcher collected a 
number of party congress documents, as well as some relevant newspaper articles and 
reports.  
Following this initial phase, the researcher’s attention turned to the Secolo 
d’Italia, the party’s official newspaper. The Secolo d’Italia provided additional resources, 
in particular editorials and articles discussing the MSI and AN’s vision of Europe, party 
programmes from both parties, and congress documents relating to AN. In fact, with the 
exception of the ‘Fiuggi Theses’, no other documents could be found online for AN. 
Microfilm copies of the Secolo d’Italia published between 1979 and 2009 were consulted 
in the library of the Università Cesare Alfieri in Florence and relevant articles were saved 
in a digital form. While other forms of grey literature were considered (such as party 
magazines), there was no magazine comparable in terms of its relevance and continuity 
to La Lettre or even to National Hebdo, so the attention was mainly focused on the Secolo 
d’Italia. I also contacted the Fondazione Alleanza Nazionale to request any relevant 
documentation they may have on AN’s positions on Europe and requested the 
Euromanifestoes of AN from the Euromanifesto study. Finally, a trip to the Biblioteca di 
Storia Contemporanea in Rome and further research in the LSE Library resulted in the 
acquisition of three further programmatic books (two interviews with party leaders on 
Europe and the project of the Eurodestra, and an ‘A to Z’ of the principles of the MSI).  
Overall, around 400 documents of various nature were collected, ranging between 
1 and 187 pages (complete list made available to examiners in electronic format). While 
there are some gaps in years (notably, there were no documents available for the FN in 
1996 or between 1982 and 1984), the entirety of the period between 1978 and 2009 for 
MSI-AN, and 1978-2017 for the FN was covered. Note that this number of documents 
does not correspond to the entirety of articles published on Europe during the period but 
only a selection of the ones which upon a first read appeared more conducive to in-depth 
analysis. In particular, when making a decision on whether to make a copy or not, the 
author tried to privilege documents of an analytical nature or which expressed partisan 
positions, rather than merely descriptive ones discussing, for example, a new EU policy 
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or the outcome of an EU summit. While the corpus is not exhaustive, the large number of 
documents provides a reasonable expectation that they could be considered representative 
of the parties’ overall positions and discourse. 
This initial corpus was read in depth and analysed, with the purpose of identifying 
common themes and threads across documents and across parties. A number of key 
documents were then selected for further in-depth analysis and brought together into a 
smaller sample of documents (26 MSI, 21 AN and 65 FN – full list available below and 
originals made available to examiners in electronic format). The choice to analyse only 
one fourth of the documents was driven by both practical and theoretical considerations. 
Theoretically speaking, the preliminary reading of the documents, as well as previous 
research on these parties (e.g. Dézé 2008) highlighted the fact that they tended to display 
high levels of ideological intensity, and often repeated the same points and ideas in 
different spaces. Thus, it was expected that analysing the whole corpus would not have 
produced significantly different results and that saturation would likely be reached even 
with a smaller sample. This was subsequently confirmed with the analysis, where the 
coding procedure stopped generating new codes before all documents had been analysed. 
Practically, given that the thesis relied on a form of qualitative analysis, analysing the 
entire corpus in full as a single researcher would have required conspicuous time 
investment for little added value.  
In order to facilitate storage, the researcher opted to code the purposive sample 
with NVivo. While NVivo has several functions that can be used to analyse a document, 
for example running word searches or seeking to identify patters, in the case of this 
research it was mostly used as a filing system in which passages were highlighted and 
sorted into different ‘codes’. Documents which were not already in a searchable PDF 
format had to be either transformed into searchable PDF files through OCR software, or 
transcribed when OCR processes failed. This was the case for all MSI/AN documents and 
for a large portion of FN documents. Short documents (two pages or less) were 
transcribed in full. In the case of longer documents, these were transcribed in full only 
when the entire document was relevant. In the case of documents where only a part had 
been dedicated to Europe (for example, in programmes where Europe only figured in the 
foreign policy section), only relevant sections were transcribed for analysis although the 
documents were all read in full.  
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APPENDIX B: DOCUMENTS SELECTED FOR IN-DEPTH 
ANALYSIS  
LIST OF ANALYSED DOCUMENTS – FRONT NATIONAL (65) 
Year Document Name Author Type 
1978 Programme 7e arrondissement FN Programme 
1979 
Plateforme de l'Union française pour 
l'Europe FN Programme 
1981 Programme élections législatives FN Programme 
1984 Les Français d'abord Le Pen J.-M.  
Programmatic 
book 
1985 
Pour la France: Le Pen Jean-Marie 
présente le programme du FN FN 
Programmatic 
book 
1985 
Immigration action ferme et résolue des 
élus FN au PE FN Article 
1986 L’Europe, d’abord une volonté Le Pen J.-M. Article 
1986 L'avenir de notre Europe Le Pen J.-M. Editorial 
1987 Construire l'Europe de la Puissance Mégret Bruno Unclear 
1987 Jeunesse Nation Europe Lang Carl  Article 
1988 
Un nouveau pas vers l'Europe du tiers 
monde Le Chevallier Jean Marie Article 
1988 
Etre ou Disparaitre: Discours Le Pen 
Europe Le Pen J.-M. Speech 
1989 Passeport pour la victoire Front National Pamphlet 
1989 
L'illusion du primat de l'économie ou 
l'Europe à l'envers Pichon Olivier Article 
1989 Pour Une Europe des Peuples Le Pen J.-M. Editorial 
1989 Euromanifesto FN Programme 
1989 Les principes fondateurs de notre Europe Mégret Bruno Article 
1989 En avant pour les Européennes Mégret Bruno Article 
1990 Schengen ils l'ont fait Salagnac Catherine Article 
1991 Militer au Front FN Party guide 
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1991 Les échecs de l'Europe des douze Le Pen J.-M. Editorial 
1992 L'engrenage de Maastricht Salagnac Catherine Article 
1992 Notre Europe les patries contre Maastricht Mégret Bruno Article 
1992 Le serment de Reims Le Pen J.-M. Editorial 
1993 Sortons de cette Europe là Le Pen J.-M. Editorial 
1993 300 mesures pour la France FN Programme 
1994 Ma vérité sur l'Europe Le Pen J.-M. Interview 
1994 Euromanifesto FN Programme 
1995 Discours 1er Mai FN Speech 
1995 
Le contrat pour la France avec les 
Français FN 
Programmatic 
book 
1997 17ème Fête des Bleu-Blanc-Rouge Le Pen J.-M. Speech 
1997 Programme FN Programme 
1998 Fête de Jeanne d’Arc du 1er Mai 1998 Le Pen J.-M. Speech 
1999 
Poursuivre notre mission pour changer 
d'Europe Le Pen J.-M. Editorial 
1999 
Le Front National pour restaurer notre 
identité́ nationale face à l'Europe fédérale NA Dossier 
2000 
La Turquie et l'Union Européenne un 
mariage impossible NA Article 
2000 Indépendance Lang Carl  Article 
2001 Entretien avec Le Pen Jean-Marie  NA Interview 
2002 L'Europe des collabos Lang Carl  Article 
2002 
Pour un avenir français : le programme de 
gouvernement du Front National FN/de Bouillon Godefroy Programme 
2003 
Au Parlement européen le Front National: 
le parti qui défend les français d'abord Lang Carl  Article 
2003 
Discours Le Pen Jean-Marie  Conseil 
National du Front National Le Pen J.-M. Speech 
2004 
Aucun bien n'est plus précieux que 
l'indépendance Le Pen J.-M. Interview 
2004 
Quelle Europe/Pour défendre la France en 
Europe 
Gollnisch Bruno, Lang 
Carl Article 
2004 Euromanifesto FN Programme 
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2005 
Le discours du NON au référendum sur la 
Constitution européenne. Le Pen J.-M. Speech 
2006 Des plombiers polonais Gollnisch Bruno Article 
2007 
Discours à Toulouse sur le thème de 
l'Europe Le Pen J.-M. Speech 
2007 
Programme de Gouvernement de Jean-
Marie Le Pen FN Programme 
2008 
Gollnisch A propos de l'Union Soviétique 
européenne Gollnisch Bruno Speech 
2009 
Discours de Louis ALIOT lors de la 
Convention d'Arras Aliot Louis Speech 
2009 Euromanifesto FN Programme 
2010  L’esprit du 29 mai Le Pen Marine Speech 
2011 
Conseil National du FN - Le discours de 
clôture de Marine Le Pen Le Pen Marine Speech 
2011 L'autre Europe Aliot Louis Editorial 
2012 
Notre projet: Programme Politique du 
Front national FN Programme 
2012 
Union européenne: vers le stade ultime de 
l’Union Soviétique Européenne ? FN Press release 
2013 
Appel de Marine Le Pen aux peuples 
d’Europe Le Pen Marine Press release 
2014 Non à Bruxelles oui à l'Europe des nations Langlois Marc Article 
2015 
M. Schulz s’en prend à la Pologne / l’UE 
de plus en plus dictatoriale Bay Nicolas Press release 
2016 
Sortir de l’Union européenne, une 
nécessité politique Club Idées Nation Blog post 
2016 
Referendum aux Pays-Bas - lorsque les 
peuples parlent, l'Union européenne 
chancelle Bay Nicolas Press release 
2016 Discours Fréjus Le Pen Marine Speech 
2017 144 Engagements Présidentiels FN Programme 
2017 Discours Le Pen Marine Journée des élus Le Pen Marine Speech 
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MOVIMENTO SOCIALE ITALIANO (26)31 
Year Document Name Author Type 
1978 Intervista sull'Eurodestra Almirante Giorgio Interview book 
1978 Programma Eurodestra MSI Programme 
1979 Programma Nazionale 1979 MSI Programme 
1979 XII Congresso Napoli 5-7 ottobre 1979 MSI 
Congress 
motions (2):32 
Continuare per 
rinnovare 
(Almirante, 
Romualdi), 
Linea Futura 
(Rauti)  
1979 Intervista sull'Europa Romualdi Pino Interview book 
1979 Programme Europee 1979 MSI Programme 
1980 Il MSI dalla A alla zeta MSI Pamphlet 
1981 Atlantismo non servile Romualdi Pino Article 
1981 Le nostre radici Romualdi Pino Article 
1982 
XIII Congresso - Roma, 18-21 febbraio 
1982 MSI 
Congress 
motions (3): 
Nuova 
Repubblica 
(Almirante), 
Spazio Nuovo 
’82 (Rauti), 
Destra ’80 
(Romualdi) 
1983 Programma MSI Programme 
1984 
XIV Congresso - Roma 29 novembre - 2 
dicembre 1984 MSI 
Congress motion 
(1) 
1985 L'Europa dei prefissi  Mantovani Cesare Article 
1985 Ma la scelta è politica Mantovani Cesare Article 
1986 La Turchia e la Comunità Europea Mollicone Nazareno Article 
 
31 Congress documents are counted as a single document, however, the number of Congress motions varies 
between the different congresses. The number and title of motions is specified in parenthesis under the 
section ‘Type’ 
32 For further information on the number of votes received by each motion, see Tarchi 1997: 62. 
209 
 
1986 Voglia d'Europa Romualdi Pino Article 
1987 Programma Politica Estera MSI Programme 
1987 
XV Congresso - Sorrento, 11-14 
dicembre 1987 MSI 
Congress 
motions (6): 
Andare Oltre 
(Rauti), Destra in 
movimento 
(Fini), Impegno 
Unitario 
(Servillo), 
Proposta Italia 
(Mennitti), 
Destra Italiana 
(Romualdi), 
Nuove 
Prospettive 
(Tremaglia) 
1988 
Alla logica della moneta  opporremo 
storia e cultura MSI Article 
1989 L’Europa riscopre le radici Urso Adolfo Article 
1990 
XVI Congresso - Rimini, 11-14 gennaio 
1990 MSI 
Congress 
motions (6): 
Destra in 
movimento 
(Fini), Andare 
Oltre (Rauti), 
Impegno 
Unitario 
(Servillo), 
Proposta Italia 
(Mennitti), 
Nuove 
Prospettive 
(Tremaglia), 
Destra Italiana 
(Lo Porto) 
1991 Tante incognite nel futuro dell'Europa Petronio Franco Article 
1992 Programma nazionale 1992 MSI Programme 
1993 La crisi politica travolge Maastricht Gasparri Maurizio Article 
1993 Nuova Europa e chi se ne è accorto Toppi Paolo Article 
1994 
XVII Congresso - Roma, 28-30 gennaio 
1994 MSI 
Congress 
motions (1) 
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ALLEANZA NAZIONALE (21) 
Year Document Name Author Type 
1994 Alleanza Nazionale Programma Politiche AN Programme 
1994 Alleanza Nazionale Programmae Europee AN Euromanifesto 
1995 Congresso Fiuggi, 25-27 Gennaio 1995 AN Congress motion 
1996 Destra vuol dire Europa Tremaglia, Mirko Article 
1997 In Europa ci andremo da turisti Malgieri, Gennaro Article 
1997 Euroconservatori Crescono Respinti, Marco Article 
1998 Tesi conferenza programmatica di Verona AN 
Programmatic 
conference 
1999 Manifesto elezioni europee AN Euromanifesto 
2000 
Valori ed idee senza compromessi –
Manifesto dei valori AN Manifesto 
2000 Rapporti piu’ chiari con l’UE Alemanno, Gianni Article 
2001 Tesi Seconda conferenza programmatica AN 
Programmatic 
conference 
2002 Fini: vogliamo un’Europa dei popoli Parlato, Lucilla Interview 
2002 E sarà patria anche la casa Europea Chiggio, Rolando Article 
2002 
Tesi II congresso: Vince la patria, nasce 
l’Europa AN Congress motion 
2003 La via maestra per la nuova Europa Armani, Pietro Article 
2004 Manifesto elezioni europee AN Euromanifesto 
2005 Se il sogno Europeo diventa incubo Selva, Gustavo Article 
2006 
L’Europa straordinaria armonia fra 
diversità Perdizzi, Riccardo Article 
2007 Una conferma europea per le tesi di AN Alemanno, Gianni Article 
2008 Quest’Europa poco amata dagli europei Carrino, Agostino Article 
2009 Mozione III Congresso AN Congress motion 
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APPENDIX C: SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
 
 
An Excel file containing the full list of documents forming the corpus was made available 
to examiners. A shared folder containing scanned copies of the documents selected for 
in-depth analysis was also provided to them. 
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